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This thesis examines the physical effects of human emotion and the mind through 
selected texts written by the Shelley circle, including P. B. Shelley, Mary Shelley, and Lord 
Byron. Emotion is a significant variable that dominates human existence. For this reason, the 
concept of emotion continues to intrigue numerous scientists working today in the fields of 
neuroscience, psychology, biology, and even robotics. With the rise of neuroscientific or 
cognitive approaches, the materiality of the mind has also been increasingly discussed in 
literary studies. Critics, including Alan Richardson, Noel Jackson, and Richard Holmes, 
revisit the mind and English Romanticism drawing on various scientific perspectives. Other 
critics, such as Adela Pinch, Thomas Pfau, and Richard C. Sha, have also reflected on 
emotional studies and Romanticism. Finding affinities with this kind of approach, recently 
defined as ‘cognitive historicism’, my thesis explores the legacy of eighteenth-century mental 
philosophy and science in the Shelley circle, 1812-1821. I argue that the Shelley circle’s 
scientific understanding of the mind and emotion is influenced by the materialism, 
empiricism, and aesthetics prevalent in the eighteenth century, which come into their own in 
the Romantic period to prefigure our current scientific understanding of emotion.  
Chapter One surveys the Shelley circle’s preoccupation with emotion and science and 
how this is manifest, to varying degrees, in a wide range of critical responses to Frankenstein 
and writings of other members of the group during this period. During the course of this 
critical survey I develop the concept of the ‘materiality of emotion’, which is used in 
subsequent chapters to re-examine the Shelley circle’s scientific philosophy and how it is 
represented in literary texts written by the group. Chapter Two argues that Shelley develops 
his views of the mind through his atheistic and materialist reasoning. This materialist thinking 
of the mind in Queen Mab exerts a seminal influence on how the Shelley circle thought about 
the workings of human emotion. Chapter Three focuses on Mary Shelley and contemporary 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scientific debates to suggest that the representation of the 
mechanism of the body in Frankenstein points to the intricate relations between the 
mechanisms of the mind and emotion and offers a means to heal the schism between French 
materialism and vitalism. Chapter Four investigates the depiction of emotional effects on the 
mind in Byron’s Manfred and Shelley’s Alastor. Both poets draw on scientific reasoning and 
imagination to come to terms with grief, the failure of love, and the loss of ideals. Chapter 
Five claims that Shelley’s Frankenstein meditates on the effects of physiological elements of 
the beautiful and the ugly, as well as emotional responses to the sublime science. My final 
chapter draws on cultural history and gender theory to interpret Byron’s Don Juan (Canto One) 
and Shelley’s Epipsychidion in an attempt to reaffirm the beautiful and the sublime in their 
materialist concept of love or sexuality.  
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PREFACE 
Neuroscientific or ‘Cognitive Historicism’, advocated by critics, such as George Lakoff, 
Alan Richardson, and Lisa Zunshine, is an emerging approach that has brought science to the 
fore of British Romantic studies. In addition to Richardson, Noel Jackson and Richard 
Holmes also draw on British Romanticism, science, and the mind. A discourse of emotions, in 
my inquiries into Romantic studies, draws on research by Adela Pinch, Thomas Pfau, and 
Richard C. Sha. My interest in science and emotion is, therefore, contextualised in these 
scientific and aesthetic trends and especially focused on English Romanticism, as well as its 
legacy of long eighteenth-century philosophy and science. This concept of science was 
defined earlier by eighteenth-century philosophers, for example Isaac Watts (1674-1748). In 
his Logic, Watts applies science to ‘a whole body of regular or methodical observations or 
propositions, … concerning any subject of speculation’ (II.ii.§9).1 According to The Oxford 
English Dictionary, the term ‘science’ referred to a ‘state or fact of knowing’ and more broadly 
as systematised forms of ‘knowledge’ since the fourteenth century. By the eighteenth century 
science is defined as a set of ‘trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth within its own 
domain’ from the eighteenth century onwards.2 The concept of ‘natural philosophy’ that was 
widely used in the eighteenth century approximates our contemporary understanding of 
science and included studies akin to physics, biology, chemistry, and neuroscience. 
Indebted to current neuroscience, my concept of emotion is discussed in the context of 
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materialist science in dialogue with literature, science, history, and philosophy. Currently, 
neuroscience comprises psychology, biology, medicine, computer science, and other 
intelligence-related disciplines, all of which connect the nervous system to the mind and 
essentially advocate the materiality of the mind. Materialist philosophy fundamentally 
underpins much of these scientific approaches. In addition to early Greek philosophy, 
Newtonian mechanistic concepts were grounded in the work of earlier philosophers, 
including Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes. By the advent of eighteenth-century 
philosophy of the mind this mechanical world view focused its reflections on the 
psychological domain. 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein forms the central text of my thesis and has been discussed 
from a variety of critical discourses. Frankenstein is used to reflect on Mary Shelley and the 
Shelley circle’s preoccupation with sciences and the human mind. This novel is regarded as a 
microcosm of eighteenth-century intellectual history. I adopt a materialist view to examine 
the significance of the human mind and emotion within the Shelley circle. This physical 
concern with human ‘feelings’ was initially emphasised by Percy Bysshe Shelley in his 
Preface and Introduction to Frankenstein. The Shelley circle, comprised of Shelley, Mary 
Shelley, and Lord Byron, first gathered in the summer of 1816 and found their mutual 
sympathies centred on debates about atheism, materialism, empiricism, and aesthetics. My 
thesis shows that these concerns are not only present in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, but 
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form important preoccupations of works written by Byron and Shelley. I articulate this shared 
philosophical interests of the Shelley circle through what is conceived of in this thesis as the 
‘materiality of emotion’. 
My introductory chapter, ‘Beyond Literature and Science: The Turn to Emotion in the 
Shelley Circle’, focuses on the issue of emotion and explains how my concept of the 
‘materiality of emotion’ permeates the Shelley circle’s works. This chapter demonstrates not 
merely this circle’s understanding of the mind and emotion, but situates my argument in the 
terrain of recent critical interpretations of Romanticism and science, as well as those distinct 
literary discourses taken up in relation to Frankenstein. The philosophy of emotion in 
Frankenstein is conceived of here as this circle’s central concern. This concept of emotion is 
traced back to Byron’s and Shelley’s early works and through to their later fascination with 
the relationship between the power of reasoning and emotion. The summer of 1816, when 
Frankenstein was engendered by a ghost-story contest, is the climax of this circle’s collective 
focus on the significance of emotion and the mind. A wide range of criticism on Frankenstein 
has explored the significance of emotion and how it is expressed through physicality. 
Psychoanalysis, gender studies, post-colonialism, and Gothic readings have all reinforced the 
concept of emotion even though the science of emotion has not been a key term used in their 
critical approaches to fear, anger, terror, anxiety, or grief in the novel. Historical, 
philosophical, and scientific studies on Frankenstein are taken into consideration in my 
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discussion of the ‘materiality of emotion’. Influenced by long eighteenth-century science, as 
well as philosophy of the mind, Frankenstein became an important text central to the 
intellectual conversations, within the Shelley circle, about science and emotion. 
In Chapter Two, ‘The Science of the Mind: Shelley’s Queen Mab (1813)’, I argue that 
Shelley develops his own views of the mind through his atheistic and materialist reasoning. 
Shelley’s Queen Mab, regarded as his first major poetic work, interrogates a number of 
materialist issues by representing and exploring various proposed ideas about the mechanisms 
of the mind. In Queen Mab, Shelley revisits his early radical views and employs scientific 
reason to criticise monarchy, government, and religion under the guise of a fairytale or 
romance tale. The concept of Shelley’s ‘science of mind’ affirms a scientific worldview and 
the importance of scientific education. Queen Mab’s instruction to Ianthe’s mind helps to 
explain Shelley’s beliefs about this form of cognitive education. This investigation of 
materialist thinking about the mind in Queen Mab exerts a seminal influence on the Shelley 
circle and anticipates Shelley’s ultimate concern with the attainment of earthly happiness. 
Chapter Three, ‘New Materialism: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818)’, aims to bridge 
the gap between French materialism and vitalism or metaphysics from a perspective of 
emotion. The authorship of Frankenstein is a contentious issue, but increasingly the work has 
been attributed to the Shelleys rather than the sole authorship of Mary Shelley.3 Aside from 
inquiries into Frankenstein’s manuscripts for clues as to its authorship, this claim is further 
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supported by Shelley’s intellectual and poetic preoccupation with materialist science and 
emotion. Playing a critical role in the Shelley circle’s philosophical discussions, Frankenstein 
combines diverse experiments of science, philosophy, and literature with debates about the 
human mind. Akin to the materialist perspective in Queen Mab, Frankenstein emphasises 
scientific ethics and (via philosophical inquiries) those intricate relations between emotion, 
lived existence, and vitality. The vitalist/materialist debate between John Abernethy and 
William Lawrence was a critical event that instigated the Shelley circle’s reassessment of 
materialism and metaphysics, as well their own ideas about scientific research and spiritual 
well-being. This reassessment is understood as a ‘new materialism’ through which the 
Shelleys endeavoured to connect materialist philosophy with the subject of emotion. 
Building on the concepts of previous chapters, Chapter Four, ‘Tracing Emotion: 
Shelley’s Alastor (1816) and Byron’s Manfred (1817)’, investigates the relationship between 
emotion and the mind from a neuroscientific perspective. Shelley’s Alastor and Byron’s 
Manfred, I suggest, demonstrate the similarities between the two poets’ respective 
philosophies of emotion. The frequent conversations between these two poets in the summer 
of 1816 confirm their communal interest in the mind and emotion. Byron’s Manfred, written 
soon after he left the Shelleys for Italy, provides the counterpart for Shelley’s Alastor. Byron 
and Shelley employ scientific reasoning to understand emotion, especially grief that derives 
from a self confronted by the failure of love. Byron’s and Shelley’s allegorical language not 
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only echoes eighteenth-century materialism and empiricism, but prefigures twentieth- and 
twenty-first century neuroscience and genetics. This physiological explanation of emotion is 
again heightened in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. 
Chapter Five, ‘A Storm of the Mind: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818)’, points to the 
influence of physical appearances on human emotion. Echoing eighteenth-century aesthetics 
and physiognomy, the Shelleys represent and interrogate physiological elements of the 
beautiful and the ugly, as well as emotional responses to the sublime and science. As Shelley 
emphasises the human mind and feelings as the central concern in Frankenstein, a number of 
terms relating to emotion are also described in this novel. Shelley’s early poetic quest for 
mystic science or vitality and a lost self, especially in Alastor, was revived in Frankenstein. 
Frankenstein, however, more openly expresses the sublime aspects of science and the 
agitated state of mind caused by this galvanic experimentation. In this chapter, my discussion 
of the contrast between the beautiful and the ugly is eventually aligned with ideas about the 
physicality of emotion. I discover that Frankenstein articulates the subtle connection between 
physical beauty and emotion and this aesthetic concern finds an affinity with those sublime 
aspects of science and cosmetic surgery. 
My final chapter, ‘Seeking Love: Byron’s Don Juan (1819) and Shelley’s Epipsychidion 
(1821)’, argues that Byron and Shelley demonstrate their distinct philosophy of love in Canto 
One of Don Juan and Epipsychidion. After Shelley was reunited with Byron in Venice in the 
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autumn of 1818, there are evident distinctive approaches in their poetic and philosophical 
treatment of emotion. Distinct from their poetic dialogues in Alastor and Manfred, Shelley 
wrote Epipsychidion to express his idealistic philosophy of love and this differs from Byron’s 
hedonistic pursuit of love in Don Juan. Drawing on cultural history and gender studies, in 
particular queer theory, this chapter explores love as a transcendental force for happiness in 
these two poetic works. This philosophy, I claim, challenges orthodox views of love and 
suggestively liberates sexual desire in the form of homosexuality and extramarital affairs. 
This materiality of love returns to the ‘aesthetic’ or emotional context of the beautiful and the 
sublime. Byron and Shelley, as do current queer critics, demonstrate the necessity of sexuality 
in their pursuit of love despite the differences in their later philosophies of love, desire, and 
the mind. 
With a greater understanding of current scientific developments in neuroscience and 
beautology, my thesis revisits key debates in the history and literature of science. The Shelley 
circle’s Romantic texts are connected with science and emotion of their own day and with 
later scientific developments. My thesis pursues the possibility of secular humanistic science 
and technological redemption, through cognitive or neuroscientific historicism, to reflect on 
the inter-relations between immediate beautology (e.g., cosmetic surgery), emotional science 
(e.g., on grief and terror), categories of beauty (e.g., social mobility and resource distributions), 
and the pursuit of happiness (e.g., love). All in all, these scientific and philosophical 
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developments of the mind and emotion are indebted to the philosophical and scientific 




















                                                 
1 See ‘Science’, def. 1a, 4a, The Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 ed., Web, 23 Nov. 2010. 
Hereafter ‘S’. 
2 See ‘S’. 
3 Whilst recognising that the writing of Frankenstein was a collaborative enterprise between 
Mary and Percy Bysshe Shelley, for ease of reference the novel will be subsequently referred to 
as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. For further details, see Note 9 to my Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Beyond Literature and Science: The Turn to Emotion in the Shelley Circle 
The Shelley circle shared an interest in contemporary science and philosophy of the 
mind and these concerns are reflected in their writings. The eighteenth-century scientific and 
philosophical legacy bequeathed to the Shelleys
1
 and Byron fuelled their interests in the 
science and the emotions. Recently critics, including Alan Richardson, Noel Jackson, and 
Richard Holmes, have reread British Romanticism through its various scientific 
understandings of the mind.
2
 Richardson and Jackson contend that these concepts of both the 
mind and sensation are evident in the writings of William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, and John Keats. Alternatively, Adela Pinch, Thomas Pfau, and Richard C. Sha 
foreground the significance of the emotions in British Romanticism.
3
 Pinch investigates the 
history of emotion in relation to empiricism and aesthetics from the late eighteenth century to 
the early English Romantic period, identifying those theories of emotion at work in British 
writers, such as Wordsworth and Jane Austen. Pfau‘s literary discussion of emotions focuses 
instead on Godwin, Wordsworth, and Keats. Sha and Richardson explore sexuality and 
aesthetics (the sublime) in relation to the biology of emotion and forbidden love in English 
Romanticism.
4
 This issue of physiology or neurology of the mind and emotion was first 
discussed in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy, but recent literary critics have taken an 
increasing interest in this emergent discourse.
5
 Despite some affinities between my study and 
                                                                             
 2 
this work on emotion and the mind, few literary critics extensively examine the texts of the 
Shelley circle and its scientific philosophy of emotion.
6
  
My readings focus on texts produced by this circle in the period from 1812 to 1821 and 
how they were influenced by scientific understanding and philosophy. For example, Shelley‘s 
Queen Mab (1813) exhibits his initial engagement with philosophical debates and fascination 
with scientific explanations of the mind and emotion. The summer of 1816, however, marked 
a turning-point in the Shelley circle‘s collective preoccupation with these theories of the mind 
and intensified them. This important year saw the genesis of Frankenstein (first published in 
1818),
7
 a work renowned for drawing on scientific explorations of emotion. Shelley‘s own 
interest in emotion is reflected in his comment on Frankenstein: ‗This novel rests its claim on 
being a source of powerful and profound emotion. The elementary feelings of the human 
mind are exposed to view …‘.8 This issue became central among the Shelleys in 
conversation and as dramatised by the poetic and philosophical dialogue between Shelley‘s 
Alastor (1816) and Byron‘s Manfred (1817), as well as later between Byron‘s Don Juan 
Canto I (1819) and Shelley‘s Epipsychidion (1821). These ‗feelings of the human mind‘ go to 
the very heart of the Promethean theme in Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein, which also testifies 
to the Shelleys‘ shared fascination with scientific accounts of the mind and emotion.9 Critics 
have examined this novel from a wide range of critical perspectives in an attempt to articulate 
its engagement with a diverse body of literary, philosophical, and scientific knowledge. This 
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is reflected in Lee Sterrenburgh‘s remarks that Frankenstein represents the dynamic 
variations of its own textual meaning and Berthold Schoene-Harwood‘s observation that 
‗[Mary] Shelley‘s metaphor was never confined to any one single historical event or 
socio-political circumstance‘, but becomes ‗almost infinitely malleable‘.10      
     Drawing on Romanticism, emotion, and the science of the mind in the eighteenth 
century,
11
 my thesis employs the concept of the ‗materiality of emotion‘ to explore further 
the issue of ‗feelings of the human mind‘ (‗OF‘, 185) in British Romanticism. For my 
purposes, I define emotion as an integration of traditional concepts of ‗feeling‘ with more 
recent psychological definitions, which extend to a state of mind. According to The 
Encyclopædia Britannica, ‗emotion‘ is produced in ‗[t]he limbic lobe, including the 
hippocampus‘, and this ‗intense feeling‘ depending on the stimulated ‗regions of the temporal 
lobes‘ refers to fear, isolation, disgust, sorrow, ecstasy, or guilt.12 In order to incorporate 
emotion into the context of materialist science and to develop my concept of the ‗materiality 
of emotion‘, I conceive of emotion as a mental phenomenon which changes with the level of 
electrochemical substance in the brain. More precisely, then, emotion is a series of brain 
activities agitated by outer sense stimuli or inner neural memories. The outer factors come 
from the physical surroundings, and the inner factors (such as the mechanism of association) 
are determined by electrochemical transmissions of neurons, including the imagination.
13
 In 
a traditional psychological definition, emotion, according to The Oxford English Dictionary, 
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is ‗[a] mental ―feeling‖ or ―affection‖ (e.g. of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, surprise, 
hope or fear, etc.), as distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of consciousness‘.14 In 
her study of emotions, Pinch ‗tend[s] to use ―passion,‖ ―emotion,‖ and ―feeling‖ almost 
interchangeably‘ (SFP, 16). According to The Oxford English Dictionary, emotion is a noun 
‗of action‘ derived from ‗ē-movē-re‘ in French, which combines ‗out‘ and ‗to move‘.15 The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary traces the etymology of ‗emotion‘ to 1579 in ‗Middle French, 
from emouvoir to stir up, from Old French esmovoir, from Latin emovēre to remove, displace, 
from e- + movēre to move‘.16 In empiricism and aesthetics, emotion is associated with 
agitations in a physical and societal sense. In John Locke‘s Education (1692), emotion refers 
to ‗[a] moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation (in physical sense)‘.17 In British aesthetics, 
Joseph Addison (1672-1719) and Edmund Burke (1729-1792) tend to regard emotion as ‗[a] 
political or social agitation‘ or ‗a tumult, popular disturbance‘.18 Other British philosophers 
and writers working on the mind, for example Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667), Richard Steele 
(1672-1729), Lord Kames (1696-1782), Thomas Reid (1710-1796), and Walter Scott 
(1771-1832), associate emotion with ‗[a]ny agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion‘ 
or ‗any vehement or excited mental state‘.19  
My concept of ‗materiality‘ is closely aligned to matter. ‗[M]atter‘, according to The 
Oxford English Dictionary, refers to ‗physical substance as distinct from spirit, mind, 
qualities, actions, etc.‘20 In certain philosophical debates, terms such as ‗spirit‘, ‗soul‘, 
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‗mind‘, or even ‗language‘ per se are no longer distinct from matter or materiality. In An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke points up debates of ‗the Soul‘s 
Materiality‘.21 Equally, in St. Irvyne (1811), Shelley enquires into the close relationship 
between ‗human nature‘ and ‗materiality‘.22 In ‗On the Nature of Virtue‘ (1816), Shelley 
emphasises what I understand as the concept of the ‗materiality of emotion‘, when he argues 
that ‗emotions‘ derive from human ‗nature‘ and are caused directly by physiological instincts: 
‗The immediate emotions of his [man‘s] nature, especially in its most inartificial (sic) state, 
prompt him to inflict pain, and to arrogate dominion‘ [emphasis added] (qtd. in ER 56). 
Subsequently, Charles Darwin pursued a scientific origin of emotion expounded in his The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) and William James, founder of 
modern experimental psychology, also examined emotion in the context of materiality.
23
 In 
his The Principles of Psychology (1890), James affirms: ‗Now the general causes of the 
emotions are indubitably physiological‘ (PP, 1065). Notably, Darwin‘s and James‘s 
physiological investigations into the mind were built upon eighteenth-century empiricist 
aesthetics and previous philosophies of the mind, which remain evident in our current studies 
of the mind and emotion.  
Integrated with ‗materiality‘ and scientific ideas of emotion, my concept of emotion 
relates to the operations of the mind or the levels of neurotransmitters which dominate human 
internal feelings as well as external behaviour. Such behaviour or facial expressions are 
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My own approach finds a context in the emergent discourse of neuroscience in recent 
long-eighteenth-century studies,
25
 but also focuses on close textual readings alert to the 
writer‘s sensibility to these issues in his or her work. Whilst new historicism and cultural 
historicism explore the significant connections between the present and past, a cognitive or 
neuroscientific historicism draws on early brain studies, philosophical, and literary texts. For 
example George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in their Metaphors We Live By (1980), re-read 
literary works and the history of their reception from a cognitive scientific perspective.
26
 
Even so, the ‗cognitive revolution‘, as Richardson puts it, started in the 1950s and triggered 
interdisciplinary dialogues between cognitive science and the humanities.
27
 Like literary 
critics who focus on the legacy of the eighteenth century in Romanticism,
28
 Richardson – 
echoing Ellen Spolsky, Mary Crane, Lisa Zunshine, and F. Elizabeth Hart – strives to 
establish ‗Cognitive Historicism‘ as a discipline and has developed his early engagement with 
the eighteenth-century science of the mind and British Romanticism.
29
 Sensitive to this 
paradigm shift, I re-examine the Shelley circle‘s works and its philosophy from the 
perspective of what I have termed as the ‗materiality of emotion‘. 
In my readings of Frankenstein and the poetic works of Byron and Shelley, drawing on 
this concept of the ‗materiality of emotion‘, I reassess the interactions between the self and 
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the physical world. Numerous studies have touched on the complexity of human emotion in 
Frankenstein even if critics have not emphasised the term ‗emotion‘ in their examination of 
the relationship between the novel, science and philosophy in the long eighteenth century. In 
spite of some critical interest in representations of emotion in Frankenstein, critics often 
choose instead to foreground social or political issues within the text. Generally, these critical 
discourses articulate the negative aspects of emotion centred on the repression of gender, 
class, and race. Such critical perspectives on Frankenstein neglect a thorough examination of 
the centrality of emotion and its relationship to materialism in the novel. 
     With its subtitle of the ‗Modern Prometheus‘, Frankenstein reflects the collective spirit 
of the Shelleys and typifies this circle‘s concern (including Byron‘s) with a Promethean 
theme. The encounter between Shelley and Byron in Switzerland in the summer of 1816 
signals a significant intellectual reciprocity between the two poets and their shared 
fascination with human emotion. Llewellyn M. Buell notes that Byron wrote ‗Prometheus‘ in 
July 1816 and this influenced his own writing of Manfred and Shelley‘s Prometheus 
Unbound.
30
 Shelley‘s ‗Hymn to Intellectual Beauty‘, re-written on the Continent during that 
significant summer, presumably also spoke of his intellectual friendship with Byron.
31
 Their 
regular conversations at Lake Geneva testify to their further concern about human emotion 
and its place in physical or materialist discourse.  
Both Shelley and Byron avowed unorthodox world views.
32
 Shelley‘s interest in 
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emotion is manifest in his first published work – a Gothic romance entitled Zastrozzi: A 
Romance (1810) – where he writes: 
          But sympathy and congeniality of sentiment, however necessary to that love 
which calms every fierce emotion, fills the soul with a melting tenderness, and 
without disturbing it continually possesses the soul, was by no means consonant 
to the ferocious emotions …. [Emphasis added]33 
Similar to Greek and Shakespearean tragedies, which Shelley knew well, Zastrozzi examines 
uncontrollable emotions such as envy, rage, and passion. This young Shelley depicts 
emotions of love and the workings of ‗emotions‘ in the ‗soul‘ through an image of ‗melting 
tenderness‘ (Z, 68). This fascination with the mystery of the soul later led Shelley to further 
scientific studies of the mind. 
In his first major work – Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem (1813) – to advocate 
reason and a philosophy of the mind, Shelley demonstrates his radical ideas both in the main 
text and the Notes in an attempt to celebrate the full freedom of human nature.
34
 A similar 
kind of pursuit reappears later in his poem, Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude (1816). Charles 
E. Robinson notes the influence of Alastor on Byron‘s Manfred (1817).35 Manfred was 
started in the later summer of 1816 after the dispersal of this circle in Switzerland on 20 
August 1816. The poetic debate staged between Manfred and Alastor is also re-imagined in 
Shelley‘s Julian and Maddolo: A Conversation, written soon after Shelley was reunited with 
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Byron in Venice in August of 1818. This philosophical debate relates to Byron‘s scepticism 
and Shelley‘s idealism, which also re-emerges in a later poetic dialogue between Byron‘s Don 
Juan and Shelley‘s Epipsychidion. My own argument singles out the issue of ‗emotion and 
science‘ as its starting-point and, through a discussion of Frankenstein and poetic works by 
Byron and Shelley, identifies the Shelley circle‘s ultimate aspiration to the attainment of 
happiness. In so doing, my thesis traces the intricate connections between the mind, emotions, 
self-quest, physical beauty, and love in the thinking of the Shelley circle between 1812 and 
1821. 
     More significantly, I trace affinities between scientific discussions of emotion and 
philosophies of feelings and sensibilities in my critical readings of Frankenstein and other 
related poems by Shelley and Byron. My approach is alert to the influence of the 
Enlightenment legacy of philosophical and scientific discourse on Romanticism. The Gothic 
tradition and scientific experiment clearly fascinated the reader in Shelley‘s own time as 
much as it has later audiences. The mystery of emotional agitations in the mind or the self 
becomes the key issue for many of the texts written by the Shelleys. Shelley, for instance, 
endeavoured to understand ‗the unseen world‘ or the principle of emotions in his poetry as he 
does, for instance, in Epipsychidion.
36
 This renewed critical focus on emotion and its 
representation produces new ways of reading Frankenstein. The Preface to Frankenstein, 
commonly assumed to be written by Shelley,
37
 notes that great works (such as The Iliad, 
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Shakespeare‘s The Tempest and Midsummer Night’s Dream, and Milton‘s Paradise Lost) 
consist of complex ‗human feeling‘ and that part of the motivation for writing is to ‗exercis[e] 
any untried resources of mind‘.38 This sense of ‗human feeling‘ closely relates to human 
emotion in the Shelleys‘ own time. In David Hume‘s discussion of passions, Pinch notes that 
feelings derive from emotions, such as hatred and love, and can dominate the individual‘s 
mind: 
He [Hume] stresses that the claims of individuals are subordinate to the feelings 
that visit them from without: ―Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth 
and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from 
my own natural temper and disposition.‖ (SFP, 1) 
Shelley‘s own writing and thinking influenced those descriptions of emotion throughout 
Frankenstein. According to Joseph Barrell, Shelley‘s Queen Mab focuses on ‗emotionalism‘ 
in search of an ideal society.
39
 One direct influence on Frankenstein would have derived 
from Mary Shelley‘s discussions with Shelley and her own reading of his Queen Mab on 6 
October 1814.
40
 Other contemporary discourses on emotion also helped to shape 
Frankenstein. The works of Locke and Hume provided the Shelleys with both rich 
background knowledge and details for their narrative depiction of the ‗materiality of emotion‘. 
Examining ‗Sciences of the Mind‘, Laura Otis points out that nineteenth-century mental 
physiologists were greatly indebted to Locke and Hume, but the study of the mind did not 
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become a new branch of philosophy until the 1830s with the advent of philosophers like 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) and George Henry Lewes (1817-1878).
41
 Both of them 
contributed to scientific discussion about ‗neurophysiology to develop their theories of mind‘ 
(‗SoM‘, 325). It is striking that later scientific investigations into the emotions were 
pre-empted by eighteenth-century aesthetics, physiognomy, and empiricist science. 
Frankenstein is both of its own historical context and a text which encapsulates our 
own contemporary discussion of human emotions. In their own time, the Shelleys were 
successors to the sentimentalism of Mary Shelley‘s parents, William Godwin and Mary 
Wollstonecraft. Godwin‘s style in Fleetwood; or, The New Man of Feeling (1805)42 exerted a 
considerable influence on Frankenstein, as Marilyn Butler argues: 
          But Mary‘s [Mary Shelley‘s] great debt intellectually and emotionally is 
probably to [Godwin‘s] St Leon (1799), which anticipates Frankenstein‘s themes 
of science and gender, its plot, and its central figure: in both novels, a selfish 
intellectual trades domestic happiness and marital love for the chimaeras of 
scientific knowledge, success, and power.
43
  
William D. Brewer, in his The Mental Anatomies of William Godwin and Mary Shelley (2001), 
reaffirms the influence of Godwin‘s mental philosophy on Mary Shelley as well as 
Frankenstein: ‗Mary Shelley praises her father‘s ability to project himself into his novels‘ 
characters in order to anatomize ―their secret hearts [mental activity]‖‘.44 In ‗Philosophical 
                                                                             
 12 
and Literary Sources of Frankenstein‘ (1965), Burton R. Pollin argues that when 
understanding the complexity of Frankenstein, ‗Shelley knew, better than any one else, how 
richly varied were the works of literature and philosophy reflected in the novel‘.45 
Schoene-Harwood goes on to note that Frankenstein‘s legacy is ‗the literary and 
philosophical heritage of the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and the French Revolution, as 
well as Europe‘s deep-rooted cultural indebtedness‘ to both ‗classical mythology and the 
Bible‘ (MSFRG, 30). Eighteenth-century studies of the ‗science of man‘, sentimentalism, and 
aesthetics also precisely bear on Frankenstein in relation to its treatment of emotion. 
     Since 1817, Frankenstein has attracted a wealth of critical responses, both positive and 
negative. The earliest review, written by Shelley, entitled ‗On Frankenstein‘ (1817), was 
posthumously published in The Athenæum Journal of Literature, Science and the Fine Arts 
on 10 November 1832.
46
 Surprisingly, positive reviews appeared in the Quarterly Review 
(1818), Edinburgh Magazine (1818), Gentleman’s Magazine (1818), and Knight’s Quarterly 
(1824).
47
 Dissenting from the praise Frankenstein received from Thomas Love Peacock and 
Walter Scott, the Tory Quarterly Review condemned the novel as the text of ‗a man who 
perverts his ingenuity and knowledge to the attacking of all that is ancient and venerable in 
our civil and religious institutions‘.48 This condemnation from the Quarterly Review did not 
appear in the review on Frankenstein, in January 1818, but in a note on the review on Leigh 
Hunt‘s Foliage: ‗At Eton we remember him [covertly, Shelley] notorious for setting fire to 
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old trees with burning glasses.…‘49 This novel in the eyes of the Tory Quarterly Review, 
‗inculcat[ed] no lesson of conduct, manners, or morality‘.50 
However, the Shelleys were concerned more with the dynamics of human emotions and 
less with moral codes. Like the emphasis on emotion in his review, Shelley, in the Preface to 
Frankenstein, emphasises the significance of ‗human nature‘ (‗FP‘, 5). This sense of ‗human 
nature‘ is closely related to human emotions. In this Preface, Shelley points out that the 
primary intention of writing Frankenstein is to link ‗a physical fact‘ – about which the author 
was particularly enlightened by Erasmus Darwin and some German physiological writers – to 
‗the elementary principles of human nature‘ (‗FP‘, 5). This reveals that the Shelleys linked 
physicality to the human mind. Shelley emphasised that Frankenstein was intended to 
awaken the reader to ‗the working[s] of passion out of passion‘ and ‗[t]he elementary feelings 
of the human mind … exposed to view …‘ (‗OF‘, 185). More notably, in the novel, the 
Shelleys catalogue a spectrum of human emotion both positive and negative and make 
reference to sensations, the mind, feelings, and emotions.
51
 With the accumulation of 
eighteenth-century scientific knowledge (empiricism, aesthetics, physiognomy), the mystery 
of ‗human nature‘ was of interest to writers and those philosophers of the ‗mind‘. In the 
eighteenth century, the ‗science of man‘ was specifically a study of human emotions.  
Biographically centred criticism further affirms an interconnection between 
Frankenstein and the interests of the wider Shelley circle. Pollin argues that in June 1816 ‗… 
                                                                             
 14 
many ideas [in Frankenstein] were being exchanged by the group of five: Byron, his callow 
physician, Dr. John Polidori, Shelley, Mary, and her step-sister, Jane Clairmont‘ (‗PLSF‘, 98). 
In her 1993 Introduction to Frankenstein, Butler notes that these concepts of the human mind 
were derived from ‗Shelley‘s reading in Berkeley and Hume‘ and other ‗traditions of thinking 
about mind‘ and shared in the conversations between Shelley and his physician, William 
Lawrence (‗BIF‘, xvii ). Holmes details the 1815 encounter between Lawrence and Shelley 
and how later Lawrence‘s materialist ideas were introduced to Shelley: ‗It was also Lawrence, 
with his unusual knowledge of French and German experimental medicine, who helped turn 
the Shelleys‘ joint scientific speculation along a more controversial path‘ (AW, 311).     
Scientific interest in emotion existed early in ancient thought and became a crucial 
issue in the eighteenth century.
52
 In recent years, discussions of emotion and the mind have 
become popular in current studies of neuroscience, psychology, biology, philosophy, and 
medicine. Through his pertinent ideas of interdisciplinarity, Richardson draws together ideas 
about the brain and the mind to conclude: ‗At a time when biological accounts of mind are 
again becoming ascendant, better knowledge of the embodied psychologies of the past may 
provide not just a richer and more accurate history, but a more useful one‘ (BRSM, 185). 
Current scientists endeavour to locate the mechanism of emotion. As a scientific expert on the 
subject of the brain and emotion, Joseph E. LeDoux, for example, conceives of the 
relationship between emotion and memory through cellular and molecular mechanisms.
53
 In 
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The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (1996), LeDoux 
indicates that Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer, American social psychologists, revived 
the discussion of ‗physiological responses in emotion (sweaty palms, rapid heart beat, muscle 
tension)‘ in the early 1960s (EB, 47). Scholars working in the field of emotional science, for 
example Dylan Evans, William Lyons, and Susan A. Greenfield, provide evidence from the 
perspectives of both philosophy of the mind and neuroscience to support those interrelations 
between emotion and materiality speculated about by the Romantics.
54
 Jean Piaget‘s 
cognitive psychology draws on modern psychology and traditional empiricism to examine the 
relationship between the mind and the world.
55
 All of these examples forge a connection 
between the classical philosophy of the mind and cutting-edge neuroscience. Like the Shelley 
circle, these later scientists of emotion are fascinated with the affinity between life, emotion, 
and science. The key difference is that the writers of the Shelley circle regard language as 
intrinsic to the intricate phenomena of human emotion and, ultimately, the meaning of human 
existence and self-identity. This power of language is clearly expressed in the episode from 
Frankenstein when the Monster finds these three works of literature, Paradise Lost, a volume 
of Plutarch’s Lives, and the Sorrows of Werter: 
I [the Monster] can hardly describe to you [Frankenstein] the effect of these 
books. They produced in me an infinity of new images and feelings, that 
sometimes raised me to ecstasy, but more frequently sunk me into the lowest 
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dejection. (F, 86) 
Later in his ‗On Life‘, Shelley re-affirms this close relationship between language and the 
mind: ‗Thoughts and feelings arise, with or without our will, and we employ words to express 
them‘.56 Frankenstein emphasises the Monster‘s sentimental self, as ‗What am I?‘ becomes 
his regular self-interrogation. Science provides biochemical evidence to explain emotion, but 
is still unable entirely to explain the complexity of emotion captured by those descriptions in 
Frankenstein. My concept of the ‗materiality of emotion‘, elaborated in this thesis, aims to 
bridge the gap between Romantic idealism, scientific rationalism, and pragmatism. 
    There is no doubt that enormous critical interest in Frankenstein has grown in recent 
decades. Some influential issues are reflected in recently published casebooks, including 
Johanna M. Smith‘s Frankenstein (2000) and Timothy Morton‘s A Routledge Literary 
Sourcebook on Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (2002).57 Since the 1960s literary scholars 
(including James Rieger, Pollin, M. K. Joseph, Harold Bloom, and Christopher Small) have 
lent academic respectability to Frankenstein through their critical works. In his Afterword to 
Frankenstein (1965), Bloom points to the conflicting ‗emotions‘ between Frankenstein and 
the Monster as ‗the Romantic mythology of the self‘.58 In his Introduction to Frankenstein 
(1969), Joseph demonstrates the relationship between ‗electricity‘ and ‗spiritual love‘ in 
Shelley‘s philosophy and the ‗three concentric layers‘ of narration in Frankenstein, which 
relate to the perspectives of Walton, Frankenstein, and the Monster.
59
 Such layers can be 
                                                                             
 17 
identified with the progressive scheme of natural philosophy, from the outer world to the 
inner world, that is to say, from a ‗man of science‘ to the ‗science of man‘.  
This ‗science of man‘ is the precursor of modern psychology and emotional science. 
Early criticism conjures with the issue of emotions, and my sense of the ‗materiality of 
emotion‘ is reflected in Douglas Bush‘s remark that ‗Berkeley and Newton are met together, 
Plotinus and Edison have kissed each other‘ (qtd. in ‗JIF‘ viii). In 1987, Chris Baldick‘s In 
Frankenstein’s Shadow: Myth, Monstrosity, and Nineteenth-Century Writing reassessed 
Frankenstein as a ‗modern myth‘.60 Baldick‘s valuable contributions to debates about the 
work of Mary Shelley‘s text and the ‗myth of modernism‘ has been built upon by Marc 
Rubenstein, Paul Sherwin, George Levine, Sterrenburg, and Franco Moretti. This revised 
sense of Frankenstein happened to such an extent that, as Anne K. Mellor noted, there ‗is 
rapidly becoming a new critical and scholarly consensus concerning the centrality of Mary 
Shelley‘s novel to our understanding of both the Romantic ―spirit of the age‖ and of literary 
modernism‘.61 Yet this sense of Frankenstein as a ‗modern myth‘ was contested by Mellor‘s 
Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters in 1988. Mellor claims that Baldick‘s 
critical book demonstrates ‗neither a study of influence nor a study of ideology‘ (‗RIFS‘, 193), 
nor explication of ‗a modern myth‘ (‗RIFS‘, 195). 
     In contrast with Baldick‘s mythic interpretation, Fred Botting‘s monograph, Making 
Monstrous: Frankenstein, Criticism, Theory (1991), provides a systematic psychoanalytic 
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reading which challenged traditional readings.
62
 Botting defends Frankenstein as good 
literature by clarifying its ‗unifying motive‘ which Bloom and Sylva Norman had doubted 
(MM, 72). Botting continues that the ‗knowledge of this self‘s intentions, attitudes and 
emotions‘ are central to unifying the text (MM, 73). Additionally, he notes that some critics 
exaggerate gender differences in Frankenstein as ‗[t]he women in Frankenstein rarely speak 
out in voices of discontent and certainly do not clamour for better treatment or equal status‘ 
(MM, 100) and, as a result, in this novel ‗gender relations are not sustained as polar 
oppositions‘ (MM, 101). 
     As a consequence of these diverse literary discourses, Frankenstein has been read more 
recently from the perspectives of gender, science, science fiction, as well as postcolonial and 
cultural studies. In his casebook of Frankenstein (1995), Botting focuses his critical attention 
on the relationship between the text and gothic genre and draws supporting arguments from 
other discourses (politics, feminism, science, psychoanalysis, post-colonialism). A year later, 
J. Paul Hunter‘s casebook of Frankenstein also reflects some of these recent critical trends 
from post-structuralism, gothic genre studies, feminism, science, autobiography, and 
imperialism. Some other influential critics combine feminist approaches with other related 




There have, however, been other more scientifically focused interpretations of 
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Frankenstein which have directly influenced my own approach to the writings of the Shelley 
circle. In 1963, Rieger analysed Frankenstein as expressing an anti-humanist sentiment rather 
than as a work of science fiction. As a refutation to this kind of reading, Joseph argues that 
scientific knowledge from Newton, Volta, Galvani, Erasmus Darwin, and Humphry Davy 
influenced Mary Shelley‘s scientific understanding. Later critics, like Butler and Maurice 
Hindle, also detect the relationship between Frankenstein and this contemporary science. In 
an Introduction to Frankenstein, Hindle discusses Frankenstein in terms of Enlightenment 
thought, science, philosophy, and society. As Hindle suggests, the radical science of 
Frankenstein is derived from Davy‘s ‗electrochemistry‘, empiricism, and galvanism, which 
challenged a traditional theological world view.
64
 By the 1970s Frankenstein was, eventually, 
recognised as a work of ‗science fiction‘, in critical writings by Robert M. Philmus (1970), 
Brian Aldiss (1973), Martin Tropp (1976), and Robert Scholes and Eric S. Rabkin (1977).
65
 
     With the rise of interdisciplinary exchanges between literature and science, 
Frankenstein criticism has, increasingly, detected an affinity between Frankenstein and 
science fiction. The very reason that Frankenstein has been gradually established in academic 
debates about ‗[t]he body, medicine and science‘, according to Morton, is because of those 
Foucauldian readings which ‗deal with issues of materiality and the physical universe‘ (ARLS, 
80). In Morton‘s edited collection of essays on Frankenstein, Marilyn Butler, Tim Marshall, 
Alan Rauch, and Paul Youngquist rethink the novel‘s relation to issues pertaining to the body, 




 Even Theodore Ziolkowski and Ray Hammond emphasise ‗the 
novel‘s representation of scientific irresponsibility and the consequences thereof‘ (ARLS, 
248). These readings share an affinity with those of the late 1970s when Sam N. 
Lehman-Wilzig connected cybernetics with the context of Frankenstein.
67
  
More recently, Donna Haraway‘s influential ‗A Cyborg Manifesto‘ (1991) suggests that 
Frankenstein‘s Monster instigates another more immediate debate about the relationship 
between humans and machines to develop the concept of ‗posthumanism‘.68 As Smith rightly 
observes, scientific readings of the novel develop from the 1970s onwards and link ‗Victor‘s 
science‘ to scientific investigations (Samuel Vasbinder), to ‗Rosicrucian science (Marie 
Roberts), to [D‘]Holbach‘s System of Nature (McWhir), to radical science (Marilyn Butler) 
and Romantic science (Marina Benjamin), and to the debates in Romantic science over 
vitalism and materialism (Maurice Hindle, Martin Willis)‘ (MSFCAT, 248). Regrettably, the 
myth of Frankenstein tends to be interpreted as a scientific allegory of potential scientific 
disasters. Such an ‗insidiously suggestive mode‘, as Schoene-Harwood suggests, permeates 
Hammond‘s The Modern Frankenstein: Fiction Becomes Fact (MSFRG, 155). Bernard E. 
Rollin and Jon Turney continue to read Frankenstein as a scientific metaphor.
69
 Rollin‘s The 
Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals 
(1995) approaches scientific ideology and ethics on animal rights from a philosophical 
perspective without touching on the text or its background. Rollin advocates that genetic 
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engineering ought not to be regarded as a Frankensteinian disaster. Instead, he suggests that 
‗any meaningful attempt to place it under meaningful social control or to orchestrate 
practicable social policies‘ can be unattainable (FS, 4). Notably, the publication of 
Vasbinder‘s study generated fresh interest in Frankenstein and the history of science. In his 
Scientific Attitudes in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1976), Vasbinder complains that 
‗criticism has generally concentrated on the moral fable that Frankenstein represents and has 
ignored the problem of the science as a side issue‘ and argues that ‗[w]ith the emergence of 
speculative fiction as a legitimate area of concern for critics in the academic arena, 
Frankenstein must be evaluated in an entirely new light as an early work of this genre 
[science]‘.70 Vasbinder stresses that ‗[u]nless the critic is well acquainted with the scientific 
matters of the age [the eighteenth century] much of the science that forms the basis of 
Frankenstein will remain invisible‘ (SAMSF, 1).  
This emergent branch of Frankenstein studies rooted in the history of science in the last 
two decades is also represented by Marshall, in Murdering to Dissect: Grave-Robbing, 
Frankenstein, and the Anatomy Literature (1995), who especially emphasises eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century anatomy and related laws as a context in which to read the 1831 
edition of Frankenstein. Marshall‘s study further signposts the close connection between 
Frankenstein and contemporary science. 
In other recent studies, Enlightenment science and philosophy have provided the 
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context of intellectual history in which to examine Frankenstein. Significantly, Botting 
attempts to suture science and literature together to heal the oppositions between science and 
alchemy, art, and humanism. In his discussion of ‗Frankenstein and the Art of Science‘, 
Botting notes that literary critics tend to define science as ‗destructive, irresponsible and 
antisocial‘ (MM, 166) and illuminates the concept of science in that period as ‗a powerful 
force linked with the aspirations and fortunes of enlightened human progress‘ (MM, 169). 
These scientific perspectives signal Frankenstein as a vibrant text rich with 
possibilities for a critical analysis of the relationship between emotion and science. 
Frankenstein studies have become an arena of both science fact and science fiction. Apart 
from feminist, psychoanalytic and gothic perspectives, some critics shift their attention to 
cultural, cyborg, and queer studies. The genre of Gothic and science fiction, in recent years, 
have continued to fascinate critics of Frankenstein, including Bernice M. Murphy (science, 
patriarchy, and violence), Jules Law (gothic violence and virtual reality), R. J. Frost (feminist 
approach in science fiction) and Frank A. J. L James and J. V. Field (Regency period). These 
issues of science and gender have also caught the attention of Mellor (studies of race), Anne 
W. Gilfoil (the role of science) and Andrew Butler (‗homosociality‘ and homosexuality).71 
Often these critics blur the boundary between science and literature. Frankenstein provides 
an inviting platform for readings by those critics who are concerned with the advances of 
science and technology. My own discussion of Frankenstein focuses specifically on 
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eighteenth-century philosophy of emotion and its relation to the Shelley circle‘s scientific 
interests and ideas as represented in this novel. 
     Those textual readings of Frankenstein that see the novel operating in the genre of 
science fiction are akin to the Shelley circle‘s concern with the agitation of human emotion.72 
Denise Gigante, in her ‗Facing the Ugly: The Case of Frankenstein‘ (2000), examines the 
ugly (a kind of lethal outer material to emotion) in eighteenth-century aesthetics (especially 
Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant).
73
 Gigante‘s analysis owes something to Barbara Claire 
Freeman‘s comparison between Kant‘s philosophy and Frankenstein and focuses on the 
influence of eighteenth-century philosophy on Frankenstein. In ‗Frankenstein with Kant: A 
Theory of Monstrosity or the Monstrosity of Theory‘ (1987), Freeman argues that the Kantian 
‗sublime‘ anticipates Frankenstein, in particular in those sublime scenes in nature described 
in Frankenstein, for example ‗lightning flashes‘, ‗mountain peaks‘, and ‗deep chasms‘, which 
trigger, as Kant points out, ‗melancholy meditation‘.74 Similar to Gigante‘s examination of 
the inter-relationship between the Burkean sublime and physical ugliness, Scott J. Juengel‘s 
reading of Frankenstein locates the Monster‘s ugliness and human compassion in 
physiognomy.
75
 In his ‗Face, Figure, Physiognomics: Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein and the 
Moving Image‘ (2000), Juengel is aware that the Monster is destined to be the ‗visually 
other‘ and employs Lavater‘s science of physiognomy to examine human countenance in the 
text.
76
 Nancy Yousef‘s Isolated Cases: The Anxieties of Autonomy in Enlightenment 
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Philosophy and Romantic Literature (2004) explores the individual‘s mental development in 
relation to the case of Frankenstein‘s monster.77 Janis McLarren Caldwell is also interested in 
human nature and specifically discusses this issue in Frankenstein in a chapter entitled 
‗Science and Sympathy in Frankenstein‘ in her book Literature and Medicine in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain: From Mary Shelley to George Eliot (2004).
78
 William S. Haney 
II contributes a chapter on ‗Frankenstein: The Monster‘s Constructedness and the Narrativity 
of Consciousness‘ in his Cyberculture, Cyborgs and Science Fiction: Consciousness and the 
Posthuman (2006) to examine consciousness in Frankenstein.
79
 More recently, Holmes‘s The 
Age of Wonder (2008) dedicated a chapter to ‗Dr Frankenstein and the Soul‘ to explore the 
relation between sensations and the ‗soul‘ in the contexts of Romantic medicine and 
Frankenstein.
80
 It appears that critics have a burgeoning interest in exploring the science of 
the mind in Frankenstein specifically and the Shelley circle more generally. These recent 
perspectives help to shape my own argument about emotional science in Frankenstein, 
although my inquiry is centred on the affinity between complicated human emotions in 
Frankenstein and a materialist worldview. 
     Academic societies have also played important roles in the synthesis of science and the 
humanities (literature). Historically, the fierce debates between scientists (Thomas Henry 
Huxley) and literary scholars (Matthew Arnold) opened up a gulf between science and the 
humanities in the late Victorian period. This academic rift was, in part, healed by C. P. Snow 
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and Thomas Kuhn. In The Two Cultures (1959), disputed by F. R. Leavis in his Two Cultures? 
The Significance of C. P. Snow (1962),
81
 Snow advocates the spirit of the interdisciplinary 
studies between science and the humanities.
82
 Kuhn‘s concept of ‗paradigm shift‘ in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) reaffirms the possibility of cross-fertilisation 
between science and the humanities.
83
 In his reading of Frankenstein, Morton extends 
Kuhn‘s concept: ‗The Romantic period was a time of tremendous paradigm shifts in 
science‘.84 After Kuhn, Aldous Leonard Huxley, author of Brave New World (1932) and 
grandson of Thomas Huxley, published Literature and Science (1963) in an attempt to close 
the gap between what had become two distinct fields. Huxley also senses the intellectual 
conflicts between (Romantic) literature, culture, and science: 
          Science sometimes builds new bridges between universes of discourse and 
experience hitherto regarded as separate and heterogeneous. But science also 
breaks down old bridges and opens gulfs between universes that, traditionally, 
had been connected. Blake and Keats, as we have seen, detested Sir Isaac 
Newton because he had cut the old connections between the stars and the 
heavenly host, between rainbows and Iris, and even between rainbows and 
Noah‘s Ark, rainbows and Jehovah—had cut the connections and so de-poetized 
man‘s world and robbed it of meaning.85 
It is clear that science should be developed in conjunction with culture instead of breaking 
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with it. Since 1947, the British Society for History of Science (BSHS) has launched annual 
academic conferences and invited contributors to enrich the history of science.
86
 The 
Wellcome Trust, in the UK, is currently the leading academic institution for the history of 
science, medicine, and technology.
87
 4S (the Society for Social Studies of Science), founded 
in 1975, opened up intellectual exchanges between social studies and science.
88
 In recent 
years, this society has invited academics in literature and arts to participate further in 
scientific dialogues. The importance of these interdisciplinary studies between science and 
literature was recognised by the SLSA (the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts), 
which has organised annual conferences in North America since 1986 and established in 1993 
its own influential journal, entitled Configurations.
89
 Following this trend, the British 
Society for Literature and Science (BSLS) was established in 2006 and has since hosted 
annual conferences throughout the UK. In step with these developments in academic research, 
the International Society for Cultural History (ISCH) was founded in the UK in July 2007.
90
 
Given this accumulation of research into Romanticism and science, as well as those scientific 
studies of Frankenstein over the past decades, it is even more surprising how relatively few 
critics have connected science, emotion, and the Shelley circle. Through my concept of the 
‗materiality of emotion‘ the major philosophical, scientific, and poetic dialogues between the 
selected literary works of Byron and the Shelleys will be examined. 
My next chapter, ‗The Science of the Mind: Shelley‘s Queen Mab (1813)‘, argues that 
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Shelley develops his views of the mind through his atheistic and materialist reasoning. This 
materialist thinking about the mind exerts a seminal influence on the Shelley circle. In 
Chapter Three, ‗New Materialism: Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein (1818)‘, Frankenstein is 
understood as incorporating diverse experiments of science, philosophy, and literature into 
the discourse of emotion. A discussion of the mechanism of the body, in Frankenstein, helps 
further to connect these operations of the mind and emotion. My Chapter Four, ‗Tracing 
Emotion: Shelley‘s Alastor (1816) and Byron‘s Manfred (1817)‘, investigates emotional 
influences on the mind. Byron and Shelley employ scientific reasoning to understand emotion. 
Their allegorical language not only echoes early materialism and empiricism, but prefigures 
neuroscience and genetics. This issue is also reflected in Frankenstein, which analyses the 
relationship between emotion and sensation. Chapter Five, ‗A Storm of the Mind: Mary 
Shelley‘s Frankenstein (1818)‘, points out further connections between the physical body and 
human emotion. Echoing eighteenth-century empiricist aesthetics and physiognomy, the 
Shelleys represent further physiological aspects of the beautiful and the ugly as well as 
emotional responses to terror as an aspect of the sublime. My sixth chapter, ‗Seeking Love: 
Byron‘s Don Juan (1819) and Shelley‘s Epipsychidion (1821)‘, suggests that Byron and 
Shelley demonstrate their distinct philosophies of love in Canto One of Don Juan and 
Epipsychidion. Drawing on cultural history and queer studies, this chapter examines the 
inter-relations between science, literature, and sexuality to explore the materiality of queer 
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love in Don Juan Canto I and Epipsychidion. 
     My thesis examines the inter-relations between the body and the mind, as well as the 
material and the ‗non-material‘.91 I employ the concept of the ‗materiality of emotion‘ as a 
critical lens to read the eighteenth-century philosophical and scientific legacy bestowed to the 
Shelley circle and how the Shelleys and Byron re-imagined its inheritance. In contemporary 
society, emotional issues are often integrated into issues of self-identity, the relationship of 
physical beauty with social acceptance and, lastly, the secular values of happiness with 
well-being. These past and present materialist concerns of scientific endeavour speak to, and 
are spoken to by, the Shelley circle and its fascination with emotional science, aesthetics, and 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Science of the Mind: Percy Shelley‘s Queen Mab (1813) 
Finding a later affinity with the Blue Fairy in Carlo Collodi‘s 1883 Pinocchio,1 
Shelley‘s Queen Mab is a fairy godmother character who has her origins in Celtic mythology 
and is mediated to us through Shakespeare‘s Romeo and Juliet (1597).2 Shelley employs this 
fairytale character in his romance narrative
3
 to disseminate his ideas about education, science 
and the construction of the human mind. Subtitled ‗A Philosophical Poem‘, Queen Mab4 is 
Shelley‘s first major poetic project to examine the mind in relation to materiality. In this 
poem, Shelley engages with ideas, concerning the mind derived from eighteenth-century 
philosophy of science, secular, and religious beliefs, through the framework of a fairytale or 
romance.
5
 My chapter focuses on how Shelley advocates ‗scientific reason‘ to understand 
rationally the human mind and its diverse emotions in Queen Mab. In my discussion, 
Shelley‘s understanding of the mind is understood as prefiguring our current concerns in the 
field of cognitive science which centre on the relationship between feelings, physical nerve 
endings, and electronic impulses, as well between brain matter and the immateriality of 
thought and memory.  
This scientific understanding of the mind is central to Alan Richardson‘s work on 
science and British Romanticism.
6
 Richardson‘s emphasis, however, rests more with 
eighteenth-century neural science and the works of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats than 
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Shelley‘s science of the mind in Queen Mab. A number of other critics, including Joseph 
Barrell, Desmond King-Hele, and Ross Greig Woodman, have previously explored the 
scientific concerns and materialist issues in Queen Mab.
7
 Barrell notes that Shelley‘s Queen 
Mab draws on eighteenth-century thought with ‗a strange mixture of humanitarianism and 
science, of intellectualism and emotionalism, of [Baron] D‘Holbach and [Jean-Jacques] 
Rousseau‘ (STHT, 73). Unlike some earlier critics, King-Hele‘s approach to Shelley‘s poetry 
and Queen Mab, draws on atheism, vegetarianism, Newtonian science, William Godwin‘s 
political philosophy, and Robert Southey‘s early poetry about republicanism.8 By focusing on 
eighteenth-century philosophy, eclecticism, and apocalyptic ideas in Shelley‘s writings, 
Woodman – echoing C. E. Pulos‘s discussion of scepticism, immaterialism, and Platonism in 
Shelley‘s works9 – points out that Shelley‘s inheritance of John Newton‘s Orphism (adopted 
from ancient Greek mysticism) is a mixture of ‗Godwin‘s immaterialism‘ and ‗D‘Holbach‘s 
materialism‘ (AVPS, 75). Recently, Christopher R. Miller has identified ‗the binary nature of 
Queen Mab – the traditional and the radical, the real and the visionary, romance and 
revolution –‘ and even ‗internal conflict and fruitful intersection‘ (‗HEA‘, 70) within the 
poem.  Shelley‘s use of a fairytale framework (or utopian vision) enables Miller to bridge the 
gap between heaven and earth, the immortal (Mab) and the mortal (Ianthe), and the ideal and 
the real in his critical account.
10
 My own reading, which sympathises with these accounts of 
Shelley‘s poetry, is sensitive to how the poem questions the boundaries between the material 
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and non-material. Such readings re-examine the relationship between Shelley‘s philosophy 
and scientific materialism to better understand how the mind was understood and constructed 
at the time.  
Continuing his earlier atheistic statements in Zastrozzi: A Romance (1810) and The 
Necessity of Atheism (1811),
11
 Queen Mab is widely acknowledged by critics
12
 as conveying 
Shelley‘s revolutionary ideas in a bid to purify our ‗contaminated‘ minds. Shelley is 
constantly fascinated by the workings of the mind throughout Queen Mab. In Queen Mab, the 
frequency of the reoccurrence of this term ‗mind‘, used some fifty-six times throughout the 
poem and Notes, indicates Shelley‘s emphasis on mental processes. For Shelley, the mind 
exists as a weightless or invisible material object in the physical world similar to atmosphere, 
light, sound, electricity, and magnetism. Shelley employs scientific reasoning to undo the 
shackles of religion that bind even intelligent minds.
13
 Institutionalised forms of religion, for 
Shelley, prevent and restrict the reasoning capacity of the most intelligent human minds. 
More significantly, Shelley seeks to examine the so-called immaterial mind from a 
perspective of materiality. The mutual relationships between the brain and the mind are 
demonstrated in Shelley‘s works and this is suggestive of the materiality of the mind, the soul, 
the spirit, and thoughts. Ellis‘s Concordance to Shelley‘s work suggests that Shelley‘s usage 
of the word ‗brain‘ mainly refers to the ‗mind‘ and only in a very few instances does he use 
brain to refer to ‗the soft mass enclosed in the skull‘ (LC, 69). In Queen Mab, Shelley 
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differentiates his atheistic views on the mind or the ‗soul‘ from those of Platonic dualism, or 
even Cartesianism, which believed in the immortality of the soul or the mind. Such 
metaphysics is distinct from Shelley‘s scientific and atheistic ‗metaphysics‘.14 The mind, in 
Shelley‘s early materialist thinking, is inseparable from the body and such philosophical 
monism continues to persist to his later work. In his ‗Speculations on Metaphysics‘ (1815), 
Shelley prefers atheistic empiricism to a metaphysical hypothesis about the human mind. 
Shelley disputes a metaphysical ‗inquiry into the phenomena of mind‘ as ‗it [metaphysics] is 
very ill adapted to express the science of mind‘ [emphasis added].15 Nevertheless, in Queen 
Mab, Shelley recognises that Christianity and other forms of superstition restrict human 
nature. This chapter concentrates on the physicality of Shelley‘s imagery to depict the fairy, 
the presence (or manifestation) of spirit, and how these images symbolise the invisible sphere 
of the mind. 
 
I. A Legacy of Eighteenth-Century Reason 
In Queen Mab, Shelley recognises that reason has been instrumental in liberating the 
individual mind and reforming society. The Romantics have been identified as disputers of 
the Age of Reason,
16
 but Shelley may prove the exception to this rule. He employs scientific 
reason to probe into the irrational principles of society‘s institutions which oppress human 
nature. For Shelley, these exist in the institutional forms of religion, government, and 
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monarchy. Shelley‘s materialist and anti-Christian stance is clearly demonstrated in the 
epigraphs that he chooses for Queen Mab. Shelley places the French radical philosopher 
Voltaire‘s epigraph, ‗Ecrasez L‘infame‘ (literally meaning ‗Crush the demon‘) to underline 
his abhorrence of Christian dogma, monarchy, and superstitious customs.
17
 Extending 
Voltaire‘s concept, Shelley's ‗demon‘ refers to religion, kingship, and government. In Canto 
IV of Queen Mab, Shelley repeatedly condemns kings, priests, and statesmen for their vices: 
‗Kings, priests, and statesmen, blast the human flower / Even in its tender bud; their influence 
darts / Like subtle poison through the bloodless veins / Of desolate society. …‘ (QM, IV.104-
07). Shelley‘s anti-establishment position is further reinforced by his use of a Latin epigraph 
derived from Archimedes (287-212 B.C.), which translates as: ‗Only give me a place on 
which to stand, and I shall move the whole world‘ (STP, 200).18 This ‗place on which to 
stand‘ suggests Shelley‘s desire to have a space to publish his controversial ideas. Like those 
Enlightenment scientists who advocated scientific reasoning to attain knowledge and 
happiness, Shelley re-affirms eighteenth-century reason as the basis of his atheistic 
materialism. 
In their commentary on Queen Mab, Donald H. Reiman and Neill Fraistat place Queen 
Mab in the context of eighteenth-century science: ‗That large role that science—from 
astronomy to biology to geology—plays in QM [Queen Mab] can be understood largely in 
terms of the revolutionary possibilities offered by scientific discourse of the eighteenth 
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century‘.19 In fact, reason plays, and continues to play, a decisive role in scientific or 
epistemological advances. The term reason or reasoning is prevailingly used in the 
Enlightenment and understood as the means by which to achieve true knowledge and is 
frequently used in Shelley‘s works. In Note 13 (QM, VII.13) of Queen Mab, Shelley stresses 
the significance of reason for disputing superstition and theism: 
Our reason can never admit the testimony of men, who not only declare that they 
were eye-witnesses of miracles, but that the Deity was irrational; for he 
commanded that he should be believed, he proposed the highest rewards for faith, 
eternal punishments for disbelief. (CPPBS Vol. 2, 266) 
Shelley suggests that the belief in the Deity is beyond reason. Nowadays this reaction against 
a superstitious worldview is increasingly common with the advent of further scientific 
developments. Although some critics have related Shelley‘s philosophy to Christianity and 
Jesus‘s morality,20 religious hypotheses are, for the young Shelley, dependent on miracles 
and self-evident testimonies and as such defy the nature of reason. Shelley‘s atheistic 
reasoning goes against those dominant Christian values of his time, but chimes more readily 
with our own current scientific age. Shelley‘s ideas anticipate the twentieth-century 
physicalism of Erich Harth, which is grounded not only in physical space (the outer world) 
but within the neural domain (the inner world).
21
  
At the beginning of Queen Mab, the Fairy wakes Ianthe‘s spirit not with bodily 
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movement, but through mental activity, by swiftly flying her through physical space to a 
Spirit‘s ‗fitting temple‘ (QM, I.277). In ‗[t]he magic car‘ (QM, I.207), Queen Mab takes the 
Spirit over ‗the mountain‘s loftiest peak‘ (QM, I.216), through ‗[f]lashing incessant meteors‘ 
(QM, I.236), and finally to outer space to witness ‗[t]he smallest light that twinkles in the 
heaven;‘ (QM, I.251). This spatial journey reflects how Shelley‘s imagination prefigures 
more recent scientific theories about the workings of the mind or the neural system. In Canto 
II, the ‗human brain‘ (QM, II.106) dominates all emotions and ‗thought‘ (QM, II.107) and is 
seen as the only means of comprehending the physical world: 
How wonderful! that even 
The passions, prejudices, interests, 
That sway the meanest being, the weak touch 
That moves the finest nerve, 
And in one human brain 
Causes the faintest thought, becomes a link 
In the great chain of nature. [Emphasis added] (QM, II.102-08) 
This neural network relates human ‗thought‘ (QM, II.107) or the mind to the physicality of 
nature. Shelley‘s lines echo George Berkeley‘s empiricist suggestion22 that ‗[the] perceiving, 
active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself‘.23 Similarly, Shelley is inclined to use 
inter-changeably the (working) brain for mind, soul, or spirit in Queen Mab and his other 
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poetic works.  
That said, Shelley elsewhere takes issue with Berkeley‘s notion of ‗immaterialism‘, as 
clearly demonstrated in his letter to Godwin on 29 July 1812: 
I have read Berkeley, and the perusal of his arguments tended more than any 
thing to convince me that immaterialism, and other words of general usage 
deriving all their force from mere predicates (sic) in non (sic), were invented by 
the pride of philosophers to conceal their ignorance, even from themselves. … 
Reason (if I may be permitted to personify it) is as much as your superior, as you 
are mine. [Emphasis added] (CWPBS Vol. 9, Letters, 184, 11) 
Disputing Berkeley‘s philosophical ‗immaterialism‘, Shelley, in Queen Mab, recognises here 
that the ‗nerve‘ (QM, II.105) or neuron dominates the mind of ‗the meanest being‘ (QM, 
II.104). In other words, emotion is subject to the deprivation of one‘s reason. Shelley‘s 
account of the vibration of nerves is particularly influenced by English physiological-
psychologist David Hartley (1705-1757). We know that Shelley received Hartley‘s 
Observations on Man, along with a few other important books, from his publisher Thomas 
Hookham on 29 July 1812: 
I have received the parcel safe. I would thank you [Hookham] to send in addition 
―Miltons Prose Works,‖ ―Elements of Chemical Philosophy‖ by Sir H. Davy (to 
be published 1st of August), ―Medical Extracts,‖ ―Hartley on Man,‖ ―Rights of 
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Woman,‖ by Mary Wollstonecraft (all in boards)‘ (CWPBS Vol. 9, Letters, 183, 
10).  
Hartley‘s theory of vibrations is then later employed in Shelley‘s discussion of love. This 
mechanism of love is demonstrated in Queen Mab and persists in Shelley‘s ‗On Love‘: 
… if we feel [love], we would that another‘s nerves should vibrate to our own, 
that the beams of their eyes should kindle at once and mix and melt into our own, 
that lips of motionless ice should not reply to lips quivering and burning with the 
heart‘s best blood. (SPP, 503-04) 
Vibrating ‗nerves‘, beaming ‗eyes‘, quivering ‗lips‘, and burning ‗blood‘ are all Shelley‘s 
physiological vocabulary to capture the material nature of love. William Drummond‘s 
Academical Questions (1805) provided Shelley with a short chapter (Chapter VI), which 
reflected on Hartley‘s physico-metaphysics. Hartley, it is claimed by Drummond, observes 
that ‗… external objects, being impressed upon the senses, occasion vibratory motions of the 
medullary particles in the nerves and brain …‘.24 It is evident that Shelley is influenced by 
this account of Hartley‘s hypothesis and experiments with this idea and the imagery of 
vibrating particles in Queen Mab. 
When ‗the meanest being‘ (QM, II.104) is swayed by his or her ‗passions, prejudices, 
[and] interests‘ (QM, II.103), Shelley suggests that an intelligent human mind governed by 
reason is able to discover the falsehood behind ‗fact‘. This is the major reason that Shelley 
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designs an ‗etherial palace‘ (QM, II.29) where Queen Mab instils a new worldview onto 
Ianthe‘s mind. This ‗new‘ worldview, according to Shelley, however, adheres to the classical 
spirit, reviving those Greco-Roman traditions: ‗… The Spirit, / In extacy [ecstasy] of 
admiration, felt / All knowledge of the past revived; the events / Of old and wondrous times, / 
Which dim tradition interruptedly / Teaches the credulous vulgar, …‘ (QM, II.244-49). The 
‗old and wondrous times‘ (QM, II.247) allude to pre-Christian or ancient Greco-Roman 
history that, for Shelley, forms the glory of human history and enlightens ‗the credulous 
vulgar‘ (QM, II.249) believers in Christianity or monarchy. This monarchy also suggests that 
it is those anti-Christian Roman emperors who destroy the liberal spirit in ancient times. 
In this context, Queen Mab conveys Shelley‘s political radicalism. In Canto III, the 
Fairy Queen, as a symbol of human nature, infuses reason into the Spirit, which represents a 
collective mind of political or religious dissidents. At the opening of this Canto, the Spirit 
appreciates the enlightenment given to her by Queen Mab: ‗―I thank thee. Thou hast given / 
A boon which I will not resign, and taught / A lesson not to be unlearned. …‘ (QM, III.4-6). 
Shelley suggests that this ‗lesson‘ (QM, III.6) taught by Queen Mab is about how to attain 
true knowledge through reason. The spirit of the Enlightenment aims to pursue knowledge 
through scientific reason, yet early religious and monarchical ideologies, as demonstrated in 
Queen Mab, undermine the spirit of reason and enslave the intelligent mind. If unable to 
know his or her own ‗nature‘ (QM, III.100) or the importance of reason, the individual, as the 
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Fairy suggests, will continue being a slave ‗… who suffers from the crimes / Of this 
unnatural being…‘ (QM, III.102-03). The ‗unnatural being‘ (QM, III.103) refers to the king, 
George III (1738-1820), who was appointed through ‗divine‘ right to govern the country. 
Ann Wroe notes Shelley‘s early display against George III with his tutor Dr James Lind: 
‗Teacher [Lind] and pupil [Shelley] cursed George III as they drank their tea together‘.25 
Lacking the spirit of republicanism from the establishment of the Roman Empire, the 
king‘s legitimacy in the Christian age, was endorsed by the church. Shelley‘s democratic 
argument echoes the eighteenth-century contractarianism of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, 
Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau‘s The Social Contract (1762), which 
disputes the myth that kingship derives authority from God. Shelley‘s political reasoning 
draws on Godwin‘s anarchism. Shelley‘s persistent emphasis on political anarchism is 
present in Queen Mab, as well as his ‗An Address, to the Irish People‘ (1812), and his later 
work, ‗The Mask of Anarchy‘ (1819). In spite of Godwin‘s reputation as an anarchical 
philosopher, Shelley started his ‗alliance‘ with Godwin by letter from 3 January 1812 and 
later revealed his own intention to free the Irish people from the regime of George III.
26
 
Against Godwin‘s warning, Shelley headed for Ireland to advocate the significance of civil 
rights. Shelley‘s declaration of rights to the Irish during his travels to Dublin, between 12 
February and 4 April of 1812,
27
 foreshadowed his political assertion in Queen Mab. After 
pointing to a series of vices instigated by monarchy, the Fairy advocates the necessity of 
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reason: ‗… And when reason‘s voice, / Loud as the voice of nature, shall have waked / The 
nations; and mankind perceive that vice / Is discord, war, and misery…‘ (QM, III.126-29). 
The ‗reason‘s voice‘ (QM, III.126) relates to Shelley‘s anti-Tory address to the Irish as well 
as the voice of Republicanism. Reason, therefore, provides Shelley with a lens through which 
to inspect the vices and illegitimacy of kingship.  
In Canto VII, Shelley negates religious goodness in an attempt to use reason as a means 
to circumvent the evil forms of rationality manifested in religion, particularly Christianity. At 
the beginning of this Canto, the created evil in religion is sharply contrasted with the natural 
goodness of the Spirit. The infant Spirit has eye-witnessed an atheist‘s tragic death by being 
‗burned‘ (QM, VII.2) under the demands of those alleged saints, described as ‗[t]he dark-
robed priests‘ (QM, VII.3). The legitimacy of this execution was simply the atheist‘s 
testimony that ‗[t]here is no God!‘ (QM, VII.13). This sympathy with an innocent atheist in 
Queen Mab also demonstrates Shelley‘s own feelings. Paul Foot notes Shelley‘s social 
activism through Shelley‘s literary career. Foot claims that without ‗political ideas … his 
[Shelley‘s] poetry loses its magic, its music and its meaning‘28 and, more importantly, 
‗[m]any of Shelley‘s political ideas‘ not only come from ‗books‘ but ‗depend at least to some 
extent on experience and on people‘ (RS, 203). Shelley‘s humanistic defence for the atheist 
named Mr. D. I. Eaton explains Shelley‘s social practice. Influenced by Thomas Paine, 
particularly his The Rights of Man (1791) and The Age of Reason (1794), Shelley invokes 
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Paine‘s concept of religious freedom throughout his letter to Lord Ellenborough. In his 
‗Letter to Lord Ellenborough‘, Shelley attempts to persuade Ellenborough to free Eaton 
instead of being a ‗deistical Bigot‘ whose ‗religion is … bloody, barbarous, and intolerant‘.29 
Shelley, in his Preface to Alastor, reassesses the risks of lacking sympathy: 
They who, deluded by no generous error, instigated by no sacred thirst of 
doubtful knowledge, duped by no illustrious superstition, loving nothing on this 
earth, and cherishing no hopes beyond, yet keep aloof from sympathies with their 
kind, rejoicing neither in human joy nor mourning with human grief; these, and 
such as they, have their apportioned curse. (SPP, 73)  
Alastor offers a revision of Shelley‘s earlier radical philosophy, but this atheistic reasoning 
central to Queen Mab remains a vital part of his thinking. Queen Mab, however, represents 
Shelley‘s adapting the practice of eighteenth-century scientific reason to re-examine 
superstition. The Fairy is Shelley‘s spokes-person in Queen Mab. ‗There is no God‘ (QM, 
VII.13), the Fairy confirms to the Spirit, and this claim reaffirms Shelley‘s atheism. In Note 
13 (QM, VII.13), Shelley attributes his atheism to Bacon‘s Moral Essays, D‘Holbach‘s 
Système de la Nature (The System of Nature), Pliny‘s Natural History, Drummond‘s 
Academical Questions, and Spinoza‘s Tractatus Theologico Politicus (Theological-Political 
Treatise).
30
 The Fairy‘s narrative becomes ironic and seeks to nominalise the essence of the 
deity. Strikingly, the Fairy points to the non-existence of God and highlights the universality 
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of the man-made God in different cultures: 
The name of God 
Has fenced about all crime with holiness, 
Himself the creature of his worshippers, 
Whose names and attributes and passions change, 
Seeva, Buddh, Foh, Jehovah, God, or Lord, 
Even with the human dupes who build his shrines, 
Still serving o‘er the war-polluted world 
For desolation‘s watch-word…. (QM, VII.26-33) 
Without offering redemption, God is simply a ‗desolation‘s watch-word‘ (QM, VII.33). The 
Fairy lists various religious terms for the divine – ‗Seeva, Buddh, Foh, Jehovah, God, or 
Lord‘ (QM, VII.31) – to establish the universality of this notion of a God and condemns those 
who are religious as ‗human dupes‘ (QM, VII.32). Undoubtedly, Shelley‘s atheistic 
worldview in Queen Mab subverts a religious worldview. On the one hand, Shelley doubts 
religious authorities and their worldview and, on the other, Shelley‘s discourse challenges 
Christianity‘s claim to be the centre of human values. Shelley‘s sceptic and decentring 




Shelley‘s atheism and conception of reason overturn Christian values and a religious 
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worldview. In Dante‘s Christian mythology, The Divine Comedy, with which Shelley was 
acquainted, humane pagans are allocated a place in the limbo of Purgatory and considered 
innocent sinners. By contrast, devout believers, in Shelley‘s deconstruction of Christianity, 
become the good-hearted but unintelligent followers – those ‗human dupes‘ (QM, VII.32) – 
of religion. Shelley not only criticises the innocent believers, but condemns intellectuals who 
strengthen religious ideology and whose endorsement of the legitimacy of Christianity 
interferes with the development of scientific reason. In Queen Mab, the Fairy confirms to the 
Spirit that the ‗peace-loving‘ God is impotent to govern the church, as its priests ‗Mak[e] the 
earth a slaughter-house‘ (QM,VII.48): 
… whilst Brahmins raise 
A sacred hymn to mingle with the groans; 
Or countless partners of his [God‘s] power divide 
His tyranny to weakness; or the smoke 
Of burning towns, the cries of female helplessness, 
Unarmed old age, and youth, and infancy, 
Horribly massacred, ascend to heaven 
In honor of his name; or, last and worst, 
Earth groans beneath religion‘s iron age, 
And priests dare babble of a God of peace, 
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Even whilst their hands are red with guiltless blood, 
Murdering the while, uprooting every germ 
Of truth, exterminating, spoiling all, 
Making the earth a slaughter-house! (QM, VII.35-48) 
The Fairy shows compassion to those sufferers, including women, the elderly, the young, and 
infants inflicted by wars (QM, VII.38-41). This sympathy exhibited by an atheist is again 
contrasted with the lack of sympathy exhibited by Christianity. The Fairy‘s condemnation of 
Christianity stems from those hypocritical ‗priests‘ (QM, VII.44) and intellectuals, namely 
‗Brahmins‘ (QM, VII.35). The priests, as the Fairy puts it, are the origin of vices and the 
obstacle to truth: ‗… their [priests‘] hands are red with guiltless blood, / Murdering the while, 
uprooting every germ / Of truth, exterminating, spoiling all, / Making the earth a slaughter-
house!‘ (QM, VII.45-48). The ‗Brahmins‘ (QM, VII.35), for Shelley, reinforce superstition by 
supporting Christianity and dissolve the scientific spirit.  
 
II. Cognitive Education: The Case of Ianthe 
Anticipating Jean Piaget‘s account of children‘s cognitive development from ‗genetic 
epistemology‘,32 Shelley employs Ianthe as a figure to symbolise vitality and the 
development of intelligence. Canto I of Queen Mab discloses Shelley‘s explanation of 
children‘s cognitive education. The Fairy symbolises the spirit of science and infuses an 
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irreligious worldview into the pure mind of Ianthe. In Queen Mab, Ianthe is described as a 
‗slumbering maid‘ (QM, I.67), whose frozen mind is as pure as a newborn. This chimes with 
Shelley‘s original hope to disseminate his revolutionary ideas to aristocratic children, as he 
writes: ‗[This book aims] to catch the aristocrats. They will not read it, but their sons and 
daughters may‘ (Letters, 7, 42).33 In this context, Ianthe‘s newborn mind becomes a vital 
metaphor for Shelley‘s empiricist ideas and notion of cognitive development, as in the 
following description: 
Soul of Ianthe! thou, 
Judged alone worthy of the envied boon, 
That waits the good and the sincere; that waits 
Those who have struggled, and with resolute will 
Vanquished earth’s pride and meanness, burst the chains, 
The icy chains of custom, and have shone 
The day-stars of their age;—Soul of Ianthe! 
Awake! arise! 
                      
Sudden arose 
Ianthe‘s Soul; it stood 
All beautiful in naked purity, 
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The perfect semblance of its bodily frame, 
Instinct with inexpressible beauty and grace; 
Each stain of earthliness 
Had passed away, it reassumed 
Its native dignity, and stood 
Immortal amid ruin. [Emphasis added] (QM, I.122-38) 
The Fairy addresses the sleeping soul of Ianthe and expects her to use her gifted intelligence 
or reason to judge independently and defeat social vices as well as old-fashioned ‗custom‘ 
(QM, I.127). This ‗custom‘ refers to any kind of dogma that binds the thinking mind. The 
scene, when the Fairy implores the ‗Soul of Ianthe‘ (QM, I.128) to ‗Awake! arise‘ (QM, 
I.129), dramatises Shelley‘s revolutionary desire to break the mind free from ‗[t]he icy chains 
of custom‘ (QM, I.127) and return to ‗[i]ts native dignity‘ (QM, I.137). Shelley‘s hatred for 
customs is emphasised in a poem, entitled ‗Passion‘, from his Esdaile Notebook, where he 
comments on the interference of custom with the mind: ‗… Custom‘s chains / Have bound 
thee [Passion] from thine Heaven-directed flight‘ (46-47).34 The concept of ‗flight‘ 
symbolises the lightness and liberation of the mind to happiness in ‗Heaven‘ and Shelley later 
employs this concept in Queen Mab. The Fairy drives a magic car, taking Ianthe to Heaven: 
‗Saw but the fairy pageant, / Heard but the heavenly strains / That filled the lonely dwelling‘ 
(QM, I.91-93). This desire for happiness is essentially identical to a religious or mythological 
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imagination of Heaven. Although Shelley later recognises emotional aspects of religion in 
Queen Mab, he pursues, within the poem, an earthly paradise that is constructed by scientific 
understanding and not realised through spiritual or religious salvation. 
In Shelley‘s philosophy, a child‘s education determines the future of society. Shelley‘s 
concern about children‘s cognition is demonstrated in a striking domestic argument between 
Shelley and Harriet Shelley about ‗hiring a wet nurse‘. Barbara Gelpi observes that Harriet 
‗refused to nurse the baby [this couple‘s first child, Ianthe] herself and insisted on hiring a 
wet nurse‘35 even though Shelley was concerned that ‗the nurse‘s soul would enter the child‘ 
(qtd. in SG 3). Despite the fact that Shelley is misled by the conception of the contemporary 
‗science‘ of nursing,36 this episode highlights Shelley‘s concern with infants‘ cognitive 
development. Shelley seeks to provide a ‗pollution-free‘ place for children‘s education. This 
concept is embedded in Canto I of Queen Mab. Unlike the physical deformity of 
Frankenstein‘s monster,37 Ianthe expresses the naturally good in the body and the mind: ‗The 
perfect semblance of its bodily frame, / Instinct with inexpressible beauty and grace;‘ (QM, 
I.133-34). In his portrayal of the ‗naked purity‘ (QM, I.132) of Ianthe‘s soul, Shelley draws 
on a Lockean concept of tabula rasa as well as Rousseau‘s concept of ‗natural man‘. 
Drawing on his arguments from The Necessity of Atheism, Shelley in Queen Mab re-affirms 
the necessity of sense experience to the development of the mind: ‗The senses are the sources 
of all knowledge to the mind; consequently their evidence claims the strongest assent‘ 
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(CPPBS Vol. 2, QM, VII.13, Note 13, 264). The development of the mind is of great interest 
to early empiricists and remains so to current cognitive psychologists. Ianthe‘s mind reflects 
an empiricist model in which the cognition of the world is accumulated through sense 
experience. Ianthe‘s cognitive process is indebted to Shelley‘s familiarity with classic 
characters, such as Pygmalion‘s female statue, Rousseau‘s Emile, and Condallic‘s walking 
statue. More significantly, this empiricist view of the character of Ianthe demonstrates 
Shelley‘s anticipation of cognitive science, particularly extended to the development of 
artificial man‘s intelligence or self.  
In this speculative field, the boundaries between science fact and science fiction often 
unnervingly blur. Mary Shelley, for example, imaginatively speculates about the cognitive 
development of an assembled and reanimated creature by drawing on the scientific context of 
galvanism. Spielberg‘s and Kubrick‘s Artificial Intelligence, as well as Brian Aldiss‘s science 
fiction, take inspiration from Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein and The Last Man to infuse 
robotic technologies with human sensibilities.
38
  The Fairy‘s role in Shelley‘s Queen Mab is 
to cleanse Ianthe‘s contaminated mind – anticipating later science fiction scenarios and 
scientific notions of wiping clean the memory chips or banks of a robot – and provide her 
with a fresh start for cognitive development. 
For Shelley, the materiality of life has its affinity with human cognition. In addition to 
Queen Mab and his earlier works, Shelley pursues these interests in life and cognition in his 
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other works. Shelley‘s ‗On Life‘ (1819), for example, confirms his enthusiasm for the 
exploration of the relationship between life and thought in the context of materialist 
empiricism. In this essay, Shelley reaffirms his anti-metaphysics: ‗I confess that I am one of 
those who am (sic) unable to refuse my assent to the conclusions of those philosophers, who 
assert that nothing exists but as it is perceived‘ (SPP, 506).39 Unlike Pulos‘s and Cian Duffy‘s 
metaphysical interpretation of Shelley‘s philosophy,40 Shelley was, effectively, a materialist 
who employs scepticism to revise his own brand of materialism. In Note 13 (QM, VII.13) of 
Queen Mab, Shelley mentions the influence of Drummond‘s Academical Questions on his 
atheism (CPPBS Vol. 2, 277). Reiman and Fraistat even point out that ‗Peacock may have 
introduced him [Shelley]‘ to Academical Questions ‗perhaps in the spring or summer of 
1813‘ (CPPBS Vol. 2, 383). In fact, as stated in his letter to Hookham on 26 January 1813, 
Shelley had earlier learned of Drummond‘s philosophy and felt detached from its apparently 
deistic philosophy or metaphysics: ‗I do not think that Sir W. Drummonds (sic) arguments 
have much weight. His Œdipus has completely failed in making me a convert‘ (CWPBS Vol. 
9, Letters, 201, 42). Earlier, then, than a focus on vitality or the very element of life in Alastor 
and Frankenstein, Shelley‘s interest in vitality is stated in the opening of Queen Mab. For the 
Narrator in Queen Mab, life and death are equally ‗wonderful‘ (QM, I.8) and the difference 
between ‗Death and his brother Sleep‘ (QM, I.2) is just in shade alone: the former is ‗blue‘ 
(QM, I.4) and the latter ‗rosy‘ (QM, I.5). These two opposite colours demonstrate Shelley‘s 
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physiological understanding of vitality symbolised through both the active life-giving ‗rosy‘ 
blood and its deathly pale ‗blue‘ counterpart.   
Ianthe is caught in a state between life and death until ‗the gloomy Power‘ (QM, I.9) or 
vitality that remains in her body re-animates her. The origin of life perplexes the Narrator, 
and Shelley‘s poem blurs the boundaries between life and death: ‗That lovely outline, which 
is fair / As breathing marble, perish? / Must putrefaction‘s breath / Leave nothing of this 
heavenly sight / But loathsomeness and ruin?‘ (QM, I.16-20). Different from Frankenstein‘s 
monster at a physical level, the ‗breathing marble‘ (QM, I.17) and ‗putrefaction‘s breath‘ 
(QM, I.18), in Queen Mab, represents Ianthe‘s fair body trapped in a limbo between life and 
death and through which Shelley meditates on the affinity between vitality and empiricism. 
This empiricist notion becomes clearer when the Narrator, in Queen Mab, wonders whether 
sensation still exists in the static Ianthe: 
Or is it only a sweet slumber 
Stealing o‘er sensation, 
Which the breath of roseate morning 
Chaseth into darkness? 
Will Ianthe wake again, 
And give that faithful bosom joy 
Whose sleepless spirit waits to catch 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 57 
Light, life and rapture from her smile? (QM, I.23-30) 
The Narrator gazes upon the motionless Ianthe with an empiricist eye: ‗Or is it only a sweet 
slumber / Stealing o‘er sensation‘ (QM, I.23-24). This ability to receive sensations, the 
Narrator suggests through these detectable signs of emotion, for example a ‗smile‘ (QM, I.30), 
which the ‗sleepless spirit waits to catch‘ (QM, I.29), can prove the existence of a sound mind 
and body. After Ianthe‘s ‗awakening‘ from a deep sleep, though without real physical 
movements, the Fairy takes the soul of Ianthe to experience a new world. This flight of the 
Fairy and the Spirit, which partly echoes Ovid‘s ‗Helios and Phaethon‘ in design,41 is a 
Shelleyan portrayal of the connection between the outer world and the inner world. ‗Light, 
life and rapture‘ (QM, I.30) allude to the origin of life and the operations of the mind. ‗Light‘ 
(QM, I.30), like electricity or essence of vitality, animates the organism and ‗life‘ (QM, I.30) 
or vitality sparks the activity of the mind. Emotion, like ‗rapture‘ (QM, I.30), explains the 
workings of the mind. The imagery of ‗light‘ (QM, I.62) which relates to a force for life 
recurs when ‗the Fairy Queen‘ (QM, I.59) launches the chariot: ‗Their [the coursers‘] filmy 
pennons at her word they furl, / And stop obedient to the reins of light: / These the Queen of 
spells drew in, / She spread a charm around the spot,‘ (QM, I.61-64). The Fairy‘s magic 
explains the mysterious vitality that activates the operations of the ‗chariot‘ (QM, I.59) – a 
physical body. This world in the journey of the Fairy and the Spirit is very different from the 
world that Shelley criticises. The detached outer space, where they eventually land, reflects 
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an ideal world. In Shelley‘s materialist concept, this imaginary world does, indeed, exist 
somewhere between the neural networks of the ‗brain‘ (QM, I.69): ‗Oh! not the visioned poet 
in his dreams, / When silvery clouds float through the ‘wildered brain, / When every sight of 
lovely, wild and grand / Astonishes, enraptures, elevates,‘ (QM, I.68-71). Shelley suggests 
that the power of animation is not derived from poetical imagination, but grounded in 
alchemical science:  
When fancy at a glance combines 
The wondrous and the beautiful,—  
So bright, so fair, so wild a shape 
Hath ever yet beheld, 
As that which reined the coursers of the air, 
And poured the magic of her gaze 
Upon the maiden‘s sleep. (QM, I.72-78) 
The Fairy‘s ‗glance‘ (QM, I.72) or ‗gaze‘ (QM, I.77) alludes to the vital substance which 
brings the vegetated Ianthe to life. This ‗magic‘ (QM, I.77) or supernatural power presumably 
relates to the application of electric impulses as the basis for life in current medical practice. 
Shelley‘s mediation on, and fascination with, alchemy, a kind of medical or chemical magic, 
is illustrated in this scene of animation. Although alchemists failed to seek the ultimate power 
of alchemy that leads to juvenescence, beauty, and longevity, Shelley fulfils this ambition 
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through his poetical fairytale. This fancy relates to the magic of the Fairy given to the 
sleeping Ianthe: ‗The wondrous and the beautiful,— / So bright, so fair, so wild a shape‘ (QM, 
I.73-74).The Fairy ‗gaze / Upon the maiden‘s sleep‘ (QM, I. 77-78) hints at the reanimation 
science of Frankenstein. The materiality of the Fairy‘s gaze foreshadows the use of galvanism 
in Frankenstein‘s second authorised edition (1831). The rebirth of Ianthe explains Shelley‘s 





III. Shelley‘s Sceptical Mind: The Case of Ahasuerus 
The episode of Ahasuerus or the Wandering Jew in Canto VII of Queen Mab is a 
powerful case in point for the necessity of the science of mind. In Queen Mab, Ahasuerus is 
an outcast Jew whose image Shelley employs to express sceptical ideas. Ahasuerus 
symbolises the spirit of scepticism and Shelley uses this character as a spokesman to examine 
Christian history and advocate the necessity of the freedom of mind. Shelley‘s scepticism is 
inevitably influenced by Drummond‘s Academical Questions. Pulos points out that 
Academical Questions nurtured the young Shelley‘s scepticism: ‗Prior to the publication of 
Queen Mab (1813) Shelley‘s knowledge of philosophical scepticism was confined to some of 
Hume‘s Essays and Drummond‘s Academical Questions‘ (DT, 37). Drummond criticises the 
abuse of materialist philosophy by the ‗professed adherents‘ (AQ, xiv) and employs his 
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‗scepticism‘ (AQ, xiv) to refine his own thinking about the ‗philosophy of mind‘ (AQ, v).  In 
his ‗On Life‘, Shelley demonstrates that Drummond‘s sceptical philosophy leads him to 
reassess his previous conviction of materialism. Scepticism, for Shelley, is a means to 
rethinking every moral system that existed in his own time. Academical Questions provided 
Shelley with diverse perspectives on scepticism and the philosophy of the mind, including 
classical scepticism (Cicero), British empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume), and philosophies 
of mind (Spinoza, D‘Holbach, Thomas Reid, Kant, Hartley). 
Some of these sceptical ideas are revealed in Shelley‘s letters to Hitchener, Thomas 
Jefferson Hogg (his friend at Oxford), Timothy Shelley (his dominant father), and Godwin, in 
particular between 1810 and 1812. These correspondences can be seen as a blueprint of 
Shelley‘s Queen Mab. In his letter to Hitchener on 15[?] October 1811, Shelley claims that 
‗Religion‘ is ‗immoral‘ and full of the ‗gigantic piles of superstition‘ (CWPBS Vol. 8, Letters, 
103, 159). Shelley‘s letter to his father, dated 6 February 1810 [1811] during his study at 
Oxford, affirms his understanding of the radical philosophies of some seminal religious 
thinkers of the day and Shelley‘s sceptical question of their worth: ‗Locke‘s Christianity 
cannot now appear so surprising, particularly if we mention Voltaire, Lord Kames, Mr. Hume, 
Rousseau, Dr. Adam Smith, Dr. Franklin et mille alios, all of whom were Deists, the life of 
all of whom was characterised by the strictest morality …‘ (CWPBS Vol. 8, Letters, 34, 51). 
In his letter to Hitchener on 2 January 1812, Shelley reveals his commitment to ‗scepticism‘ 
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and challenges Southey‘s belief in Christian Trinity (CWPBS Vol. 8, Letters, 142, 227).43 
This acquaintance with eighteenth-century radical philosophy helps the young Shelley 
develop his own sceptical position. 
The case of Ahasuerus is for Shelley a sceptical exercise in the discourse of materialist 
atheism. This materialist atheism informed by D‘Holbach attracts the young Shelley. 
Regarded as ‗the Bible of all Materialism‘,44 D‘Holbach‘s The System of Nature (1770) steers 
Shelley towards materialist scepticism.
45
 Prior to Queen Mab, Shelley‘s scepticism against 
Christianity and other religions is expressed in his correspondences with his father: 
‗―Religion fetters a reasoning mind with the very bonds which restrain the unthinking one 
from mischief.‖ [Shelley‘s previous comments on religion] This is my great objection to it 
[religion]‘ (CWPBS Vol. 8, Letters, 34, 52).46 The image of the sceptical Jew reflects 
Shelley‘s continual desire to liberate and exercise the mind. Reworking his own early 
writings, Shelley gives the spirit of Ahasuerus ‗a place on which to stand‘47 and attempts to 
subvert a Christian worldview. Ahasuerus‘s spirit is viewed as a kind of material substance 
that is the product of the interactions between the individual‘s mind (or neurons) and written 
words. These written words, ‗printed‘ from the brain, record the working of the mind in the 
vanished ‗mind‘ and decayed brain. Shelley reifies this spirit, in Ahasuerus‘s case, as a ‗… 
phantasmal portraiture / Of wandering human thought‘ (QM, VII.274-75).  This outcast 
figure also appears in Shelley‘s early poems, ‗The Wandering Jew‘s Soliloquy‘ and The 
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Wandering Jew; or, The Victim of the Eternal Avenger (1811). The image of God, according 
to this sceptical Jew, is a merciless tyrant. In ‗The Wandering Jew‘s Soliloquy‘, this negative 
image of God is first expressed: ‗Tyrant of Earth [God]! pale Misery‘s jackall (sic) thou! / 
Are there no stores of vengeful violent fate / Within the magazines of thy fierce hate?‘ (11-
13).
48
 The image of this avenging God emerges in The Wandering Jew. Employing scientific 
reason to understand this ‗history‘ or Christian folklore, Shelley articulates a materialist 
concept to demonstrate the Jew‘s sufferings: ‗‘Twas then I fell on the ensanguined earth, / 
And cursed the mother who gave me birth! / My maddened brain could bear no more—‘ (The 
Wandering Jew, 849-51).
49
 By inference, Ahasuerus‘s punishment is meted out by Christian 
‗mobs‘ instead of God. God‘s ‗curse‘ on Ahasuerus of eternal wanderings on Earth is simply 
Christian cruelty in the guise of Christian ‗justice‘. Like some mild religious dissidents, 
Ahasuerus is a victim who is physically assaulted and exiled until his death. In his Preface to 
The Wandering Jew, Shelley points to his demythologising perspective and regards the role 
of this wandering Jew simply as ‗an imaginary personage‘ instead of ‗the reality of his 
existence‘.50 Shelley employs the concept of materiality to re-examine the consequences of 
being an anti-Christian dissident in a Christian world. The ‗brain‘ (WJ, 851), in Shelley‘s 
materialist understanding, is the only receptor of sufferings and becomes a corporeal hell. 
This image of the Wandering Jew, for Shelley, relates to John Milton‘s scepticism 
about religious ideology. Satan in Milton‘s Paradise Lost (1668) is, for Shelley, another 
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Ahasuerus. Milton‘s material ‗hell‘ is stated in the epigraph of The Wandering Jew: ‗Which 
way I fly is hell—myself am hell‘ (TWJ, 1). Due to his denial of Christian values, Satan, as a 
symbol of every religious dissident, may also endure ‗hellish‘ physical tortures. In Queen 
Mab, the ghost of Ahasuerus exemplifies Shelley‘s materialist scepticism.  
The return of Ahasuerus‘s ghost goes some way to explain Shelley‘s sceptical critique 
of Christianity. Unsatisfied with this Christianity-centred society, Shelley endeavours to 
defend this demonised sceptic (Ahasuerus) and, more importantly, to revive a sceptical 
philosophy that was overshadowed by a Christianity-based society. Whilst the Spirit 
symbolises an individual mind, Ahasuerus relates to a sceptic or dissident in ancient times 
who questions Christianity. In Canto VII, the encounter between Ahasuerus‘s ghost and the 
Spirit of Ianthe reflects the ethos of the Enlightenment in which people are encouraged to use 
reason to attain absolute ‗truth‘ through sceptical questioning. After Shelley‘s attack on 
monarchy, in Canto III, the appearance of Ahasuerus – invoked by the Fairy (QM, VII.67) – 
instigates Shelley‘s attempt to approximate ‗truth‘ via the articulation of the figure of 
Ahasuerus set against Christ (QM, VII.84-275). Despite the interrogations of the concept of 
‗truth‘ or ‗reality‘, as Jean Baudrillard raises,51 a comparatively convincing ‗truth‘ is 
continually refined. Shelley‘s notion of reconstructing ‗truth‘ is present in his ‗On Life‘, 
where Shelley employs scepticism and empiricism to reassess epistemology: ‗What follows 
from the admission? It establishes no new truth, it gives us no additional insight into our 
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hidden nature, neither its action, nor itself‘ (‗OL‘, 507). He suggests that the intellectual 
systems should strive to develop a ‗new truth‘ (‗OL‘, 507). This ‗new truth‘ relates to a 
sceptical idea. This reconstructive strategy is also significant for the operations of the mind in 
Queen Mab. In Queen Mab, Shelley gives three stages of the processions of human cognition 
towards nature. At this second stage, of the present, Shelley seeks to subvert the stigma of 
atheism. Ahasuerus, in this Christian discourse, becomes a victim of the ‗original sin‘ of 
atheism. In Shelley‘s Note 14 (QM, VII.67) to Queen Mab, Ahasuerus is condemned by ‗an 
angel of death‘ as a ‗Barbarian‘ who ‗denied rest to the Son of Man [Jesus]‘ when Jesus 
Christ ‗was wearied with the burthen of his ponderous cross, and wanted to rest before the 
door of Ahasuerus‘ (CPPBS, 278). Ahasuerus is eventually punished by walking the earth 
until Jesus ‗comes to judge the world‘ at the Last Judgement (CPPBS, 278). Shelley‘s 
interpretation of this episode is different from a traditional Christian point of view. Ahasuerus 
is physically tortured by Christians instead of being ‗cursed‘ by God and wandering the earth 
alone until the Last Judgement. Ahasuerus is a striking example through which Shelley 
attempts to expound the vices of those revengeful Christians: ‗When I [Ahasuerus] awoke 
hell burned within my brain, / Which staggered on its seat; for all around / The mouldering 
relics of my kindred lay, / Even as the Almighty‘s ire arrested them, / And in their various 
attitudes of death / My murdered children‘s mute and eyeless sculls / Glared ghastily (sic) 
upon me‘ (QM, VII.186-92). This suggests that Ahasuerus endures physical tortures inflicted 
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by Jesus‘s followers and this physical pain is like ‗hell burn[ing] within [his] brain‘ (QM, 
VII.186). The ‗brain‘ (VII.186), in Shelley‘s materialist understanding, is the ‗seat‘ (QM, 
VII.187) of our sense of existence and feelings. In addition, other atheists or religious 
dissidents are murdered, along with Ahasuerus‘s innocent children (QM, VII.188-92). 
Ahasuerus responds to the Spirit‘s question – ‗Is there a God?‘ (QM, VII.83) – by means of a 
negating philosophy: ‗Is there a God!—aye, an almighty God, / And vengeful as 
almighty! …‘ (QM, VII.84-85). This ironic answer demonstrates Shelley‘s intention to 
overturn Christian values. That is, God is not at all sympathetic, but only ‗vengeful‘ (QM, 
VII.85). This negation of God is evident earlier in the subtitle of Shelley‘s The Wandering 
Jew which refers to God as ‗the Eternal Avenger‘. Shelley‘s disgust at the Christian God is 
clearly expressed in Ahasuerus‘s address: ‗… Once his [God‘s] voice / Was heard on earth: 
earth shuddered at the sound; / The fiery-visaged firmament expressed / Abhorrence, and the 
grave of nature yawned / To swallow all the dauntless and the good / That dared to hurl 
defiance at his throne, / Girt as it was with power. …‘(QM, VII.85-91). Shelley continually 
negates the mercy of the Christian God and reveals God‘s tyranny to weed out naturally good 
dissidents: ‗To swallow all the dauntless and the good / That dared to hurl defiance at his 
[God‘s] throne,‘ (QM, VII.89-90). As a result, the ‗almighty God‘ (QM, VII.84), in Shelley‘s 
interpretation, is simply an ‗omnipotent fiend‘ (QM, VII.97) and ‗insensate mob‘ (QM, 
VII.239) ‗[o]f tyrannous omnipotence‘ (QM, VII.93) and God‘s ‗justice‘ (QM, VII.126) is 
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essentially only ‗blind revenge‘ (QM, VII.125). 
Advocating scientific reasoning and scepticism, Shelley persists in refuting the 
Christian belief through his depiction of Ahasuerus‘s ghost. Ahasuerus‘s address conveys 
Shelley‘s abhorrence of those legitimated prophets who deceive unintelligent followers. The 
arch prophet, Moses, according to Shelley, is a ‗murderer‘ (QM, VII.100), an ‗[a]ccomplice 
of omnipotence in crime, / And confidant of the all-knowing one [God]‘ (QM, VII.103-04), 
but exerts his religious influence to destroy human nature that desires freedom of thought: 
… None but slaves 
Survived,—cold-blooded slaves, who did the work 
Of tyrannous omnipotence; whose souls 
No honest indignation ever urged 
To elevated daring, to one deed 
Which gross and sensual self did not pollute. 
These slaves built temples for the omnipotent fiend [God], 
Gorgeous and vast: the costly altars smoked 
With human blood, and hideous pæans rung 
Through all the long-drawn aisles. A murderer heard 
His voice in Egypt, one whose gifts and arts 
Had raised him to his eminence in power, 
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Accomplice of omnipotence in crime, 
And confidant of the all-knowing one [God]. (QM, VII.91-104) 
Shelley‘s humanistic spirit discloses the potential values of religious followers. Shelley 
considers these followers as unwise or naturally evil as ‗cold-blooded slaves‘ (QM, VII.92), 
who help to remove the religious Other (namely, those who defy Christianity) in order to 
establish a Christian kingdom: ‗… None but slaves / Survived,—cold-blooded slaves, who 
did the work / Of tyrannous omnipotence; whose souls / No honest indignation ever urged / 
To elevated daring, …‘ (QM, VII.91-95). In the end, Shelley overturns the image of Moses, 
rendering him not as a virtuous prophet, but as a murderer who fears God‘s punishment (or 
the pangs of Moses‘s own conscience) and, finally, obeys ‗the omnipotent fiend‘ (QM, VII.97) 
and enslaves the human mind: ‗Even the murderer‘s [Moses‘s] cheek / Was blanched with 
horror, and his quivering lips / Scarce faintly uttered—―O almighty one [Jehovah], / I tremble 
and obey!‖‘ (QM, VII.158-60). 
This scenario of Ahasuerus‘s anti-Christianity, in Canto VII, does not end until 
Ahasuerus‘s ghost unveils Jesus‘s vice to the Spirit (QM, VII.161-266). Shelley uses 
Ahasuerus‘s figure to rethink those Christian self-centred values. Shelley‘s concept of 
materialist empiricism suggests that thought processes within the brain, which are constructed 
through sense experience, have the ability to affect our judgement and action. Unfortunately, 
Jesus‘s Christian ideology, according to Ahasuerus, has dominated this thinking ‗brain‘ (QM, 
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VII.162) for ‗centuries‘ (QM, VII.161): ‗O Spirit! centuries have set their seal / On this heart 
of many wounds, and loaded brain, / Since the Incarnate [Jesus] came: …‘ (QM, VII.161-63). 
Ahasuerus offers an alternative perspective from which to re-examine Jesus‘s origin: 
… humbly he [Jesus] came, 
Veiling his horrible Godhead in the shape 
Of man, scorned by the world, his name unheard, 
Save by the rabble of his native town, 
Even as a parish demagogue. He led 
The crowd; he taught them justice, truth, and peace, 
In semblance; but he lit within their souls 
The quenchless flames of zeal, and blest the sword 
He brought on earth to satiate with the blood 
Of truth and freedom his malignant soul. 
At length his mortal frame was led to death. (QM, VII.163-73) 
In this anti-Christian view, Jesus is ‗… in the shape / Of man …‘ (QM, VII.164-65) with 
God‘s vice — ‗horrible Godhead‘ (QM, VII.164) — and incites ‗the rabble of his native 
town‘ (QM, VII.166) to rebellion under the disguise of ‗justice, truth, and peace‘ (QM, 
VII.168). Different from an image of love and mercy in Christianity, Jesus, in Ahasuerus‘s 
eyes, becomes a ‗mortal‘ (QM, VII.173) advocate of the devil. In addition to Jesus‘s 
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incitement to riot and trickery in religion, Ahasuerus also points to the main reasons for 
Jesus‘s prosecution: ‗The massacres and miseries which his name / Had sanctioned in my 
country …‘ (QM, VII.177-78). The wrong-doer, in Ahasuerus‘s view, is Jesus as ‗… he 
[Jesus] lit within their [Jesus‘s country mobs‘] souls / The quenchless flames of zeal, and 
blest the sword / He brought on earth to satiate with the blood / Of truth and freedom his 
malignant soul‘ (QM, VII.169-72). Jesus here is regarded as the leader of mobs and a 
‗malignant soul‘ (QM, VII.172), who only accepts a narrowly defined ‗truth and freedom‘ 
(QM, VII.172). Compared with the freedom afforded by atheism, Jesus‘s crime, according to 
Ahasuerus, does not warrant his sympathy. Consequently, Ahasuerus rejects the fatigued 
Jesus ‗on the torturing cross‘ (QM, VII.174) and prior to that refuses him rest at Ahasuerus‘s 
house: ‗… I [Ahasuerus] cried, / ―Go! go!‖ in mockery‘ (QM, VII.178-79). 
The young Shelley employs Ahasuerus‘s statement to disclose the dark history of 
Christianity in order to liberate the imprisoned thinking mind. Scepticism is Shelley‘s 
weapon to attack Christian doctrinal authority. Shelley attempts to re-examine the essence of 
Christianity and the image of Jesus Christ. Ahasuerus embodies Shelley‘s critique of 
Christianity and his rejection of authorities of ‗thought‘: ‗But my soul, / From sight and sense 
of the polluting woe / Of tyranny, had long learned to prefer / Hell‘s freedom to the servitude 
of heaven‘ (QM, VII.193-95). ‗Hell‘ (QM, VII.195), for Ahasuerus, refers to his bodily 
sufferings. Nevertheless, Ahasuerus‘s rejection of Jesus‘s authority and the existence of God 
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demonstrates a reasoning mind capable of denying superstition because, as Ahasuerus notes, 
the Christian ‗heaven‘ (QM, VII.195) is a ‗servitude‘ (QM, VII.195) of the human mind. The 
hypocrisy of Christians and their treatment of Ahasuerus and other atheists are predicted by 
Ahasuerus‘s claim: 
These have I seen, even from the earliest dawn 
Of weak, unstable and precarious power, 
Then preaching peace, as now they practice war; 
So, when they [Christians] turned but from the massacre 
Of unoffending infidels, to quench 
Their thirst for ruin in the very blood 
That flowed in their own veins, and pityless (sic) zeal 
Froze every human feeling, …. (QM, VII.205-12) 
Ahasuerus emphasises that the ‗war‘ (QM, VII.207) and the ‗massacre‘ (QM, VII.208) are 
waged by allegedly peace-loving (QM, VII.207) Christians, whose ‗human feeling‘ (QM, 
VII.212) is so ‗pityless‘ (QM, VII.211) that they slaughter those ‗unoffending infidels‘ (QM, 
VII.209).  
At the end of Canto VII, Ahasuerus articulates a further atheistic perspective to explore 
the oppressed state of human nature and the falsehood of Christianity. Ahasuerus reaffirms to 
the Spirit that Christians beautify the essence of Christianity: ‗… whilst one hand was red / 
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With murder, feign to stretch the other out / For brotherhood and peace; and that they now / 
Babble of love and mercy, whilst their deeds / Are marked with all the narrowness and crime‘ 
(QM, VII.239-43). In other words, ‗brotherhood and peace‘ (QM, VII.241), for those 
Christians, exist only as a verbal manipulation to conceal their ‗narrowness and crime‘ (QM, 
VII.243). As an alternative, Ahasuerus instead introduces the Spirit (Ianthe) to reason in order 
to demythologise religious superstitions and obtain real knowledge: ‗Reason may claim our 
gratitude, who now / Establishing the imperishable throne / Of truth …‘ (QM, VII.245-47).  
Rejecting a Christian worldview Ahasuerus, like other atheistic martyrs, persists in his 
liberty of thought and desire for truth through which the mind can be comparatively 
‗peaceful‘ (QM, VII.256): ‗Thus have I stood,—through a wild waste of years / Struggling 
with whirlwinds of mad agony, / Yet peaceful, and serene, and self-enshrined, / Mocking my 
powerless tyrant‘s horrible curse / With stubborn and unalterable will‘ (QM, VII.254-58). 
Effectively, the role of Ahasuerus articulates Shelley‘s scientific reasoning and scepticism 
against those forms of superstition and religion. Ahasuerus‘s ghost reflects the spirit of the 
past ‗goodness‘ that Shelley attempts to revive, consisting of: ‗The matter of which dreams 
are made / Not more endowed with actual life / Than this phantasmal portraiture / Of 
wandering human thought‘ (QM, VII.272-75).  Returning to his original conviction of reason, 
Shelley redefines Ahasuerus‘s ‗ghost‘ as a material substance or presence of ‗thought‘ (QM, 
VII.275) which questions the authority of Christianity. 
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IV. The Ethics of the Mind 
Shelley‘s proleptic view of the constructs of the mind, stated in the last two cantos of 
Queen Mab (Cantos VIII and IX), evolves into a kind of ethics that monitors the advances of 
a scientific society. Ethics is employed to both reform society and especially the mind. 
Shelley disavows the legitimacy of a Christian moral system and inclines towards scientific 
ethics to guide a brand-new society: ‗The present now is past. / … / The wonders of the 
human world to keep, / Space, matter, time, and mind. Futurity / Exposes now its 
treasure; …‘ (QM, VIII.44-51). Shelley‘s vision influenced Karl Marx‘s vision of an ideal 
socialist society. Bernard Shaw claims that Shelley‘s Queen Mab is ‗the Chartists‘ bible‘ and 
inspired Marxism as a social movement (qtd. in SHTW 45). Shelley‘s ethical concerns and 
values of religion are clearly demonstrated in his works and his correspondences prior to his 
writing of Queen Mab. In Canto VIII and Canto IX, Shelley envisaged that his new 
materialism of the mind will be the basis of establishing a perfect society. 
In Canto VIII, Shelley‘s ethical vision, ‗[l]ove, freedom, [and] health‘ (QM, VIII.15) 
are the tenets of this atheistic life to reach happiness. ‗Love‘ in this context is defined as 
‗sympathy with nature and one‘s fellowmen, tenderness of heart, benevolence‘ (LC, 418).52 
In Shelley‘s materialist concept, a ‗healthy‘ body is the foundation of the workings of the 
sound mind. More significantly, the freedom of the mind and the possession of love promise 
an earthly well-being. Shelley illustrates an earthly utopia without recourse to Christian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 73 
custom. Shelley, through the words of the Fairy, envisages that no religion exists in the future: 
‗All was inflicted here that earth‘s revenge / Could wreak on the infringers of her law; / One 
curse alone was spared—the name of God‘ (QM, VIII.163-65). In the future, all vices of 
kings and priests in the past and the ‗present‘, for Shelley, are ceased. They are all ‗tyrant[s]‘ 
(QM, VIII.181) who torture the human mind and should be despised like ‗worms‘ (QM, 
VIII.184) in the future society: ‗To turn to worms beneath that burning sun, / Where kings 
first leagued against the rights of men, / And priests first traded with the name of God. / 
―Even where the milder zone afforded man / A seeming shelter, yet contagion there, / 
Blighting his being with unnumbered ills,‘ (QM, VIII.184-89). Shelley repeats his negation of 
monarchy and the church in this future stage. The ‗… milder zone [that] afforded man / A 
seeming shelter …‘ (QM, VIII.187-88) alludes to the church that advocates peace. 
Nevertheless, Shelley doubts the necessity of the ‗milder‘ (QM, VIII.187) church as it still 
spreads ‗contagion‘ (QM, VIII.188) or superstitious views to the innocent. The church, 
according to Shelley, even prevents the ‗progress‘ (QM, VIII.191) of ‗truth‘ (QM, VIII.190) 
and causes human dignity to become ‗the train-bearer of slaves‘ (QM, VIII.194). According 
to Shelley, ‗slaves‘ refer to Christians, especially priests, as they are enslaved by their 
superstitions and beliefs. At this future stage, Shelley affirms that all negative emotions or 
vices no longer exist in this earthly paradise: ‗All evil passions, and all vain belief, / Hatred, 
despair, and loathing in his mind, / The germs of misery, death, disease, and crime. / No 
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longer now the winged habitants, / That in the woods their sweet lives sing away, / Flee from 
the form of man; …‘ (QM, VIII.216-21). At the end of Canto VIII, Shelley advocates his 
materialist philosophy as a means to realise a secular paradise:  
… happiness 
And science dawn though late upon the earth; 
Peace cheers the mind, health renovates the frame; 
Disease and pleasure cease to mingle here, 
Reason and passion cease to combat there; 
Whilst each unfettered o‘er the earth extend 
Their all-subduing energies, and wield 
The sceptre of a vast dominion there; 
Whilst ever shape and mode of matter lends 
Its force to the omnipotence of mind, 
Which from its dark mine drags the gem of truth 
To decorate its paradise of peace.‖ (QM, VIII.227-38) 
[S]cience (QM, VIII.228), according to Shelley, is the major factor to enable happiness or 
peace of the mind. The development of the mind or cognitive development in the ‗future‘ is 
based on scientific reasoning instead of religious teachings. This passage foreshadows 
Shelley‘s Prometheus Unbound (1818-1819), in which the Titan, Prometheus, is rescued by 
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Hercules and becomes ‗Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free‘ (Prometheus Unbound, 
IV.577).
53
 Likewise, the mind in Queen Mab is finally ‗unfettered‘ (QM, VIII.232) and 
obtains ‗dominion‘ (QM, VIII.234) or autonomy: ‗Whilst each unfettered o‘er the earth 
extend / Their all-subduing energies, and wield / The sceptre of a vast dominion there;‘ (QM, 
VIII. 232-34). Shelley even suggests that ‗matter‘ (QM, VIII.235) or materiality is the ‗force‘ 
(QM, VIII.236) of the mind and that only the autonomous mind discovers ‗truth‘ (QM, 
VIII.237) and ‗paradise‘ (QM, VIII.238). 
In the last canto of Queen Mab (Canto IX), Shelley illustrates his secular idealism by a 
further examination of the mind. The necessities of Shelley‘s idealism include hope, love, and 
virtue, but the young Shelley divorces these values from the institution of the church. The 
rejection of superstition and religion, according to the Fairy, leads to an earthly life of 
happiness or the ‗reality of Heaven‘ (QM, IX.1): 
―O happy Earth! reality of Heaven! 
To which those restless souls that ceaselessly 
Throng through the human universe, aspire; 
Thou consummation of all mortal hope! 
Thou glorious prize of blindly-working will! 
Whose rays, diffused throughout all space and time, 
Verge to one point and blend for ever there: 
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Of purest spirits thou pure dwelling-place! 
Where care and sorrow, impotence and crime, 
Languor, disease, and ignorance dare not come: 
O happy Earth, reality of Heaven! (QM, IX.1-11) 
Shelley‘s philosophy of Heaven echoes Greek Epicureanism, in which secular happiness is 
the ultimate wish of one‘s existence. This Greek philosophy was revived particularly by 
French materialists. French materialism not only attacks religion but develops atheistic ethics 
to improve human life. In one of Shelley‘s favourite materialist works, The System of Nature 
(1770), D‘Holbach claims that happiness is the ultimate goal in a materialist world and 
knowing one‘s own self-nature can lead to happiness: ‗The source of man's unhappiness is 
his ignorance of Nature‘.54 A constructed ‗happy Earth‘ (QM, IX.1) is the ‗reality of Heaven‘ 
(QM, IX.1). The real ‗Heaven‘, for Shelley, is grounded in scientific practice instead of 
religious imagination or scientifically unproven miracles. Shelley‘s universe is no longer 
related to God but to a human sphere – ‗the human universe‘ (QM, IX.3). Even though 
Shelley once said to Southey that ‗the Universe  is God‘, Shelley explains to Hitchener that 
God is simply another atheistic metaphor for describing the Universe: ‗I tell him [Southey] 
that God is another signification for the Universe‘ (CWPBS Vol. 8, Letters, 142, 227).55 
Shelley‘s ideas of the Universe and God prefigure the assertion of Timothy Leary, American 
atheist materialist and psychologist. Introducing immediate science into religion, Leary 
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redefines the notion of God by basing theism on atheistic science: ‗God is the DNA code‘.56 
This ‗God‘, for Shelley, relates to the material Universe. That is, the Universe is determined 
by the DNA code (God), which shapes living organisms and the thinking brain. Any pursuit, 
as the Fairy advises the Spirit, should rely on tangible hypotheses: ‗Thou consummation of 
all mortal hope!‘ (QM, IX.4). Different from ‗hope‘ in a Christian context, Shelley‘s ‗mortal 
hope‘ (QM, IX.4) is earthly and scientific. In other words, Shelley implies the worthlessness 
of a religious ‗hope‘ in miracles or God‘s mercy. Shelley‘s scientific claim for hope is 
illuminated in Canto VIII, where the necessity of ‗science‘ (QM, VIII.228) is equal to that of 
‗happiness‘ (QM, VIII.227). For Shelley, the mind at the future stage requires a ‗pure 
dwelling-place‘ (QM, IX.8) to reach happiness. Shelley suggests that this ‗pure dwelling-
place‘ (QM, IX.8) only accepts science and rejects religion as religious paradoxes can only 
pollute the land as well as the ‗purest‘ (QM, IX.8) mind:57 ‗Of purest spirits thou pure 
dwelling-place! / Where care and sorrow, impotence and crime, / Languor, disease, and 
ignorance dare not come:‘ (QM, IX.8-10). Those negative elements, such as ‗… care and 
sorrow, impotence and crime, / languor, disease, and ignorance …‘ (QM, IX.9-10), allude to 
religious contamination and perils. Shelley, therefore, suggests that with scientific reasoning 
those characteristics cannot ‗come‘ (QM, IX.10) into the mind. 
In the earlier Cantos, Shelley disputed the disguised philanthropism of Christianity via 
the diverse vices of Christians. Christians, for Shelley, are ‗inhuman and uncultured‘ (QM, 
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II.149): ‗There an inhuman and uncultured race / Howled hideous praises to their Demon-
God; / They rushed to war, …‘ (QM, II.149-51). Instead, Shelley‘s true philanthropism is 
revealed in Canto II and strengthened in the last Cantos. In Canto II, Shelley‘s view of love 
or virtue is presented in his idealist dwelling ‗[i]n a celestial palace‘ (QM, II.60). In Queen 
Mab, the Fairy reminds the Spirit to ‗[l]earn to make others happy …‘ (QM, II.64) and 
suggests the significance of the past, the present, and the future (QM, II.65-67). The revival 
of the Greco-Roman spirit helps unfetter the shackles of the mind from Christian dogmas 
(QM, II.162-81) and warns against ‗Where Socrates expired, a tyrant‘s slave, / A coward and 
a fool, spreads death around— / Then, shuddering, meets his own. / Where Cicero and 
Antoninus lived, / A cowled and hypocritical monk / Prays, curses and deceives‘ (QM, 
II.176-81).     
In this revolutionary poem, Shelley rethinks the traditional and religious constructs of 
the mind by means of scientific reasoning. Shelley does this by integrating the natural 
emotion – love – into his discussion of reason. Different from Descartes‘s or Kant‘s absolute 
reason to attain happiness, Shelley places his emphasis on the union of the body and the soul. 
Shelley‘s anti-dualism does not lead him to adopt an anti-virtue or anti-goodness stance, as 
exhibited by Christianity‘s condemnation of atheists. In the last scene of Queen Mab, love or 
affectionate attachment is illuminated during Henry‘s gaze on Ianthe: ‗She [Ianthe] looked 
around in wonder and beheld / Henry, who kneeled in silence by her [Ianthe‘s] couch / 
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Watching her sleep with looks of speechless love,‘ (QM, IX.236-38). Henry, although 
narrowly defined by critics as Ianthe‘s lover,58 more generally refers to the carer of the 
‗[m]oveless‘ (QM, IX.235) Ianthe. Not necessarily Ianthe‘s lover, Henry is a friend, a nurse, a 
family member, or a benevolent stranger who willingly cares for the severely injured Ianthe: 
‗Henry, who kneeled in silence by her couch, / Watching her sleep with looks of speechless 
love‘ (QM, IX.237-38). In this sense, ‗virtue‘ (QM, IX.205) is Shelley‘s broader sense of love 
or benevolence in the future: ‗Which thou hast now received: virtue shall keep / Thy 
footsteps in the path that thou has trod, / And many days of beaming hope shall bless / Thy 
spotless life of sweet and sacred love‘ (QM, IX.205-08). Only through ‗beaming hope‘ (QM, 
IX.207) the world can reach an asexual happiness which consists of a ‗spotless life of sweet 
and sacred love‘ (QM, IX.208).  Earlier in ‗Henry and Louisa‘ (1809)59 of his Esdaile 
Notebook, Shelley characterises Henry as a persona of virtue or philanthropism and this 
image persists in Queen Mab. Influenced by ethical philosophy from Benedict de Spinoza 
(1632-1677)
60
 – via Drummond‘s sceptical philosophy in Academical Questions and later 
Shelley‘s own translation of Spinoza‘s work – Shelley adopts Spinoza‘s notion that reason 
and emotion should reconcile with each other in the new age. Spinoza‘s Ethics were an 
influential moral philosophy in the long eighteenth century. In Part III, ‗Concerning the 
Origin and Nature of the Emotions‘ of Ethics, Spinoza regards himself as the first one to 
determine ‗the nature and force of the emotions‘ and guides the reader to the necessity of 
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emotion by interrogating Descartes‘s conviction of absolute reason that ‗the human mind had 
absolute power in its actions‘.61 Spinoza‘s scepticism grows into an emotional discourse. 
Spinoza accepts emotions as a positive part of human nature: ‗For such emotions as hate, 
wrath, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and ability of 
nature …‘ (Ethics, 84). Shelley‘s concept of nature echoes Spinoza‘s. In Canto VIII, Shelley 
points to the relationship between nature and the mind as well as emotion: ‗All evil passions, 
and all vain belief, / Hatred, despair, and loathing in his [the human being‘s] mind, / The 
germs of misery, death, disease, and crime‘ (QM, VIII.216-17). With the advent of a 
scientific age (QM, VIII.228), those previous conflicts between the issues of reason and 
passion or emotion vanish: ‗Reason and passion cease to combat there;‘ (QM, VIII.231). 
Shelley‘s ethics in Queen Mab more closely approximates scientific and secular pursuits 
rather than Spinoza‘s superficially God grounded ethics.62 
Love that obeys a ‗natural‘ or genetic law, Shelley believes, can improve the world 
without religious morality. Shelley has examined the enchanted force of love in his love 
poems, in the Esdaile Notebook, to Harriet Grove – Shelley‘s unsuccessful love affair before 
his marriage to Harriet Westbrook. Many of Shelley‘s works, including Alastor, 
Epipsychidion, and Prometheus Unbound, continue to centre on this subject. In Queen Mab, 
Shelley‘s ‗love‘ is secular and cultivated by the ‗purest‘ mind, that is, a mind without the 
shackled dogma. Shelley‘s philosophy of the mind not merely devastates all fettered 
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authorities, including religion, monarchy, and government, but advocates a secular love as a 
significant force to advance the world. Love is not only an emotional concept, but a peaceful 
foundation for a perfect society. At an imagined ‗future‘ stage in Queen Mab, Shelley 
replaces religious ‗love‘ or virtue with natural love: 
―Then, that sweet bondage which is freedom‘s self, 
And rivets with sensation‘s softest tie 
The kindred sympathies of human souls, 
Needed no fetters of tyrannic law: 
Those delicate and timid impulses 
In nature‘s primal modesty arose, 
And with undoubting confidence disclosed 
The growing longings of its dawning love, 
Unchecked by dull and selfish chastity, 
That virtue of the cheaply virtuous, 
Who pride themselves in senselessness and frost. 
No longer prostitution‘s venomed bane 
Poisoned the springs of happiness and life; 
Woman and man, in confidence and love, 
Equal and free and pure together trod 
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The mountain-paths of virtue, which no more 
Were stained with blood from many a pilgrim‘s feet. (QM, IX.76-92) 
This stanza conveys Shelley‘s ethical concern beyond a Christian framework. This primitive 
pursuit refers to the freedom of the mind as Shelley believes that ‗human souls‘ or minds 
naturally interact with our sensations and this genetic law is an alternative ‗sweet bondage‘ 
(QM, IX.76). In other words, this natural good, sympathy, or love does not need any religious 
or ‗moral‘ force to ‗purify‘ the mind. Such ‗moral‘ force or religious teaching has become the 
‗fetters‘ (QM, IX.79) of the mind due to the domination of ‗tyrannic law‘ (QM, IX.79) or 
religious dogma. This natural goodness, in Shelley‘s view, is as simple as physical ‗impulses‘ 
(QM, IX.80) or neurons that activate unexplainable feelings in the brain activity, including: 
‗Those delicate and timid impulses / In nature‘s primal modesty arose,‘ (QM, IX.80-81). 
Shelley‘s conception of these workings of the mind echoes Hartley‘s neural psychology, in 
which the mind is connected to a series of neural vibrations or ‗impulses‘. In this stanza, 
‗nature‘s primal modesty‘ (QM, IX.81) is the genetic or natural goodness. Shelley terms this 
feeling as ‗love‘ (QM, IX.83). False love emerges in the ‗future‘ as religiously ‗dull and 
selfish chastity‘ (QM, IX.84) or ‗virtue of the cheaply virtuous‘ (QM, IX.85) and no longer 
interferes with the secular life, as Shelley writes: ‗No longer prostitution‘s venomed bane / 
Poisoned the springs of happiness and life;‘ (QM, IX.87-89). Shelley constructs a vision of 
love in the future world which incorporates an equality of gender and the mind without 
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recourse to Christian vices: ‗Woman and man, in confidence and love, / Equal and free and 
pure together trod / The mountain-paths of virtue, which no more / Were stained with blood 
from many a pilgrim‘s feet‘ (QM, IX.89-92). Shelley‘s concept of ‗virtue‘ (QM, IX.91) is 
disconnected from religion‘s self-evident ‗virtue‘. The Christian ‗virtue‘, for Shelley, 
disguises brutal killings ‗… stained with blood from many a pilgrim‘s feet‘ (QM, IX.92). 
Earlier in Canto V, Shelley relates religion to ‗selfishness‘ (QM, V.22) and a source of 
‗horrors‘ (QM, V.24): ‗Twin-sister of religion, selfishness! / Rival in crime and falsehood, 
aping all / The wanton horrors of her bloody play;‘ (QM, V.22-24). In this future stage, 
Shelley removes religious hypocrisy and envisages an ideal world where only science and 
love guide humans to an earthly paradise. 
Focusing on the science of the mind, as recognised in this chapter, discloses Shelley‘s 
atheistic thinking about the human mind in Queen Mab. This scientific monism, for Shelley, 
connects scientific reasoning to a new sense of the possibility of atheistic ethics. In Queen 
Mab, all ‗custom‘ in government, religion, and monarchy are re-examined in order to 
establish a more humanistic age to liberate those oppressed thoughts and actions, which cause 
negative emotions in the mind. In an imagined future age, scientific thinking is a necessity to 
help the mind understand the materialist world and, ultimately, obtain happiness – the 
optimal emotional state. As anticipated by Shelley‘s Queen Mab, our current science 
continually aspires towards a perfect society that provides health, freedom, and love. Despite 
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the weakening of the authorities of existent monarchy, religion, and the forming of 
democratic governments in our age, Shelley‘s scientific idealism remains unattained some 
two hundred years after Queen Mab. Nevertheless, Shelley‘s revolutionary poetics of the 
mind, reason, and atheism introduces the reader to the complexity of human life, as well as 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Carlo Collodi is the pen-name of Carlo Lorenzini (1826-1890). Collodi‘s idea of the fairy 
derives from a European tradition of fairytales. This empiricist concept of a walking puppet 
echoes the design of Condillac‘s walking statue and Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein. More 
significantly, the sentimental quest of an ‗artificial boy‘ and the appearance of a fairy 
reappear in a science fiction genre, for example Steven Spielberg‘s Artificial Intelligence or 
A.I. (2001), which is based on Brian Aldiss‘s short story entitled ‗Super-Toys Last All 
Summer Long‘ and Stanley Kubrick‘s A. I. The ‗Blue Fairy‘ is particularly named in 
Spielberg‘s A.I. In Collodi‘s Pinocchio, the girl who rescues the hanging Pinocchio is 
described as ‗a good-hearted fairy‘ with blue hair ‗liv[ing] in [a] wood for more than a 
thousand years‘. See Carlo Collodi, Pinocchio, trans. E. Harden (London: Puffin, 1974) rpt. 
1996, 84. Brian Wilson Aldiss, Supertoys Last All Summer Long: And Other Stories of 
Future Time (New York: Griffin, 2001). Hereafter SLASL. ‗A.I. Artificial Intelligence‘, 
IMDb [the Internet Database], Web, 27 Feb. 2011. 
2
 Regarding the Celtic mythology and Shakespeare‘s mention of Queen Mab, see James 
Mackillop, A Dictionary of Celtic Mythology, 1998 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004) 179; ‗Mab‘, 
Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010 ed., Web, 25 Mar. 2010. 
3
 David Duff reads Queen Mab as a romance, yet Christopher R. Miller regards it as a 
fairytale. See David Duff, Romance and Revolution: Shelley and the Politics of a Genre 
(Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge UP, 1994) rpt. 1996, 54-114. Christopher R. 
Miller, ‗Happily Ever After? The Necessity of Fairytale in Queen Mab‘, The Unfamiliar 
Shelley, ed. Alan M. Weinberg and Timothy Webb (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2009) 69-84. Hereafter US as the title of Weinberg and Webb‘s book and ‗HEA‘ for Miller‘s 
article.  
4
 All quotations of Queen Mab come from Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat, eds. Shelley’s 
Poetry and Prose: Authoritative Texts, Criticism (New York: Norton, 2002). Hereafter SPP. 
According to Reiman and Fraistat, Queen Mab is composed ‗primarily between April 1812 
and mid-February 1813‘ (SPP, 15). Hereafter Queen Mab is abbreviated as QM. 
5
 Even though my thesis centres on the materiality of emotion, the materialist phenomena of 
the mind can affirm the hypothesis of emotional materials.  
6
 See Alan Richardson, British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2001). 
7
 Joseph Barrell, Shelley and the Thought of His Time: A Study in the History of Ideas (New 
Haven: Yale UP, 1947) rpt. 1967. Hereafter STHT. Desmond King-Hele, Shelley: His 
Thought and Work (London: Macmillan; New York: St Martin‘s, 1960). Hereafter SHTW. 
Ross Greig Woodman, The Apocalyptic Vision in the Poetry of Shelley (Toronto: U of 
Toronto P, 1964). Hereafter AVPS. Critics, including Hugh Roberts, Alan Richardson, Paul 
Hamilton, and Merle A. Williams, though not exclusively examining Queen Mab, also follow 
Barrell, King-Hele, and Woodman, who revived the significance of the long eighteenth-
century philosophy and science in Shelley‘s studies. Roberts demonstrates Shelley‘s 
ambivalence between Lucretian materialism and Romantic idealism. Hamilton provides an 
overall analysis of Shelley‘s inheritance of materialism (Holbach) and empiricism (Hume) in 
Queen Mab. See Hugh Roberts, Shelley and the Chaos of History: A New Politics of Poetry 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1997). Paul Hamilton, ‗Literature and 
Philosophy‘, The Cambridge Companion to Shelley, ed. Timothy Morton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2006) 166-84. Hereafter ‗L&P‘. Merle A. Williams, ‗Contemplating Facts, 
Studying Ourselves: Aspects of Shelley‘s Philosophical and Religious Prose‘, US, 199-219. 
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8
 SHTW. 27-47. 
9
 See C. E. Pulos, The Deep Truth: A Study of Shelley’s Scepticism (Lincoln, NE: U of 
Nebraska P, 1962). Hereafter DT. 
10
 Miller simply relates ‗Shelley‘s radical ideas‘ to the ‗structuring frame‘ of fairytale which 
derives from David Duff‘s approach of ‗romance‘ (‗HEA‘, 70). 
11
 Prior to Queen Mab, Shelley‘s distrust of religious dogmatism in his early works, including 
his first published atheistic and gothic novel – Zastrozzi: A Romance (1810) – and The 
Necessity of Atheism (1811), reveals the foundation of his controversial philosophy that is 
developed further in Queen Mab. The Necessity of Atheism is the bolder of these two earlier 
works and instigated his expulsion from Oxford University in March 1811. 
12
 Barrell, King-Hele, and Hamilton all recognise the significance of Queen Mab throughout 
Shelley‘s literary career. Barrell regards Queen Mab as ‗the most purely philosophical poem 
that Shelley ever wrote‘ (STHT, 64). King-Hele claims that Queen Mab is ‗the clearest and 
sharpest of his attacks on society-as-it-is‘ (194-95). Hamilton, like King-Hele, notes that 
Queen Mab is ‗Shelley‘s first long poem‘ (173). Nevertheless, Kenneth Neil Cameron notes 
that ‗Henry and Louisa‘ (1809) is ‗Shelley‘s first attempt at a long poem‘ (260) and this 
‗radical social philosophy‘ (261) influences Queen Mab. Desmond King-Hele, Erasmus 
Darwin and the Romantic Poets (London: Macmillan, 1986) 194-95. Hereafter EDRP. ‗L&P‘, 
166-84, 173. Percy Bysshe Shelley, The Esdaile Notebook: A Volume of Early Poems, ed. 
Kenneth Neill Cameron (London: Faber, 1964) 260-61. Hereafter EN. 
13
 Even though research about human intelligence is challenged to some degree, the 
understanding of the workings of the human mind, for example genius or autism, remains 
fascinating to scientists. As a specialist of genetics and human behaviour, Matt Ridley states 
the interrelationship between nature and nurture: ‗IQ is approximately 50 per cent ―additively 
genetic‖, 25 per cent influenced by the shared environment and 25 per cent influenced by 
environmental factors unique to the individual‘ (90). Ridley also emphasises the influence of 
genes on our ‗self-quest‘ in life: ‗Having ―sporty‖ genes makes you want to practise at sport; 
having ―intellectual‖ genes makes you seek out intellectual activities. The genes are agents of 
nurture‘ (92). Ridley‘s words explain why those ‗intelligent‘ dissidents fight against 
unreasonable custom. From a physiological explanation, without being radical these 
dissidents will feel ‗fettered‘ like genetically fierce animals and, therefore, become unhappy. 
Their struggle is the only direct way to satisfy their oppressed mind or scientifically to 
activate their unconnected neural network in the brain. In Queen Mab, Shelley is a typical 
image of this kind of radical. See Matt Ridley, Nature via Nurture: Genes, Experience and 
What Makes Us Human (London: Fourth, 2003) 90, 92. 
14
 Distinct from neuroscientific psychology that refers the human mind to the materialist 
structure, atheistic metaphysics, although detached from religious hypotheses, denies the 
materiality of the mind. Nevertheless, I recognise that atheistic ‗metaphysics‘ can be 
classified as atheistic materialism because the term ‗mind‘ per se is still a tangible material 
(sign or sound) that is physically received by the brain through sight or hearing. 
15
 This prose, according to Mary Shelley‘s Note to it, was written in 1815. Percy Bysshe 
Shelley, ‗Speculations on Metaphysics‘, The Complete Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. 
Roger Ingpen and W. E. Peck, vol. 7 (London: Benn, 1965) 59-83, 62. Hereafter CWPBS Vol. 
7. 
16
 Like those critics who attempt to bridge the gap between science and Romantic literature, 
Richard Holmes, in his The Age of Wonder, questions the argument of anti-science in 
Romanticism and instead relates Romantic poetry to science. Richard Holmes, The Age of 
Wonder: How the Romantic Generation Discovered the Beauty and Terror of Science 
(London: Harper, 2008) rpt. 2009, xv-xxi.  
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 Richard Holmes claims that ‗[t]he ―infame‖ of Voltaire was the Church in general; but the 
same phrase had also been adopted by the Illuminists [members of secret societies] as its 
motto referring specifically to Christ‘. Richard Holmes, Shelley: The Pursuit, 1974 (London: 
Flamingo, 1994) 200. Hereafter STP. 
18
 Holmes translates and interprets this epigraph in a chapter entitled ‗A Poem and a Wife: 
Queen Mab 1813‘ and emphasises Shelley‘s ‗ideas of changing society‘ (STP, 200). In 
Reiman and Fraistat‘s translation this epigraph reads: ‗Give me somewhere to stand, and I 
will move the earth‘ (SPP, 16). I prefer Holmes‘s version as he incorporates a physical 
‗earth‘ into a social context. 
19
 Percy Bysshe Shelley, The Complete Poetry of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. Donald H. 
Reiman and Neil Fraistat, vol. 2 (Baltimore; London, Johns Hopkins UP, 2000-2004) 503. 
Hereafter, CPPBS as the title of this book.  
20
 In ‗Shelley and Jesus‘, David Fuller discusses Shelley‘s Queen Mab and his other works in 
a religious discourse, drawing on Christianity and Shelley‘s (anti-) religious values. See 
David Fuller, ‗Shelley and Jesus‘, The Durham University Journal 54.2 (1993): 211-23. 
Hereafter DUJ as the title of this journal.  
21
 Twentieth-century physicalism, according to The Oxford English Dictionary, was refined 
by Erich Harth to explain from ‗physical properties and laws‘ in all reality to ‗all mental 
phenomena‘ in 1993. Shelley‘s materialist hypothesis approximates the inference of current 
physicalists who introduce more scientific understanding into the materialism of his day. 
22
 The influence of Berkeley on Shelley, according to Pulos, is demonstrated in Drummond‘s 
Academical Questions and Mary Shelley‘s comments that refer Shelley to ‗a disciple of 
Berkeley‘ (DT, 37). Even so, Shelley‘s philosophy is too diverse to be classified into 
Berkeley‘s empiricism.  
23
 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, British 
Empirical Philosophers: Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and J. S. Mill, ed. A. J. Ayer and 
Raymond Winch (London: Routledge, 1952) 161-290, 178. 
24
 William Drummond, Academical Questions, 1805 (Delmar, NY: Scholars, 1984) 289. 
Hereafter AQ. 
25
 Ann Wroe, Being Shelley: The Poet’s Search for Himself (London: Cape, 2007) 14. 
26
 CWPBS Vol. 8, 232-33, 239-44. 
27
 PWPBS Vol. 5, 215-47. 
28
 Paul Foot, Red Shelley, 1980 (London: Bookmarks, 1988) 13. Hereafter RS. 
29
 Percy Bysshe Shelley, The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. E. B. Murray, vol. 1 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1993) 61-73, 64. Hereafter PWPBS. 
30
 CPPBS Vol. 2, 263-77. 
31
 Note 13 to Queen Mab includes Shelley‘s The Necessity of Atheism and his supplement to 
it, at the end of which Shelley jots down a Latin passage from Spinoza‘s ‗Tract. Theologico-
Pol. chap. i. page 14‘ (CPPBS Vol. 2, 277). Reiman points out ‗Shelley‘s translation of 
Spinoza at Marlow in 1817‘ and details its sources. See Donald H. Reiman, ed. Shelley and 
His Circle, 1773-1822, vol. 8 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1986) 738-39, 738. 
32
 Piaget explored the mind from genetic biology and became an influential psychologist in 
the human development of intelligence in the twentieth century. See Ulrich Müller, Jeremy I. 
M. Carpendale, and Leslie Smith, Introduction, The Cambridge Companion to Piaget, ed. 
Ulrich Müller, Jeremy I. M. Carpendale, and Leslie Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009) 
1-44, 8. Also refer to Jean Piaget, Biology and Knowledge: An Essay on the Relations 
Between Organic Regulations and Cognitive Processes, 1966 (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1971).  
33
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 Percy Bysshe Shelley, ‗Passion‘, EN, 41-42, 42. 
35
 Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi, Shelley’s Goddess: Maternity, Language, Subjectivity (New 
York: Oxford UP, 1992) 3. Hereafter SG. 
36
 Gelpi, quoting Newman Ivey White‘s inquiries, draws on George Ensor‘s Independent 
Man (1806) and the young Shelley‘s thinking of the influence of the nurse‘s ‗milk‘ on the 
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37
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38
 See SLASL. 
39
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40
 Like some Shelley critics who relate Shelley‘s philosophy to metaphysics, Pulos concludes 
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41
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CHAPTER THREE 
New Materialism: Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein (1818) 
My chapter examines modern ideas of materialism, as well as the legacy of eighteenth-
century and early philosophy, in the 1818 version of Frankenstein
1
 to reassess the 
significance of materialism in this novel. This reassessment recognises that Frankenstein is 
enmeshed in a complex exchange of philosophical and scientific ideas to which Mary Shelley 
responded both positively and negatively. Mary Shelley‘s novel, at varying moments in the 
course of its narrative, simultaneously, avows and critiques different philosophic and 
scientific interpretations taken up in relation to its central preoccupation with the subject of 
mind, emotion, and brain. Mary Shelley‘s blurring and critiquing of these various 
philosophical and scientific systems seeks to synthesise them with a view to advocating what 
is understood as a ‗new‘ materialism.2 Through this notion of ‗new‘ materialism Shelley both 
expresses dissatisfaction with and seeks to revise contemporary materialism and metaphysics. 
Shelley‘s ‗new‘ materialism sought to understand the immaterial aspects of the mind and 
emotion in scientific terms. With his application of materialist and scientific principles to 
these immaterial aspects of human nature and experience, Shelley wanted to temper 
philosophical ideas of materialism and metaphysics by recognising those immaterial factors 
of emotion and thought.  
Mary Shelley shared in Shelley‘s and Byron‘s preoccupation with the science of the 
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mind and emotion. The issue of the body, robotics, and cybernetics in Frankenstein closely 
relates to early philosophical and scientific ideas of eighteenth-century materialism, which 
advocated a concept of the mechanical body that encompassed both the human mind and 
emotion. Despite the fact that a number of critics point to scientific overreaching as the key to 
Frankenstein, the connection between eighteenth-century materialism and thinking about the 
mind in this novel has not been fully explored.
3
 In the initial chapters of Frankenstein, Mary 
Shelley introduces the reader to the mechanism of the body by drawing on a materialist 
worldview both to expose the limitations of this model and to explain the complexities of the 
mind. Due to the inadequacy of scientific evidence in support of the hypothesis that ‗matter‘ 
is the only substance that can comprise a living body, eighteenth-century French materialism 
faced strong opposition from those who believed in the immortality of the ‗spirit‘ or ‗soul‘.  
What I understand as ‗new materialism‘4 in Frankenstein inherits certain assumptions 
from French materialism, as well as Hellenic philosophy, and develops the connection 
between the concept of machine and living organism in a bid to reconcile the intangible mind 
with the physical world. From a materialist perspective, the mind or the ‗soul‘ is seen as an 
extension of the physical body. This thinking also finds an affinity with later notions of 
physicalism which, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, operates with the assumption 
that ‗physical processes‘ can ‗account for all mental phenomena‘.5  
Frankenstein acts as a conduit for dialogues between these types of materialism and 
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other philosophical discourses much debated in Mary Shelley‘s own time. The breadth of 
Mary Shelley‘s readings in the arts and sciences explains the extent to which Victor 
Frankenstein
6
 crosses the boundaries between literary and scientific perspectives.
7
 This 
chapter on Frankenstein draws together the often polarised perspectives of literature and 
science, Creationism and reason, Stoicism and Epicureanism, vitalism and materialism, and 
Romantic idealism and scientific realism. 
 
I. Alchemy and Hellenism: From the Body to the Emotions 
In Frankenstein, the novel‘s discourse of the body is rooted in a materialist worldview, 
which is closely related to the alchemists‘ ultimate desire for the mystery of vitality and the 
natural philosophers‘ theory of the elixir of life. Frankenstein is a symbol of both 
Enlightenment man
8
 and a mysterious alchemist, as is evident in his explanation for the 
reason that he strives to discover the secret of life: 
I saw how the fine form of man was degraded and wasted; I beheld the 
corruption of death succeed to the blooming cheek of life; I saw how the worm 
inherited the wonders of the eye and brain. I paused, examining and analysing all 
the minutiae of causation, as exemplified in the change from life to death, and 
death to life … I alone should be reserved to discover so astonishing a secret.9 
By implication, Frankenstein challenges the irreversibility of death by scientifically 
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discovering ‗the minutiae of causation‘ (F, 30) of life and death. His fascination with the 
secret of re-animation and his quest for the ‗elixir‘ of life or the Philosopher‘s Stone is 
derived from early alchemists, such as Cornelius Agrippa (1486-1535). In Mary Shelley‘s 
novel, Agrippa‘s theory stimulates Frankenstein to discover the secret of life.10 Despite his 
father‘s mockery of alchemy, Frankenstein continues his enthusiasm for the alchemical 
sciences: 
… My father looked carelessly at the title-page of my book [‗a volume of the 
works of Cornelius Agrippa‘ (F, 21)], and said, ―Ah! Cornelius Agrippa! My 
dear Victor, do not waste your time upon this; it is sad trash.‖  
… I should certainly have thrown Agrippa aside.… It is even possible, that the 
train of my idea [from Agrippa‘s alchemy] would never have received the fatal 
impulse that led to my ruin. But the cursory glance my father had taken of my 
volume by no means assured me that he was acquainted with its contents; and I 
continued to read with the greatest avidity. 
When I returned home, my first care was to procure the whole works of this 
author, and afterwards of Paracelsus and Albertus Magnus. I read and studied the 
wild fancies of these writers with delight…. (F, 21-22) 
In addition to Agrippa and Magnus, Paracelsus was also an influential alchemist who devoted 
himself to experimentation on the human body and influenced the later creation hypotheses 
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of a homunculus (literally, ‗little man‘).11 The alchemists‘ desire for life and immortality is 
the impetus behind the rationalist and scientific Frankenstein taking up alchemy, as he 
gradually realises the limitations of contemporary natural philosophy and its theories of re-
animation. Enlightened by alchemical theories, Frankenstein reluctantly, at first, embarks on 
the creation of ‗a being like [him]self or one of simpler organization‘ (F, 31) but he 
eventually resolves ‗to make the being of a gigantic stature … about eight feet in height, and 
proportionably large‘ (F, 32). It is explicitly clear in the text that alchemy‘s notion of the 
homunculus creation is unable to satisfy Frankenstein‘s ambition.  
Mary Shelley‘s description of alchemy in Frankenstein was influenced by ideas from 
both her father, William Godwin, and partner, Shelley. Both Godwin and Shelley were 
familiar with the studies of alchemy and, inevitably, these interests exerted their influence on 
Mary Shelley‘s imagination in Frankenstein.12 Walter Scott (1771-1832) regarded 
‗Frankenstein‘ as ‗a novel upon the same plan with [Godwin‘s] St Leon‘.13 According to 
Maurice Hindle, ‗Godwin‘s ―alchemical‖ novel, whose hero, a man of Faustian ambitions, 
makes a pact in which he takes the curse of immortality in exchange for the Philosopher‘s 
Stone and the Elixir of Life‘ (‗HFI‘, xxxviii). In Frankenstein, we discover that Frankenstein 
never forgets the fact that his wild imaginative creation was originally enlightened by the 
work of alchemists, even though he is equally familiar with the ‗natural philosophy‘ taught 
by his professors – M. Krempe and M. Waldman – at Ingolstadt (F, 26-28). Frankenstein 
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fuses together the creative theories of alchemy with the practical insights of natural 
philosophy: 
Besides, I had a contempt for the uses of modern natural philosophy [e.g., 
chemistry]. It was very different, when the masters of the science sought 
immortality and power; such views, although futile, were grand: but now the 
scene was changed. The ambition of the inquirer seemed to limit itself to the 
annihilation of those visions on which my interest in science was chiefly founded. 
(F, 27) 
          Frankenstein‘s enthusiasm for re-animation derives from alchemy and prefigures 
scientific explorations in Mary Shelley‘s own time. References to these ‗skills‘ of re-
animation can be found in alchemy, voodoo, mummification, and ancient reanimation myths. 
Contemporary scientific theories and advances of her day informed Mary Shelley‘s depiction 
of Frankenstein‘s understanding of the structure of the body and the principles of life. In 
Frankenstein, these theories included physiology, anatomy, and chemistry (F, 30). For 
Frankenstein, vitality within the mechanical body is ‗a mystery‘ (F, 30): ‗One of the 
phænonema (sic) which had peculiarly attracted my attention was the structure of the human 
frame, and, indeed, any animal endued with life‘ (F, 30). By explaining the mechanism of life, 
re-animation challenged both a theological worldview and the concept of divine design.  
Frankenstein‘s alchemical pursuit, narrated in the opening chapters of Frankenstein, 
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presents a subtle relationship between the physical body and the invisible mind, which had 
also been a source of intrigue for ancient Greek philosophy. Those intricate relations between 
the body and the mind stated in Hellenic philosophy are also reflected in Frankenstein. 
Enlightenment philosophers revisited ancient Greek thought to understand the relationship 
between the body and the mind.
14
 In Hellenic philosophy, the stark differences between 
Stoicism and Epicureanism (or atomism) are reflected in their perspectives on the mind and 
the body. Such prominent debates recurred in the eighteenth century and Mary Shelley‘s own 
time, as well as extending into our own current scientific age. Frankenstein inclines the 
reader towards a materialist worldview, yet suggests that such a model leaves the complexity 
of the mind in Shelley‘s novel unresolved. At the very end, Frankenstein dies in anger and 
agony as death becomes the ultimate resolution for the Monster to cease his agitated mind: 
‗…the bitter sting of remorse may not cease to rankle in my wounds until death shall close 
them for ever‘ [emphasis added] (F, 156). Even today neuroscientists have so far failed to 
locate all the chemical substances that control the mind or emotions. Nevertheless, some 
neurotransmitters have been identified, including acetylcholine, serotonin, and dopamine, and 
go some way to explain the mystery of the mind.
15
 According to such chemical mechanisms, 
the ‗self‘ is the sum of an individual‘s brain activity and is reduced simply to matter rather 
than comprised of a non-material mind capable of linguistic nuances, poetical expression, and 
creative thought. In this materialist account, the studies of physical brain lesions exemplify 
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the direct relationship between the mind and the brain.  
This concept of a mechanism of the mind and the body prevalent in eighteenth-century 
materialism, as found in Cartesian philosophy and theories of La Mettrie discussed later,
16
 
has its origins in early Greek Stoicism and Epicureanism. The original concept of the mind in 
Stoicism was also the dominant worldview of the Epicureans, both of which approximated 
later theories of materialism. In fact, Epicurus‘s philosophy takes the form of ‗reductionism‘ 
and is mainly based on the thoughts of Democritus and Aristotle. The main reason, according 
to Tim O‘Keefe, that Epicureans avoid explaining affections or sensations, as Democritus‘s 
atomism stresses, is that ‗it is unacceptable to abolish sensible qualities from one‘s ontology 
in this way, because the s[c]epticism that results from such a position would make life 
impossible to lead‘.17 Instead, they believed in ‗the reality of sensible qualities‘ (EF, 6) and as 
such, as O‘Keefe argues, ‗[t]he Epicureans are materialists, holding that the only things that 
exist per se are bodies and ―void‖, which is just empty space‘ (EF, 1). Following Epicurus 
(ca. 342-270 B.C.), the influential Epicurean Titus Lucretius Carus (ca. 96-55 B.C.) expresses 
a considerable number of materialist views in his On the Nature of Things (i.e., De rerum 
natura).
18
 Mary Shelley had also read parts of Lucretius‘s writings enjoyed by Shelley. 
Lucretius refuted the hypothesis of the Pythagoreans and Plato that the soul lives in the body 
and escapes with the death of the body. Lucretius, following atomism and Epicureanism, 
contends that the mind, the soul, and the spirit are parts of the body. Regarding atomism of 
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the mind and the mortality of the soul, Lucretius further suggested that the mind is ‗delicate 
and composed of minute particles and elements much smaller than the flowing liquid of water 
or cloud or smoke‘ (221) and ‗when the body has perished, you must confess that the spirit 
[mind, or soul] has passed away, torn to pieces throughout the body‘ (249).19 This atomic 
concept connects with Frankenstein, especially in those moments when Frankenstein 
attempts to unshackle his mind from torment: ‗―Oh! stars, and clouds, and winds, … if ye 
really pity me, crush sensation and memory; let me become as nought…‘ (F, 101). In this 
context, ‗sensation and memory‘ (F, 101) are ascribed to Frankenstein‘s corporeal mind and 
it is suggested that only through death can the mind become ‗nought‘ (F, 101). Such a 
statement echoes Epicureans‘ own attempts to dispel the fear of ‗death‘. Epicurus and 
Epicureans believe in optimism (avoiding pessimistic scepticism, determinism, fatalism) and, 
ultimately, strive to achieve freedom and happiness. 
Unlike the extreme pursuit of Epicureanism for freedom, Stoic materialism emphasised 
the significance of self-control and meditation and these ideas are also detectable in 
Frankenstein. The Stoic school, called ‗the school of the Porch‘ and founded by Zeno of 
Citium, was the ‗main rival of the Epicurean school under the late Republic and early 
Empire‘.20 Like Eastern philosophers, Stoics disapproved of the excess of sensory freedom 
and recognised that environmental stimuli are the source of an agitated mind. Thus, they 
resist excessive sensory pursuits and enjoyments in order to obtain a peaceful ‗mind‘. 
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Frankenstein‘s father (Alphonse) symbolises an absolute Stoic. Revealingly, Frankenstein 
reminds himself of his father‘s words during his studies at Ingolstadt: ‗A human being in 
perfection ought always to preserve a calm and peaceful mind, and never allow passion or a 
transitory desire to disturb his tranquillity‘ (F, 33). This Stoic philosophical viewpoint aims 
to conquer the fear of death and recalls Lucretius‘s materialism: ‗Those maxims of the Stoics, 
that death was no evil, and that the mind of man ought to be superior to despair …‘ (F, 46). 
Even though the fundamental hypothesis of Stoicism approximates materialism, it differs 
from the dualism between the body and the mind debated in the philosophy of Plato and, 
much later, Descartes. Stoic ‗dualism‘ stresses the significance of the body per se. In Stoic 
Studies (1996), A. A. Long indicates that ‗[t]he Stoics distinguish the mind and the soul (of 
which the mind is a part) from the body, but they take the soul itself to be corporeal‘.21 Long 
concludes that Stoicism ‗is not a dualism of matter and incorporeal substance‘ (SS, 226). In 
other words, Stoics emphasise the mechanism of the body but, more importantly, do not 
permit emotion to disturb the corporeal mind. This Stoical idea of resistance to negative 
emotions, observed in Frankenstein, finds an affinity with those materialist accounts of the 
workings of the mind. 
In Frankenstein, Mary Shelley demonstrates a variety of cases in support of Stoical 
materialism. She notices that the mind can be influenced by the environment and other 
outward physical stimuli. Bodily exercise, labour, society, changes in environmental factors, 
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forgiveness, and imagination, as Frankenstein suggests, could dispel negative feelings and 
help to unite a mind at peace with its body. Frankenstein states that ‗exercise and amusement 
would soon drive away such symptoms [of pain]‘ (F, 34) which, in the 1831 version of 
Frankenstein, are specified as ‗incipient disease‘ (HF, 57). Reporting little William‘s death to 
Frankenstein by letter, Frankenstein‘s father stresses the importance of peace of mind: 
                    Come, Victor; not brooding thoughts of vengeance against the assassin, but with 
feelings of peace and gentleness, that will heal, instead of festering the wounds 
of our minds. Enter the house of mourning, my friend, but with kindness and 
affection for those who love you, and not with hatred for your enemies. (F, 45-46) 
Like the Stoic ‗maxim‘ that Frankenstein was taught by his father, Alphonse here suggests 
that anger (from ‗vengeance‘) or ‗hatred‘ is poison to the mind and ‗kindness and affection‘ 
(F, 46) will dispel such ‗evil‘. The way in which emotions change via bodily effort is 
described in Frankenstein‘s ambiguous feelings towards a materialist view: ‗Sometimes I 
could cope with the sullen despair that overwhelmed me … by bodily exercise and by change 
of place, some relief from my intolerable sensations‘ (HF, 97). Mary Shelley‘s novel follows 
Stoic philosophy, but sometimes those practices are found to be invalid and its ideas are 
critiqued by those characters who are overcome by tremendous emotional agitations. A clear 
example of this is the scene set in the Irish prison, where Frankenstein‘s Stoical father 
attempts to dispel Frankenstein‘s sadness and madness by reminding him of his familiar 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 101 
home and family. Frankenstein states: ‗My father tried to awaken in me the feelings of 
affection. He talked of Geneva, which I should soon visit – of Elizabeth [his cousin and wife 
to be], and Ernest [his younger brother] …‘ (F, 127). Nevertheless, Frankenstein‘s father, 
travelling from Geneva to rescue Frankenstein ‗from the vexations of a criminal charge‘ (F, 
126), cannot simply dispel Frankenstein‘s mental trauma through these ‗positive‘ kinds of re-
imaginings. Effectively, Frankenstein‘s trauma is dominated by a ‗negative‘ memory of the 
Monster: ‗The past appeared to me in the light of a frightful dream [i.e., Frankenstein‘s 
ambition for creation]‘ (F, 127). Accordingly, his father‘s Stoic philosophy fails to heal 
Frankenstein‘s broken heart: 
… [My father‘s] words only drew deep groans from me. Sometimes, indeed, I 
felt a wish for happiness; and thought, with melancholy delight, of my beloved 
cousin [Elizabeth]; or longed … to see once more the blue lake and rapid 
Rhone … but my general state of feeling was a torpor.… At these moments I 
often endeavoured to put an end to the existence I loathed …. (F, 127)  
In extreme pain, Frankenstein turns to the alternative notion of a Lucretian suicide or self-
determined death, invoked by his utterance: ‗At these moments I often endeavoured to put an 
end to the existence I loathed …‘ (F, 127). Despite the fact that Stoic materialist principles 
are created to calm the corporeal soul, these seemingly ‗scientific‘ practices in Frankenstein 
still choose to ignore the psychological and emotional effects of pain. Apart from 
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contributing to religious or mystic debates on dualism, Stoicism also sought to convey 
positive values. According to Long, ‗Stoic philosophers maintained that happiness consists in 
living harmoniously … or living in harmony with nature …‘ (SS, 202). More importantly, 
based on ‗Zeno‘s original formulation of the ethical goal‘, Stoics sensed that people‘s 
unhappiness derives from living ‗in conflict‘ (SS, 202). 
With increased understanding of the close relationship between the body and the mind, 
current medical practices evident in the prescription of tranquillizers, Prozac, and emotional 
therapies, though still imperfect, offer some forms of alleviation to the patient. Mary 
Shelley‘s Frankenstein partially advocates the value of Stoic materialist views in order to 
balance Stoic self-control against Epicurean self-liberation. Platonic philosophy is also 
central to how Mary Shelley conceives of her revised form of materialism in Frankenstein, 
which seeks to blend the established views of classical materialism with the recent scientific 
innovations of her own day. A weariness of the perils of excessive freedom, morality or 
ethics is a strikingly cautionary aspect of Mary Shelley‘s own re-examination of Plato‘s 
philosophy which permeates Frankenstein. In ‗On the Symposium‘, Shelley notes that Plato‘s 
attempt to ‗procee[d] those emanations of moral and metaphysical knowledge‘ is because ‗an 
incalculable variety of popular superstitions‘ undermine human values.22 Platonic love, 
derived from Plato‘s Phaedrus and The Symposium, also advocates this harmonious rationale. 
Overwhelming and ‗harmful‘ emotions or excessive sexual impulses are controlled through 
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moral education of self-discipline and ‗reason‘. Christopher Gill states that ‗the ―erotic-
educational‖ relationship … is one between an older and a younger male, in which the older 
initiates the younger into ―virtue‖, as understood in male citizen circles‘. Such a relationship 
is seen as ‗an ideal form of love‘ which is ‗non-sexual [and] philosophical‘ in character.23 
Clearly, Platonism seeks to avoid emotional agitations derived from Eros or sexuality.  
Similar to Stoic philosophy, Platonic reason emphasises the tranquillity of the mind in 
which reason provides an ethical guide and steers the self or the society in the right direction. 
In The Symposium, Socrates conveys the danger of ‗Love‘ to Agathon and Phaedrus and 
stresses the significance of ‗not love‘.24 Poetically, Socrates states his point of view: ‗Peace 
among humankind and windless calm at sea, / Rest for the winds, and sleep for those 
distressed‘ (Symposium, 31). Socrates, through Plato, advocates the importance of peace of 
mind and thinks that reason can be a useful agent to resist powerful emotional stimuli. This 
philosophy of love is demonstrated in Frankenstein and restated in Elizabeth‘s ‗love letter‘ to 
Frankenstein:  
I confess to you, my cousin [Frankenstein], that I love you, and that in my airy 
dreams of futurity you have been my constant friend and companion. But it is 
your happiness I desire as well as my own, when I declare to you, that our 
marriage would render me eternally miserable, unless it were the dictate of your 
own free choice. … I, who have so interested an affection for you, may increase 
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your miseries ten-fold, by being an obstacle to your wishes. [Emphasis added] (F, 
130) 
This art of love for Elizabeth echoes Platonism, which avoids excessive affections. The 
implication is that Platonism teaches Elizabeth to curb the desires of her necessary, but 
passionate, love until the rites of marriage have been satisfied. Elizabeth writes to 
Frankenstein that without love their ‗marriage would render [her] eternally miserable‘ (F, 
130). Essentially Elizabeth longs for romantic or mutual love instead of purely Platonic or 
asexual love, but is still able to practice self-restraint and contain her desires. 
In Frankenstein, the scientific quest for knowledge or progress relates to Epicurean 
freedom, but Stoicism and Platonism provide their own unique ethical framework. Some 
Frankenstein critics condemn the novel as harmful to society due to its preoccupation with 
the potential perils of freedom.
25
 Such condemnation may sound irrational but, if the moral 
values of Stoicism and Platonism are taken into account, Frankensteinian overreaching 
becomes a kind of devastating power and the cause of Frankenstein‘s despair and eventually 
tragic death. In fact, an ethical framework is evident at the end of Frankenstein when 
Frankenstein confesses to his scientific overreaching to Walton: 
I trod heaven in my thoughts [i.e., the rapture of re-animation], now exulting in 
my powers, now burning with the idea of their effects. From my infancy I was 
imbued with high hopes and a lofty ambition; but how am I sunk! Oh! my friend 
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[Walton], if you had known me as I once was, you would not recognize me in 
this state of degradation. Despondency rarely visited my heart; a high destiny 
seemed to bear me on, until I fell, never, never again to rise. [Emphasis added] 
(F, 147) 
The terms of this confession outline Mary Shelley‘s conception of the Fall of Satan and 
Adam, as well as that of Icarus and Phaethon. Some critics also read the novel positively, as 
the disasters in Frankenstein serve as an admonishment to scientists about those potential 
perils of scientific experiments and ambition.
26
 Joseph points out that Mary Shelley creates ‗a 
lasting symbol of the peril of scientific Prometheanism‘ (‗JFI‘, xiii).  The key to the novel 
resides in a recasting of the materialist worldview to incorporate the immateriality of emotion 
and thought, which helped to shape the fabric of Mary Shelley‘s vision in Frankenstein.  
 
II. The Changing Concept of the Mind in the Enlightenment 
With the advances of eighteenth-century medicine, science, and technology, Mary 
Shelley aims to disclose the shortcomings of a materialist perspective through her depiction 
of Frankenstein‘s pursuit of science. Concerned with issues of the body and the mind, as well 
as physical and emotional desire, Enlightenment philosophy also relates to classical Greek 
philosophy. Philosophers in the eighteenth century meditated on the issues of the functions of 
the body. Zoologists provided contributions to these discoveries and invited comparisons 
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between animals, humans, and machines. British and French philosophers attempted to 
discover the mechanism of the human body and mind. In spite of Shelley‘s dissatisfaction 
with contemporary materialism, such materialist assertions also form part of the Shelley 
circle‘s fundamental way of understanding the world and human existence. This acceptance 
of, and resistance to, materialism informs Mary Shelley‘s meditation on materialism in 
Frankenstein. 
In Frankenstein, the motif of freedom, inherited from Epicurean thinking, is explicit as 
freedom is the guarantor of happiness in the view of many eighteenth-century philosophers. 
Mary Shelley creates scenarios for her characters in Frankenstein to enable them to dramatise 
different forms of freedom. For example, Walton launches his whaling business and 
expeditions to the poles partly because of his ambition to be prosperous and partly because of 
his enthusiasm to explore the unknown in both his own life and the geographical world.
27
 
Such geographical freedom can be associated with Columbus‘s voyage of 1492, in the Age of 
Discovery, whose pioneering spirit persists to our present-day in the form of our explorations 
of outer space. Dependent on Epicurean assertion – and later the Enlightenment motto, 
‗Sapere aude‘ (literally meaning ‗dare to know‘) from Kant28 – Frankenstein‘s enthusiasm for 
scientific freedom reflects natural philosophers‘ conviction to break free from Christian 
dogmatism. In Frankenstein, the creation of a perfect human being, as Frankenstein claims, 
represents a bid for scientific freedom. Scientific knowledge enables Frankenstein to 
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challenge the boundaries of the unknown in nature and to break through the limitations of 
knowledge. Greatly influenced by M. Waldman and his modern chemistry at Ingolstadt, 
Frankenstein learns of the advances of techno-science, including the invention of the 
microscope, the discoveries of blood circulation, as well as air composition and the command 
of thunders (electricity), all of which enable his scientific contemporaries to ‗penetrate into 
the recesses of nature, and shew how she works in her hiding places‘ (F, 28).29 In the view of 
Frankenstein or other Enlightenment naturalists, Christian creation never took place: the 
origin of life is a question open to scientific experiment.  
Epitomising the Shelley circle‘s philosophy, Frankenstein is Mary Shelley‘s attempt to 
subvert a Christian worldview through re-imagining the myth of the biblical genesis. The 
comparison between the organic body and the machine did not directly emerge with 
Descartes‘s assertion about the mechanism of animals. In order to consolidate the Christian 
worldview, Descartes (1596-1650), like other early natural philosophers, refrained from 
making an explicit connection between humans and machines. Instead Descartes claimed that 
a human‘s ‗soul‘ or ‗spirit‘ originates from God‘s creation. In his Treatise on Man, Descartes 
argued that ‗I suppose the body to be just a statue or a machine made of earth which God 
forms with the explicit intention of making it as much as possible like us…. [He] also places 
inside it all the parts needed to make it walk, eat, breathe, and imitate‘ as many things as we 
can.
30
 Descartes‘s binary opposition between the body and the soul (or the mind) took up the 
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concept of Plato‘s ‗immortality of the soul‘ and placed it within a system of theological 
values. The rise of machines and body-related automata provided natural philosophers, 
particularly the physiologists, with an opportunity to examine the differences and similarities 
between the organic body and the machine. Frankenstein‘s Monster is a classic 
‗representation‘ of such a mechanistic concept.  
Humans were metaphorically conceived of as machines throughout the eighteenth 
century. In his Machine Man (1748) and Treatise on the Soul (1750), La Mettrie boldly 
denies the immortality of the soul and stresses the mechanism of humans.
31
 According to 
Seamus Deane, Shelley is more deeply influenced by ‗the French Enlightenment‘ – in the 
wake of the French Revolution and materialism – and La Mettrie‘s materialist philosophy, 
than any other ‗English writer of the period 1789-1832‘.32 It is inevitable that Shelley‘s 
radicalism is embedded in Frankenstein. La Mettrie to some extent is Descartes‘s follower, 
but La Mettrie‘s idea of the ‗human machine‘ subverts the assumption of Cartesian dualism, 
which champions the ‗immortality of the soul‘. Automata, regarded as early robots, were very 
mechanical and ‗soulless‘ and easily differentiated from humans. In spite of the fact that he is 
defined as an artificial man, Mary Shelley‘s monster is presented as, essentially, possessing a 
‗soul‘, or some other form of intelligence. 
La Mettrie‘s ‗human machine‘ relates directly to the Monster‘s creation. Echoing 
Descartes‘s ‗animal machine‘, La Mettrie provides a more specific concept of the body as 
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‗human machine‘. In Machine Man, La Mettrie argues that ‗[t]he human body is a machine 
which winds itself up, a living picture of perpetual motion‘ (MMOW, 7). This mechanism in 
philosophy dates back to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes‘s universal mechanism is 
depicted in his Leviathan (1651), where Hobbes explains the universe and the human body in 
terms of mechanical laws.
33
 Such mechanism in physics particularly relates to the mechanical 
laws of motion, formulated by Newton. La Mettrie‘s concept of ‗human machine‘ is indebted 
to Descartes‘s ‗animal machine‘ and his interpretation of the mechanism of the human body. 
Nonetheless, La Mettrie attempts to attack the Christian myth of creation and blur the 
differences between humans and animals. Conflicts between metaphysics and materialism 
arise again. Cartesians, following Descartes‘s philosophy and even Plato‘s earlier dualism, 
believed in the immortality of the soul and, at the same time, evaded the animal nature of 
humans and the mechanical principles of the human soul. Descartes especially separates 
humans from animals. Like La Mettrie‘s assertion of human machines, Descartes also affirms 
the mechanism of the human body, but he believes that the immortal soul, created by God, 
provides a force at work on the body. In Treatise on Man, Descartes argues from a 
perspective of theological physiology:     
… God so disposed these tidy fibres [in the brain] that the passages He left 
between them are able to conduct the spirits, when these are moved by a 
particular action, toward nerves which allow in this machine just hose movements 
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that a similar action could incite in us when we follow our natural instinct. 
[Emphasis added] (WOW, 169) 
Descartes claims that the brain is a machine even if the soul, for Cartesians and later vitalists, 
is God given. K. T. Maslin interprets Descartes‘s philosophy on the difference between 
humans and animals in the following ways: 
Only human beings have souls, Descartes maintained, and thus animals have 
neither thought nor consciousness. Animals, or the brutes, as Descartes 
sometimes referred to them, should be regarded as automata, albeit machines 
that are ‗incomparably better arranged, and adequate to movements more 
admirable than is any machine of human invention‘. The last part of this remark 
makes it clear that Descartes thinks that it is impossible that we should be 
inflicting suffering on animals when we kill and eat them, because we would be 
doing these things merely to non-conscious machines, and hence we would be no 




Descartes discovers two major reasons for distinguishing between humans and animals: 
language and creativity (IPM, 44-45). Mary Shelley provides the reader with a number of 
physiological descriptions of the mechanism of the body. Ironically, even though 
Frankenstein‘s monster possesses both language and creativity, its monstrous body is never 
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treated as human, but as a horrific and horrifying animal. Without any understanding of the 
Monster‘s intelligence and humane ‗soul‘, those who observe the Monster tend either to 
attack him or run away. The Monster was created of an unusually gigantic stature of ‗about 
eight feet in height‘ (F, 32) and this preternatural physique serves only to alienate 
Frankenstein‘s creation further from society. In Chapter 3 of Volume 2 in Frankenstein (F, 
70), the response of an old man and later other villagers to the Monster‘s beast-like 
appearance demonstrate the differences between humans and non-humans. Kind-hearted 
Felix, as the Monster had thought previously, ‗dashed me [the Monster] to the ground and 
struck me violently with a stick‘ when he saw him with the old De Lacey (F, 91). 
Frankenstein‘s innocent brother, William, regards the Monster as no more than an animal – a 
man-eating ‗ogre‘ (F, 96). 
The mechanism of the human body is thoroughly demonstrated in Frankenstein. In the 
beginning, Walton‘s sailors mechanically pilot the whaling ship. When the crew rescue 
Frankenstein from the icy wastes, Walton uses brandy to keep him warm and provide him 
with nutrition. Given Frankenstein‘s perilous situation, warmth, fresh air (oxygen), and food 
are the three vital factors for his survival. In his fourth letter to his sister, Margaret Saville, in 
Volume 1, Walton describes Frankenstein‘s physical condition: 
His limbs were nearly frozen, and his body dreadfully emaciated by fatigue and 
suffering. I never saw a man in so wretched a condition. We attempted to carry 
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him into the cabin; but as soon as he had quitted the fresh air, he fainted. We 
accordingly brought him back to the deck, and restored him to animation by 
rubbing him with brandy, and forcing him to swallow a small quantity. As soon 
as he shewed signs of life, we wrapped him up in blankets, and placed him near 
the chimney of the kitchen-stove. By slow degrees he recovered, and ate a little 
soup, which restored him wonderfully. [Emphasis added] (F, 14) 
This passage demonstrates the mechanical body as well as those changes in vitality or ‗signs 
of life‘ (F, 14). Such first-aid skills are common sense and based on empirical experience. 
However, such empirical experience results in understanding the human body as a 
mechanism. In other words, ‗brandy‘ (F, 14) penetrates into his skin and the alcohol speeds 
up the circulation of blood and helps to warm the body. ‗Rubbing‘ with brandy and ‗forcing 
him [Frankenstein] to swallow a small quantity‘ (F, 14), as Walton applies, makes the alcohol 
penetrate faster. The blood transfers nutrition and oxygen to the cells. Walton may not have 
knowledge of the blood circulatory theories of William Harvey (1578-1657), but this 
scientific theory is alluded to by Frankenstein, when he comments that: ‗… they [natural 
philosophers or scientists] have discovered how the blood circulates, and the nature of the air 
we breathe‘ (F, 28). Oxygen was extracted from the air in England in 1774 and in Sweden in 
1775, where it was discovered by German-Swedish chemist Carl Wilhelm Scheele (1742-
1786) and the British theologian Joseph Priestley (1733-1804).
35
 As a ‗materialist‘ who was a 
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theologian and metaphysician, allied with Coleridge‘s vitalist camp, Priestley argues that 
animals become increasingly active when they are given more oxygen. Oxygen becomes the 
fire of life; Scheele called this gas ‗fire air‘ (‗DO‘, 718). The third vital factor for life that 
Walton identifies is seen when he provides Frankenstein with food: ‗[Frankenstein] ate a little 
soup, which restored him wonderfully‘ (F, 14). A little liquid food supplies nutrition to the 
weak patient. 
La Mettrie notices the common relationship between food and the mechanical body and 
reaffirms these notions in his idea of the ‗human machine‘. In Machine Man, he observes that 
soldiers went mad without enough nutrition and again emphasises: ‗Food maintains what is 
aroused by fever. Without it, the soul languishes, becomes furious and dies dejected‘ 
(MMOW, 7). In Frankenstein, the Monster experiences numberless physical sufferings and 
these disturb his relationship with the environment. The Monster says: ‗I was oppressed by 
fatigue and hunger, and far too unhappy to enjoy the gentle breezes of evening, or the 
prospect of the sun setting behind the stupendous mountains of Jura‘ (F, 96). Such physical 
sufferings, particularly due to lack of food, are also seen in the De Lacey family. In the 
beginning, the Monster is envious of the condition enjoyed by the De Lacey family until he 
notices their lack of food: 
―They were not entirely happy…. They possessed a delightful house (for such 
it was in my eyes), and every luxury; they had a fire to warm them when chill, 
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and delicious viands when hungry; they were dressed in excellent clothes; and, 
still more, they enjoyed one another‘s company and speech, interchanging each 
day looks of affection and kindness. What did their tears imply? Did they really 
express pain? I was at first unable to solve these questions; but perpetual 
attention, and time, explained to me many appearances which were at first 
enigmatic. 
―A considerable period elapsed before I discovered one of the causes of the 
uneasiness of this amiable family; it was poverty: and they suffered that evil in a 
very distressing degree. Their nourishment consisted entirely of the vegetables of 
their garden, and the milk of one cow, who (sic) gave very little during the winter, 
when its masters could scarcely procure food to support it. They often, I believe, 
suffered the pangs of hunger very poignantly, especially the two younger 
cottagers; for several times they placed food before the old man, when they 
reserved none for themselves. [Emphasis added] (F, 74) 
Obviously, the De Lacey family enjoy air (oxygen) and warmth, but lack the third vital 
factor – food. The Monster recognises that ‗poverty‘ is an ‗evil‘ (F, 74), that the lack of food 
tortures the human body and mind. In other words, Mary Shelley tends to depict the harsh 
conditions of human existence from a mechanical view of the body and the significance of 
material substance. 
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In addition to the mechanism of the body, the mind that La Mettrie speculated about 
provides an important connection with current brain studies. Ann Thomson points out that  
‗[r]ecently, interest in La Mettrie‘s works has been aroused, including among those studying 
brain functioning, but attention still tends to be paid mainly to Machine Man‘ (MMOW, x). 
La Mettrie was indebted to early philosophy, including Greek materialism and Lockean 
empiricism, but most of his insights were directly derived from his medical observations. As 
a military surgeon, La Mettrie obtained a wide range of evidence from patients‘ diseases and 
his philosophical understanding of the mind. Unlike Descartes‘s theological view on the 
discussion of human machines, La Mettrie‘s precursors, such as Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), 
Thomas Willis (1621-1675), and Guillaume Lamy (1644-1683), had already consigned the 
soul to a corporeal prison of materialism.
36
 Nevertheless, early Greek Epicureans provided a 
primary hypothesis of the corporeality of the soul. Against Descartes and early dualistic 
philosophers, La Mettrie openly denied the immortality of the human soul. In his Treatise on 
the Soul,
37
 La Mettrie attempts to avoid complicated philosophical debates when he states his 
physiological observations on the soul or the mind in connection with the body: 
You can see that, in order to explain the union of the soul with the body, there 
is no need to torture one‘s mind as much as those great geniuses Aristotle, Plato, 
Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz and Stahl did, and that it is enough to keep 
going in a straight line and not look behind or to the side when the truth is in 
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front of one. But there are people who have so many prejudices that they would 
not even bend down to pick up the truth if they found it where they did not want 
it to be. 
… [S]ince diseases of the brain, according to the place they attack, destroy 
sometimes one sense and sometimes another, are those who place the seat of the 
soul in one of the pairs of optic lobes any more wrong than those who would like 
to limit it to the oval centre, the corpus callosum or even the pineal gland? 
[Emphasis added] (MMOW, 64-65) 
La Mettrie disputes Cartesian dualism and argues that ‗diseases of the brain‘ (MMOW, 64) 
affect human sensations as well as the function of the ‗soul‘. Descartes originally applied the 
concept of mechanism to the discussion of the physiological structure of animals and humans 
to develop his own theological dualism of the human body and the incorporeal soul.  
Self-discovery is one of the key philosophical messages in Frankenstein. In a sense, the 
major characters in Frankenstein crystallise this secular pursuit of self-exploration by the 
Shelley circle. Self-explorations of a brave new atheistic world present new philosophical 
challenges to Walton, Frankenstein, Henry Clerval, and the Monster. According to M. K. 
Joseph, Walton, Frankenstein, and the Monster represent ‗three concentric layers‘ from ‗the 
outermost layer‘ to ‗the very centre‘.38 Despite Joseph‘s clear-cut classifications of narrative 
structure in Frankenstein, the issues of materialism and human emotions permeate Mary 
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Shelley‘s novel and dismantle the boundaries between these narrative ‗layers‘. The concept 
of the mechanism of the body and the mind is vital to Frankenstein, exemplified in both the 
creation of the Monster and its cognitive development. Frankenstein is fascinated by ‗the 
structure of the human frame‘ and ‗the principle of life‘ and attempts to ‗besto[w] animation 
upon lifeless matter‘ (F, 30). For Frankenstein, ‗the apparition of a spirit‘ is simply ‗a tale of 
superstition‘ (F, 30). As a result, life does not consist of any kind of invisible substance – 
such as the ‗immortal soul‘ – but can be explained by natural philosophy. After his birth, the 
Monster‘s mind or cognitive development resembles an artificial intelligence or a robot. His 
brain is like a programmed and integrated circuit, accumulating information through 
numberless sensory inputs from the environment. With the advances of Internet technologies, 
information processing among networks can be seen as analogous to those processes of 
human cognition. More precisely, the individual can be seen as a terminal and messages from 
the outer world can only be garnered via the Internet or network. The Monster describes his 
own experience and finds: ‗My sensations had, by this time, become distinct, and my mind 
[working brain] received every day additional ideas. My eyes became accustomed to the light, 
and to perceive objects in their right forms; I distinguished the insect from the herb, and, by 
degrees, one herb from another‘ (F, 69). It is clear that the Monster‘s mind is constructed as, 
or at least compared with, a kind of ‗flexible‘ mechanism or artificial intelligence. Newton‘s 
understanding of the mechanical world is the foundation of the ‗science of man‘ or study of 
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the mind. As Peter Gay reminds us, there is an affinity between Newton‘s physics and 
Enlightenment ‗psychology‘, because ‗Newton‘s influence on psychology was implicit, 
though obvious‘.39 In this sense, Frankenstein leads to the physicality of the mind or 
physiological/psychological explanation of its operations. 
Frankensteinian scientific myth derived from eighteenth-century materialist philosophy 
of the body and the mind. La Mettrie‘s contemporaries, for example Hartley and Condillac, 
adhered to Lockean empiricism and strived to construct a materialist view of the mind.
40
 The 
corporeal mind understood as the brain is regarded as a physical force to control the 
mechanical operation of the body. The scientific influence of the artificial man in 
Frankenstein is specifically associated with Hartley‘s Observations on Man, His Frame, His 
Duty, and His Expectations (1749) and Condillac‘s statue in the Treatise on the Sensations 
(1754).
41
 That Shelley bought Hartley‘s Observations in 1812, according to Thomas 
Jefferson Hogg,
42
 suggests that Mary Shelley‘s ideas in Frankenstein were also influenced by 
Hartley. Mary Shelley‘s understanding of Condillac‘s statue derives from Shelley‘s reading 
of ‗Diderot‘s works‘ (the Lettre sur les sourds et muets, the Tableau de Famille).43 This 
evidence has encouraged critics to connect Hartley‘s ‗new science‘ with Condillac‘s 
empiricist materialism and Mary Shelley‘s imagining of artificial humans.  
The inquiries of the mechanism of the body made by Hartley, Condillac, or La Mettrie 
are far removed from the anatomy of a dead body. Instead, they attempt to employ a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 119 
materialist perspective to examine human nature. Influenced by Newton and Locke, the 
British ‗materialist‘ Hartley44 developed ‗his physiological psychology‘, through the theory 
of vibrations, in which he likened the vibrations of the nerves ‗among the medullary 
particles‘ to sensations, and developed further ‗the theory of associations [to] explai[n] the 
construction of simple sensations into man‘s total experience‘ (EISF, 181-82).  Indebted to 
Greek atomism and Descartes‘s study of the brain, Hartley‘s theory of particles became the 
forerunner of current neuroscience. This atomist concept, related to particles, intrigued more 
eighteenth-century British philosophers. In his ‗Of the Standard of Taste‘ (1757), Hume 
emphasises the materiality of the mind and emotions. ‗Those finer emotions of the mind‘, for 
Hume, work like ‗small springs‘ in the machine.45 This is like other contemporaries. For 
example, Thomas Reid, in An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), explains the physical 
mechanism of the mind: ‗All that we know of the body, is owing to anatomical dissection and 
observation, and it must be by an anatomy of the mind that we can discover its powers and 
principles‘.46 
In Frankenstein, such vibrations of the nerves do not occur until the Monster 
experiences sensory stimuli in the forest. As soon as the Monster‘s brain is activated, his 
nervous vibrations lead him to learn of the physical world: 
―It is with considerable difficulty that I remember the original æra (sic) of my 
being: all the events of that period appear confused and indistinct. A strange 
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multiplicity of sensations seized me, and I saw, felt, heard, and smelt, at the same 
time; and it was, indeed, a long time before I learned to distinguish between the 
operations of my various senses. By degrees, I remember, a stronger light 
pressed upon my nerves, so that I was obliged to shut my eyes. [Emphasis added] 
(F, 68) 
The Monster‘s mind is depicted in very material terms and the construction of his worldview 
cannot avoid operating according to materialist rules, as the Monster reacts based on reflex 
principles: ‗… a stronger light pressed upon my [his] nerves, so that I was obliged to shut my 
eyes‘ (F, 68). All of the Monster‘s ideas or mental reflections during the time of his language 
acquisition ‗with‘ the De Lacey family and through reading Milton‘s Paradise Lost, a volume 
of Plutarch‘s Lives, and Goethe‘s The Sorrows of Werter,47 are rooted in a complicated form 
of mechanism. Interestingly, these attendant issues and the science of the mind have recently 
attained prominence in literary criticism. Current neuro-imaging technologies, like fMRI 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) and PET (positron emission tomography), locate the 
affinity of language and the brain and give more concrete evidence in support of early 
materialists‘ hypotheses about the materiality of the mind. Alan Richardson, in his British 
Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (2001) and in his later work, The Neural Sublime: 
Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts (2010), relates mental science or neuroscience to 
Romanticism. Richardson‘s materialism-based mind inquiries about the late eighteenth and 
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early nineteenth century associate Romantic texts with neuroscience. Revisiting Lockean 
empiricism, Nancy Yousef draws on Condillac‘s empiricist philosophy and Rousseau‘s 
natural man to interpret Romantic literature, for example Wordsworth‘s The Prelude and 
Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein.48 However, Frankenstein is read here as incorporating the 
empiricist materialism of Hartley, Condillac, and Hume into a Romantic discourse.  
Condillac‘s empiricist philosophy of the living statue further reflects the Monster‘s 
mechanical body and mind. Condillac‘s statue, similar to Pygmalion‘s statue, adds another 
materialist dimension to the discussion of Frankenstein‘s artificial man – the Monster. 
Pygmalion‘s statue, however, wakes up because of the goddess Venus‘s magic.49 The statue 
in Condillac‘s Treatise on the Sensations (1754) increasingly experiences the physical world 
through the sense of touch. In Chapter 7 of his Treatise on the Sensations, Condillac 
discusses the 1694 case of a feral boy ‗living in the forests on the frontiers separating 
Lithuania and Russia‘.50 This example provides Condillac with sufficient evidence for the 
centrality of sensations to our experience of the world, as well as proof of cognitive 
development of his statue. Condillac makes a comparison between the statue and the child, 
who lived among bears in the forests of Lithuania, and argues that without imitations of 
‗human‘ behaviour the statue and the animal-like child can only lead an animal life, ‗in a 
search for food‘ (TS, 225).  
Such innocence untainted by human ‗civilisations‘ is similar to the Monster‘s early life. 
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The Monster, like Condillac‘s walking statue, learns of the world through sensory experience 
and a trial-and-error process. In Chapter 3 of Volume 2 in Frankenstein, the Monster‘s 
experience on earth is identical to the statue and the ‗bear boy‘. The only task the Monster 
has to perform is to collect food for survival. The Monster recalls that ‗I lay by the side of a 
brook resting from my fatigue, until I felt tormented by hunger and thirst‘ [emphasis added] 
(F, 68). The Monster, like any other animal or human, is no doubt a machine. Food is to him 
what a battery is to a machine or petrol to a car. In terms of Mary Shelley‘s revised concept 
of materialism, the Monster is an intelligent machine. More concisely, Condillac‘s statue 
reflects a mechanical body – a non-organic body – with intelligence through which the 
cognitive developments of the Monster become more understandable. 
Pygmalion‘s ivory statue in Ovid‘s Metamorphoses (a work with which Mary Shelley 
was evidently familiar according to her journal entry of spring 1815)
51
 is a prototype of 
Condillac‘s statue and the model for Frankenstein‘s creation. The figure of the Monster is so 
horrific to Frankenstein that he escapes from his laboratory without displaying any kindly 
emotions towards his ‗perfect‘ creature. Before his escape, Frankenstein describes his 
aspiration to create the ‗perfect‘ creature: 
His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. 
Beautiful! – Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles 
and arteries beneath; his hair was of lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a 
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pearly whiteness…. (F, 34) 
Mary Shelley wittily integrates Condillac‘s ‗cognitive science‘ with ancient myth. In 
Pygmalion‘s myth, the couple fall in love with each other and live happily ever after. In 
Frankenstein‘s plot, the ‗couple‘ (Frankenstein and the Monster) become enemies and the 
story ends in tragedy. On this view, the homosexual or simply male chauvinistic desire in 
science to create a man instead of a woman differs from Pygmalion‘s desire for a perfect wife: 
When Pygmalion saw these women, living such wicked lives, he was revolted by 
the many faults which nature has implanted in the female sex, and long lived a 
bachelor existence, without any wife to share his home. But meanwhile, with 
marvelous artistry, he skillfully carved a snowy ivory statue. He made it lovelier 
than any woman born, and fell in love with his own creation. The statue had all 
the appearance of a real girl, so that it seemed to be alive, to want to move, did 
not modesty forbid. So cleverly did his art conceal its art. Pygmalion gazed in 
wonder, and in his heart there rose a passionate love for this image of a human 
form. [Emphasis added] (MO, 231) 
In contrast to these women‘s innate ‗nature[s]‘, Pygmalion‘s ivory statue is based on a 
Lockean hypothesis of tabula rasa as represented by Condillac‘s statue and Frankenstein‘s 
Monster. Anticipating the built-in memory of a robot (which consists of sophisticated RAM 
chips that enable it to ‗learn‘ by means of sensors),52 the mind of the statue or Monster 
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develops through its increased interactions with the environment.  
Apart from this statue creation myth, the body of Frankenstein‘s monster also draws on 
empiricist materialism. Imbued with a contemporary philosophy of science, Frankenstein 
also seems to interact with some other important philosophical and literary texts that Mary 
Shelley read between 1815 and1816 as the foundation of its scientific concerns.
53
 Shelley‘s 
own understanding of Lockean empiricism and the life principle influenced Frankenstein. In 
addition to the creation of the Monster, the unfinished body of the female monster again gives 
further evidence of this analogy between mechanical and bodily parts. In order not to be 
cursed by future generations, Frankenstein destroys the female creation by tearing it ‗to 
pieces‘ (F, 114): 
Had I a right, for my own benefit, to inflict this curse upon everlasting 
generations? … I shuddered to think that future ages might curse me as their pest, 
whose selfishness had not hesitated to buy its own peace at the price perhaps of 
the existence of the whole human race. (F, 114-15) 
Frankenstein regards the body as a machine and its galvanic ignition is the origin of vitality. 
The destruction of the body through a murderous act is the destructive means to cease ‗life‘. 
In Frankenstein, the creation and development of the Monster embodies not only Condillac‘s 
empiricist views, but Hartley‘s theory of vibrations among the nerves. Mary Shelley employs 
physiological terms, for example senses and nerves, in support of a materialist view. The 
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article ‗Of Cannibals‘ in Michel Montaigne‘s Essays (1580) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau‘s 
Emile; or, On Education (1762), which Mary Shelley read, provided her with further ideas to 
depict the Monster‘s natural development.54 The image of the Monster can be compared with 
Condillac‘s Lockean analysis of the ‗bear boy‘. Like the analysis of the bear boy, Rousseau‘s 
primitivist assertion of the ‗noble savage‘ or the ‗natural man‘ is mirrored in the case of the 
Monster. Mary Shelley‘s novel reassesses the changing mode of human cognition through re-
imagining the workings of the mind and emotion from a mechanistic worldview.  In this 
reading, Frankenstein emerges as a complex conduit for a number of important 
Enlightenment philosophical and scientific inquiries about the mind and the body.  
 
III. The Birth of ‗New‘ Materialism in Romanticism 
The birth of the Monster, Mary Shelley suggests, announces an atheistic materialism. 
Despite a legacy reaching back to ancient Greek philosophy, the materialist discourse in 
Frankenstein originated with the critical debates between John Abernethy‘s vitalism and 
William Lawrence‘s materialism.55 These great debates between theists and physicists56 were 
recently re-explored at a seminar, entitled ‗God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the 
Evidence‘ (2007-2008), at the Infidels forum.57  
Humphry Davy (1778-1829) provides an important connection between the vitalist 
debates and Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein.58 As a member of the Godwin circle, Davy was 
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regarded as a materialist due to his advocacy of the chemistry of life. Suffering from 
academic pressure from his peers, Davy was later converted to vitalism as a result of 
admonishments from the vitalist Coleridge.
59
 Despite his ambivalent position in the vitalist 
debates, Davy emphasises the importance of science and scientific reasoning. He notes that 
‗in the progression of knowledge, observation, guided by analogy, leads to experiment, and 
analogy confirmed by experiment, becomes scientific truth‘ (qtd. in SAMSF 66). As a result, 
the motif of freedom in Frankenstein echoes the secular worldview of Epicureans.  
Davy also introduced the Shelleys to the science of chemistry and electricity. The 
influence of Davy is evident in Frankenstein and over-shadows this novel. After ‗a most 
violent and terrible thunder-storm‘ (F, 22), Frankenstein‘s father (with echoes here of 
Godwin, Shelley‘s spiritual father) took him to ‗attend a course of lectures upon natural 
philosophy‘ (F, 23):  
The professor discoursed with the greatest fluency of potassium and boron, of 
sulphates and oxyds, [chemical] terms to which I could affix no idea; and I 
became disgusted with the science of natural philosophy, although I still read 
Pliny and Buffon with delight, authors, in my estimation, of nearly equal interest 
and utility. (F, 23) 
In Frankenstein, this ‗professor‘ (F, 23), who excelled in modern chemistry, is a possible 
allusion to Davy. Davy was a professor of chemistry when Shelley was a ‗man of science‘ in 
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London. Shelley did not meet Davy, but Mary Shelley was taken by Godwin to attend Davy‘s 
lectures on ‗modern‘ chemistry in 1812.60 The Shelleys knew of Davy‘s science and 
philosophy through reading Davy‘s Elements of Chemical Philosophy (1812) from 28 
October 1816 to 4 November 1816.
61
 In his Contributions to Physical and Medical 
Knowledge (1799), Davy followed Priestley‘s research in chemistry and regarded 
‗phosoxygen‘ (oxygen) as the vital thing for ‗organic beings‘ (qtd. in SV 37). Godwin‘s 
criticism of Davy‘s chemistry may have influenced Mary Shelley‘s idea of duality in 
Frankenstein. Though defended by his poet friend, Coleridge, Davy‘s chemistry is limited, as 
Godwin complained: ‗[Davy] would ―degrade his vast Talents‖ by limiting them to 
chemistry‘ (AW, 267). This degradation of Davy‘s chemistry echoes Frankenstein‘s remarks 
about his professor: ‗… I became disgusted with the science of natural philosophy 
[chemistry]…‘ (F, 23). In the 1831 version of Frankenstein, Mary Shelley includes 
references to Davy‘s ideas about ‗electricity and galvanism‘ (HF, 43): 
Before this [the most fearful thunderstorm] I was not unacquainted with the more 
obvious law of electricity. On this occasion a man of great research in natural 
philosophy was with us, and, excited by this catastrophe, he entered on the 
explanation of a theory which he had formed on the subject of electricity and 
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This echoes Davy‘s Lectures on Chemistry in 1802. Davy mentioned electricity and galvanic 
experiment in his ‗A Discourse, Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Chemistry‘ (1802): 
… the phænomena of electricity have been developed; the lightnings have been 
taken from the cloud; and, lastly, a new influence has been discovered, which has 
enabled man to produce from combinations of dead matter effects which were 
formerly occasioned only by animal organs. [Emphasis added]
63
 
The assembled body of the Monster is grounded in a materialist worldview. In the 1831 
Introduction to Frankenstein, Mary Shelley suggests that ‗perhaps the component parts of a 
creature might be manufactured, brought together, and endued with vital warmth‘ (HF, 8).  In 
the novel, Frankenstein regards the human body as a machine and, therefore, collects 
‗materials‘ from a churchyard and a slaughterhouse so as to ‗assemble‘ a perfect human being. 
To Frankenstein, body parts are like machine parts: ‗The dissecting room and the slaughter-
house furnished many of my materials …‘ (F, 32). This mechanical science, for Frankenstein, 
would, he hoped, lead to success: 
… my operations might be incessantly baffled, and at last my work be imperfect: 
yet, when I considered the improvement which every day takes place in science 
and mechanics, I was encouraged to hope my present attempts would at least lay 
the foundations of future success. [Emphasis added] (F, 31) 
For that reason, he attempts to understand the ‗intricacies of fibres, muscles, and veins‘ (F, 31) 
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and ‗renew life where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption‘ (F, 32). In order 
to make his ‗first success‘, Frankenstein eventually resolved to create a preternaturally large 
creature (F, 32). Physiologically, Frankenstein‘s creation is based on the concept of 
mechanism. Exploring the unknown is thrilling to the scientific mind despite its potential 
perils. Frankenstein states his enthusiasm for discovery and science: ‗In other studies you go 
as far as others have gone before you, and there is nothing more to know; but in a scientific 
pursuit there is continual food for discovery and wonder‘ (F, 29). Without ‗moral‘ or ethical 
concerns, Frankenstein aims to transcend human limitations. Materialist values are the only 
way to encourage him in creation or re-animation. Frankenstein‘s case is a striking example. 
Frankenstein forces himself to ‗spend days and nights in vaults and charnel houses‘ in order 
to ‗examine the cause and progress of this decay‘ (F, 30). Natural philosophy, including 
physiology and anatomy, provides him with scientific knowledge to understand the human 
frame. A body without life is like a machine without fuel or electricity. Even so, the living 
organism is more mysterious and complicated. Like Aldini‘s galvanic experiment, aimed at 
imbuing life into a lifeless body, Frankenstein‘s theory of creation apparently questions an 
entirely mechanical view of the human body. 
Distinct from the first-generation Romantics (Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Robert 
Southey), the Shelley circle more openly disputed religious and political conservatism. For 
example, Southey was admired by the younger Shelley, but was eventually ridiculed by the 
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aspiring poet for his political and religious conservatism in later years. After his visit to 
Southey at Keswick, the Lake District, in late December of 1811, Shelley complained to 
Elizabeth Hitchener about Southey‘s bigotry.64 The second-generation Romantics expressed 
great opposition to Wordsworth, particularly to The Excursion (1814), for the poem ‗aspires 
to permanence in a traditional, institutional, orthodox Christian vein‘ and opposed 
‗innovatory Voltairean France‘.65 On 14 September 1814 Shelley, according to Mary Shelley, 
observed that Wordsworth was enslaved to his own religious view when he read part of 
Wordsworth‘s The Excursion: ‗Shelley calls on Hookham and brings home Wordsworths 
Excursion (sic), of which we read a part—much disappointed. He is a slave‘.66 Mary Shelley 
read it in the following two days.
67
 This disappointment in Wordsworth was later suggested 
in Shelley‘s ‗To Wordsworth‘, which speaks suggestively of Wordsworth‘s defection from 
‗truth and liberty‘ (12): ‗In honoured poverty thy voice did weave / Songs consecrate to truth 
and liberty,— / Deserting these, thou leavest me to grieve, / Thus having been, that thou 
shouldst cease to be‘ (11-14).68  
A rejection of orthodox religious views is evident in the idealistic and secular pursuits 
of intimate relationships reflected in Frankenstein. The pursuits of Robert Walton, 
Frankenstein, and the Monster all represent non-religious philanthropy. Walton‘s affection 
for Frankenstein is because ‗[h]e is so gentle, yet so wise; his mind is so cultivated, and when 
he speaks … [his words] flow with rapidity and unparalleled eloquence‘ (F, 15-16). Walton 
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points to his own idealism in friendship: ‗One day I mentioned to him [Frankenstein] the 
desire I had always felt of finding a friend who might sympathize with me, and direct me by 
his counsel‘ (F, 16). Nevertheless, their idealism in the quest for happiness eventually returns 
them to the same destructive ground. The issue of happiness and its pursuit links these two 
generations of Romantic writers regardless of their conflicting materialist and religious 
worldviews.  
With the rise of anatomy and physiology, the human body appealed to natural 
philosophers and their quest to unearth the ‗soul‘ from the body. Shelley‘s Queen Mab hints 
at the possible lethal dangers of an atheistic perspective in a Christian society: ‗I [the Spirit] 
was an infant when my mother went / To see an atheist burned…‘ (VII.1-2).69 In his earlier 
arguments in The Necessity of Atheism (1814), Shelley seems simply to have expounded his 
connection with atheism and materialism. As a follower of Humean scepticism, Drummond 
emphasised the significance of the human mind and ‗combated the arguments of the 
materialist‘.70 The young Shelley, however, expressed his dislike of Drummond‘s religious 
philosophy when he wrote to Thomas Hookman on 26 January 1813: ‗I do not think that Sir 
W. Drummonds (sic) argument have much weight. His Œdipus has completely failed in 
making me a convert‘ (CWPBS Vol. 9, Letters, 201, 42). In the Preface to Frankenstein and 
in ‗On Frankenstein‘, Shelley also affirms the significance of the human mind throughout 
Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein.71 
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Mary Shelley is inevitably influenced by Shelley‘s scepticism and atheism as expressed 
in his early philosophy in Zastrozzi (1810), The Necessity of Atheism (1811), Queen Mab 
(1813), and A Refutation of Deism (1814). Reflecting on Christianity in his ‗Essay on 
Christianity‘ (1815), Shelley starts, however, to make a connection between all schools of 
philosophy and their respective theories of the human mind: 
The thoughts which the word ‗God‘ suggests to the human mind are susceptible 
of as many variations as human minds themselves. The Stoic, the Platonist, and 
the Epicurean, the Polytheist, the Dualist, and the Trinitarians, differ infinitely 
in their conceptions of its meaning. They agree only in considering it the most 
awful and most venerable of names, as a common term devised to express all of 




This ‗invisible world‘ in Shelley‘s eyes belongs to God, the human mind, and may even be 
extended to the workings of the brain. The untouched aspect of the human mind is reflected 
in Shelley‘s poetry and Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein. The Shelleys notice the insufficiency of 
modern materialism and strive to comprehend the invisible substance in the mind or brain 
that dominates human thought and feelings. Shelley further complains that ‗[t]his materialism 
is a seducing system to young and superficial minds [and] … allows its disciples to talk and 
dispenses them from thinking‘ (‗OL‘, 506). Here Shelley attempts to ascribe the significance 
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of poetry and the self a meaning that resides somewhere beyond matter. Shelley recognises 
the inadequacy of contemporary materialism as does Frankenstein. Facing the failure of his 
creation, Frankenstein exclaims: ‗The different accidents of life are not so changeable as the 
feelings of human nature‘ (F, 34). These ‗feelings of human nature‘ suggest that the concept 
of emotion is conceived of as an attribute of the mind.  It is in these terms that Frankenstein 
confesses to Walton his ambition for scientific research: 
Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is 
the acquirement of knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes 
his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his 
nature will allow. (F, 31) 
In this respect, the intangible mind remained an unexplored area that early philosophers and 
Mary Shelley, like Frankenstein, were eager to study. Frankenstein plays an important role in 
bridging the gulf between machines and organisms by developing a revised account of 
materialism. The creation of the Monster announces the birth of an organic machine. By 
definition, the organism and the machine are polar extremes. Coleridge‘s organic theory, 
which was conveyed to the Shelleys through their readings of his works, stressed the 
significance of the mind or imagination within a living being as a refutation to ‗lifeless 
mechanism‘. James Engell draws a comparison between Coleridge‘s philosophy and Locke‘s, 
stating that ‗[t]he emphasis for Coleridge was to ―make the senses out of the mind—not the 
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mind out of the senses, as Locke did‖‘.73 Coleridge‘s claim is misleading. In Hartley‘s theory 
of ‗physiological psychology‘, the mind works within and through the brain. Coleridge‘s 
abhorrence to materialism was detected in his later attitude towards Hartley and later 
inclination towards Abernethy‘s vitalist camp, which disputed materialism. Despite his early 
admiration of Hartley (even naming his eldest son [Hartley David Coleridge] after him),
74
 
Coleridge, in his 1817 Biographia Literaria, reduced his admiration for Hartley simply 
because of his later emphasis on the mechanical mind:  
It is most noticeable of the excellent and pious [David] Hartley, that in the proofs 
of the existence and attributes of God, with which his second volume 
commences, he makes no reference to the principles or results of the first. Nay, 
he assumes, as his foundations, ideas which, if we embrace the doctrines of his 
first volume, can exist no where but in the vibrations of the ethereal medium 
common to the nerves and to the atmosphere.
75
 
Coleridge‘s organic theory of the mind originates from his support of vitalism and his dislike 
of Hartley‘s mechanical hypothesis. The Monster‘s body, in Mary Shelley‘s novel, mediates 
between these theories of Coleridge and Locke, a cross-fertilisation of an organicist view 
with a mechanical one. On the one hand, its body is created without a ‗natural‘ process or a 
divine design. On the other, the Monster has a human and ‗organic‘ mind more sensitively 
attuned than those of others. 
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The Monster‘s ‗artificial‘ body dismantles the boundaries between the mechanic and 
the human and prefigures a post-industrial view of the body. With interpretations in 
philosophy and life science, the concept of ‗machine‘ exists in greater variations in the 
modern era. Cyborgs, artificial intelligence (robots), and clones are all current terms that blur 
the boundaries between natural selection and technological manipulations or ‗the human and 
nonhuman‘.76 In this sense, Frankenstein‘s monster is their forerunner in the issue of an 
organic machine. This concept of machine in Frankenstein may date back to an eighteenth-
century automaton fiction in which a craftsman nicknamed Frankenstein creates an intelligent 
automaton.
77
 Despite their being no direct link between the organic body and the notion of 
the ‗human machine‘, the union of the two was circulated as an ideal in the eighteenth 
century and has been revived in present cybernetics. Redefining our sense of the ‗human‘ can 
bring about a new, materialist way of thinking. Some current critics, for instance, Jay Clayton 
and Andrea Austin, have read Frankenstein in relation to cyborg studies.
78
 In cyborg studies, 
Frankenstein‘s monster is viewed as a classic organicist machine. Generally, a cyborg (a term 
coined by Manfred Clynes in 1960)
79
 is defined as a contraction of ‗cybernetic organism‘, 
and is ‗a hybrid of machine and organism‘ (either robots with humanlike qualities or humans 
with extensive and interactive synthetic components).
80
 Clayton closes the gap between 
Romanticism and posthumanism
81
 by connecting the subjectivity of the cyborgs in science 
fiction to the Frankenstein myth. Fred Botting, however, associates Romantic rebellion with 
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‗[i]nformational and post-industrial revolutions‘ and claims this as the advent of ‗virtual 
Romanticism‘.82 Current cyborg studies tend to follow the concept of the human as machine 
and explain the human body from a materialist perspective and this interest starts to shift to 
the consciousness.
83
 Like Descartes, some theologians shun the analogy between humans and 
machines in order not to subvert Christian values. Such conservative values and ethical 




Frankenstein employs eighteenth-century materialist philosophy and science to re-
examine the human body and mind in an attempt to develop a new form of materialism. This 
new kind of materialism finds expression in Mary Shelley‘s revisionism of materialism which 
fuses the immaterial aspects of human experience, such as thought and emotion, with a 
mechanistic and materialist worldview. Read as a radical novel, Frankenstein extensively 
demonstrates atheistic and materialist views in analysis of the mechanism of the human body. 
The failure of Frankenstein‘s creation and a warning of scientific perils imply Mary Shelley‘s 
ethical concerns and echo Shelley‘s own philosophy of the mind. Aside from the human mind, 
the human body in Frankenstein is placed in the context of mechanism. The radical 
revolution and materialism in late eighteenth-century France formed the centre of radical 
philosophy and politics. Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein acts as a conduit for both materialism 
and non-materialism, entering into a Romantic conversation about the presence of a spirit 
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beyond the mechanical body. That spirit is the human mind. Science is the main pursuit of the 
Enlightenment of thought which considers real knowledge as the product of rationalist 
inquiry. Romantics also pursue science, but their ultimate concerns centre on subjectivity and 
a nostalgic quest for a lost self. The Shelleys and their circle strike a balance between science, 
religion, and humanism.  The Romantic spirit of the Shelley circle and ‗new‘ materialism 
become the precursor of twentieth- and twenty-first century materialism (or physicalism) and 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Tracing Emotion: Shelley‘s Alastor (1816) and Byron‘s Manfred (1817) 
This chapter examines the role of emotion in Alastor and Manfred.
1
 Few critics have 
focused directly on the issue of emotion in Alastor and Manfred despite the fact that critics, 
including Harold Bloom, Jerrod E. Hogle, and James Twitchell, have recognised the 
significance of Alastor and Manfred to Romantic literature.
2
 The subject of human emotion 
intrigues the Shelley circle and becomes a central concern of their works, as is evident in 
Shelley‘s Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude (1816)3 and Byron‘s Manfred (1817).4 Even in 
earlier works, this intellectual group was preoccupied with human emotions and how they 
relate to the mind.
5
 Both Shelley's and Byron's works, Alastor and Manfred, share a 
fascination with the morally unconventional Faustian figures and this in various, often 
unexpected, ways reinforces their focus on emotion.
6
 My chapter aims to explore the varying 
degrees to which Byron‘s Manfred and Shelley‘s Alastor are permeated with their respective 
poet‘s scientific understanding of mind and emotion. This fascination with explanations of 
the mind and emotion extends to the rest of the Shelley circle and plays a part in forming its 
alliance in Geneva in the summer of 1816.
7
 Shelley and Byron delineate ‗negative‘ emotions, 
particularly solitude and grief, throughout Alastor and Manfred. In the 1815 Preface to 
Alastor, Shelley considers his narrative poem ‗as allegorical of one of the most interesting 
situations of the human mind‘ (SPP, 72) and points out selfishness or self-love as an 
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‗apportioned curse‘ (SPP, 73) that causes the poet-figure to become alienated from both 
society and happiness: 
All else, selfish, blind, and torpid, are those unforeseeing multitudes who constitute, 
together with their own, the lasting misery and loneliness of the world. Those who 
love not their fellow-beings, live unfruitful lives, and prepare for their old age a 
miserable grave. (SPP, 73) 
Mary Shelley‘s comments on Alastor single out ‗emotion‘ and see the poem as ‗the 
out-pouring of his [the Poet‘s] own emotions‘.8 Similarly, Byron‘s earlier works explore 
emotion
9
 and Manfred in particular focuses on those destructive emotions of the human mind, 
such as remorse and madness. This chapter focuses on the philosophical dialogues between 
Shelley and Byron in Alastor and Manfred as a starting-point to explore the significance of 
emotion within these specific works and the Shelley circle (1812-1821) more generally. 
     Surprisingly, there are few comparative readings of Alastor and Manfred which focus 
solely on both emotion and the mind.
10
 Charles E. Robinson notes the relationship between 
Shelley‘s Alastor and Byron‘s Manfred: ‗That Byron‘s first drama [Manfred] resulted from 
Shelley‘s influence is apparent, I believe, from the foregoing evidence of the Alastorian quest 
in Manfred‘.11 Expanding D. G. James‘s and Robinson‘s views, Peter Cochran conveys 
Byron‘s anti-idealism in Manfred and Shelley‘s idealism in Alastor: ‗Drama and idealism 
make poor bedfellows, for drama is unhappy with the abstract‘.12 Earl R. Wasserman 
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indicates that Shelley‘s Alastor occupies a conflicted site between reason and passion which 
finds expression in the ambiguous relationship between the ‗Wordsworthian Narrator‘ (20) 
and the poet-figure in Shelley‘s poem.13 Writing after Wasserman, critics including Michael 
O‘Neill, Jerrold E. Hogle, Timothy Clark, and Karen Weisman have examined the workings 
of the mind in their readings of Alastor.
14
 Hogle also describes Shelley‘s desire for ‗seeking 
relationships between thoughts and sentient beings‘ in Alastor.15 Critics of Manfred, 
including Bertrand Evans, Andrew Elfenbein, and Drummond Bone, connect mental 
processes to the issue of emotion by discussing the role of remorse and lust in Byron‘s 
drama.
16
 More recently, Ross Woodman has analysed representations of the mind in 
Romanticism and those metaphorical and reciprocal connections between the polarised 
emotions – ‗sanity‘ and ‗madness‘ – in the works of both Byron and Shelley.17 Similar to my 
critical concerns, Alan Richardson aims ‗to give the brain a central place in the history of the 
Romantic mind‘ by focusing on the history of neuroscience and those Romantic texts 
produced outside of the Shelley circle ‗from the 1790s to around 1830‘.18 
     Byron‘s and Shelley‘s allegorical language is read in this chapter as prefiguring 
neuroscience and genetics and echoing early empiricism and materialism. Despite some 
criticism on psychic process in Alastor and Manfred, the relationship between emotion and 
materiality has not been central to interpretations of either Shelley‘s Alastor or Byron‘s 
Manfred. My comparative reading of these two poems draws on eighteenth-century 
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philosophical ideas of materialism and empiricism prevalent in Shelley‘s own time and 
explores, where appropriate referring to recent neuroscientific theory, Shelley‘s and Byron‘s 
poetic representations of the mind and emotion. Distinct from the approaches of Bloom‘s 
‗mythmaking‘ and Weisman‘s ‗fiction making‘ to Shelley‘s poetry,19 my neuroscientific 
reading – closer to Hogle‘s assertion of demythologisation20– demonstrates the desire Byron 
and Shelley shared to understand the human mind and emotion within their poetry. 
 
I. The Mind and Science 
A series of debates between John Abernethy and William Lawrence about vitalism and 
materialism from 1814 to 1819 significantly influenced the thinking of Byron and Shelley 
about the workings of the mind. Opposed to materialism, vitalism is associated with the 
concept of the immateriality of the mind or the long-established idea of the soul. Both the 
young Byron and Shelley, however, were sympathetic to some form of atheistic materialism. 
Just as ‗materialist-vitalist debates‘ and ‗phrenology‘ influenced Jane Austen,21 empiricism, 
materialism, and atheism also furnished Byron and Shelley with a scientific philosophy to 
understand the world and the self. Shelley‘s interest in science started during his few months 
study at Oxford and his interest in electricity leads him to the realm of the mind.
22
 In fact 
before writing Alastor, Shelley bought, on 18 April 1815, a translation of De Rerum Natura 
(On the Nature of Things), written by Lucretius (ca. 99 – ca. 55 B.C.) and reread this volume 
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when he was in Byron‘s company at the Villa Diodati, Switzerland, in the summer of 1816.23 
Lucretius incorporates Epicureanism, materialism, and atomism into his book to speculate 
about the mortality of the mind and thought. Recent critics, in particular Hugh Roberts, do 
recognise Lucretius‘s influence on Shelley, but the subject of the human mind in Alastor has 
not been the main critical focus.
24
 
These philosophical exchanges between Byron and Shelley, within the context of 
debates between contemporary theories of materialism and vitalism, influenced both poets‘ 
understandings of the human mind. Alastor chimes with Shelley‘s conviction about atheism 
and materialism that he followed and defended in his earliest works.
25
 Shelley‘s letter to 
Elizabeth Hitchener, dated 11 June 1811, is suggestive of his negotiations with materialist 
thinking.
26
 In his 1815 ‗On Life‘, a significant essay that forms an early draft of his 
Philosophical View of Reform (1819),
27
 Shelley acknowledges that French materialism 
provided him with the means to negate moral or religious dogmatism, but he complains that 
materialism and dualism alike fail to help him understand the precise significance of the 
existence of a living organism: ‗Such contemplations as these materialism and the popular 
philosophy of mind and matter, alike forbid; they are consistent only with the intellectual 
system‘ (SPP, 507). This confusion over the precise meaning of life even persists in Shelley‘s 
final and unfinished poem The Triumph of Life (1822): ‗―Then, what is Life?‖ I said …‘ 
(544).
28
 Earlier than his Philosophical View of Reform, Shelley noted this potential problem 
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with materialism during the composition of Alastor in 1815. In the Preface to Alastor, Shelley 
points out that the poet-figure shifts his enthusiasm from scientific knowledge to a less rigid 
understanding of the mind and the emotion of love: ‗But the period arrives when these 
objects cease to suffice. His mind is at length suddenly awakened and thirsts for intercourse 
with an intelligence similar to itself‘ (SPP, 73). Shelley attempts to articulate the significance 
of emotion by retelling the poet-figure‘s miserable quest. In Alastor, Shelley re-imagines a 
Wordsworthian epiphany of religious love, described in The Excursion, as ‗human sympathy‘ 
(SPP, 73) in terms of: ‗Those who love not their fellow-beings, live unfruitful lives, and 
prepare for their old age a miserable grave‘ (SPP, 73). This motif of sympathy recurs in 
Frankenstein, where Victor Frankenstein isolates himself from society, only seeking to 
succeed in creation of a perfect human being through galvanic reanimation. Frankenstein 
lacks sympathy for the Monster and his ugliness and eventually, like the Poet in Alastor, dies 
in misery. Similarly, Shelley‘s poems meditate on the complicated subject of the mind from 
an atheistic and materialist perspective.
29
 
Intimate with his physician, John Polidori, and Lawrence‘s materialist circle, Byron 
also has sympathy with atheism and materialism. Byron‘s atheist scientific views permeate 
his Manfred. Shelley and Byron shared and discussed their mutual intellectual interests after 
Byron and Polidori moved to the Villa Diodati on 10 June 1816 and were the Shelleys‘ 
neighbours.
30
 In her journal on 28 and 29 July 1816, Mary Shelley points to this momentous 
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philosophical spark within the circle: 
I read Voltaires Romans. S. [Shelley] reads Lucretius & talks with Clare – after 
dinner he goes out in the boat with Lord Byron … Monday 29th Write – read 
Voltaire & Quintius Curtius – a rainy day with thunder and lightning – Shelley 
finishes Lucretius & reads Pliny‘s letters. (JMS Vol. 121) 
Shelley may have shared his reading with Byron at this time on Lake Geneva. Prior to this 
encounter in July 1816 and his writing of Manfred in September 1816, Byron noted his 
sympathy with materialism in his diaries and letters in 1813. Byron shared Shelley‘s 
impression of Voltaire‘s epitaph and supported this arch French radical philosopher in a letter 
to Lady Melbourne written on 21 September 1813.
31
 In addition to his sympathy with French 
materialists, Byron is deeply influenced by the philosophy of Epicurus and Lucretius. In his 
diary entry, dated 17 November 1813, Byron affirmed his adherence to Epicurus and 
Lucretius: 
          We are all selfish—and I believe, ye gods of Epicurus! I believe in 
Rochefoucault about men, and in Lucretius (not Busby‘s translation) about 
yourselves. … I remember, last year, ** [Lady Oxford] (sic) said to me, at ** 
[Eywood] (sic). ‗Have we not passed our last month like the gods of Lucretius?‘ 
And so we had. (SPLD Vol. 1, 211) 
     Byron‘s and Shelley‘s enthusiasm for scientific reasoning, in particular their 
 150 
interrogations of nature, permeates the opening passages of Shelley‘s Alastor and Byron‘s 
Manfred. Shelley and Byron meditate on the mystery of nature and attempt to reveal its inner 
mysteries.
32
 Unlike Wordsworth, Byron and Shelley attempt to reconcile the physical nature 
with that of human nature and the mind from a materialist point of view. The conflict 
between vitalism and materialism explains the distinctive perspectives on ‗life‘ taken up by 
the first- and second-generation Romantics, but Wordsworth‘s influence is also clearly 
exerted upon the Shelley circle.
33
 Byron‘s and Shelley‘s scientific interpretations of human 
nature prefigure recent concepts of human nature, which relate human behaviour to genetic 
engineering.
34
 Following Charles Darwin‘s theory of evolution, researchers in socio-biology 
have revisited the significance of ‗a genetic explanation of behaviour‘: 
Thus, in addition to constant announcements of discoveries of genes for any 
number of diseases, we also have the concomitant announcement of a single or a 
small number of genes for complex behaviours such as homosexuality, 




In my following discussion, the mind or brain activity is understood as determined by genetic 
manipulations and environmental stimulations. This revisionist hypothesis follows current 
debates over ‗genes and environment‘ or ‗the nature-nurture problem‘ in biology and 
psychology. Referring to Wimsatt (1986) and Oyama (1985), Daniel W. McShea re-affirms 
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that ‗… the nature-nurture problem has taken the form of a debate over the relative 
importance of genes and environment to the determination of human nature‘.36 In the context 
of British Romanticism, Richardson notes that ‗new biological psychologi[sts]‘ reassert the 
old-fashioned ‗temperament‘ and focus on ‗the innate and hereditary aspects of character‘ 
(‗HHI‘, 303).37 In the opening passages of Alastor and Manfred, Shelley‘s Narrator and 
Byron‘s Manfred endeavour to understand the nature of their minds through recollections of 
their past. In the opening of Alastor (A, 1-49), the Narrator invokes nature, calling her 
‗Mother of this unfathomable world‘ (A, 18), in order to know the mystery of ‗thought‘ (A, 
40). Shelley, in the Preface to Alastor, demonstrates his attempt to connect nature with human 
nature: ‗The magnificence and beauty of the external world [nature] sinks profoundly into the 
frame of his conceptions [human nature]…‘ (SPP, 72). 
Byron‘s Manfred also invokes nature (‗the unbounded Universe‘ (I.i.29)) and 
speculates about the origin of irresistible ‗thought‘ within him (I.i.4-7).38 Manfred explores 
‗spirits‘ (M, I.i.29) that exist in nature and human nature: ‗Mysterious Agency! / Ye spirits of 
the unbounded Universe! / Whom I have sought in darkness and in light—‘ (M, I.i.28-30). 
Byron suggests that this ‗[m]ysterious Agency‘ (M, I.i.28) relates to the mechanism of being 
and those ‗spirits‘ (M, I.i.29) which exist as particles of the Universe – whose mystery 
Manfred attempts to disclose. In Manfred, Byron‘s Manfred in particular meditates on the 
workings of thought when he recalls his travels to the ruins of Rome: ‗‘Tis strange that I 
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recall it at this time; / But I have found our thoughts take wildest flight / Even at the moment 
when they should array / Themselves in pensive order‘ (M, III.iv.43-46). Despite dwelling in 
the mind, ‗thoughts‘, like an uncatchable substance, lose control and ‗take wildest flight‘ (M, 
III.iv.44). 
Human nature, mind, or thought in Alastor and Manfred is born with the advent of 
vitality or life. Distinct from Wordsworth‘s sense of immaterial vitality, vitality in Shelley‘s 
and Byron‘s philosophy is associated with matter. William Empson, analysing Wordsworth‘s 
‗Tintern Abbey‘, notes that Wordsworth‘s perspective ‗teeters between pantheism and the 
monistic materialism‘.39 Nevertheless, Paul H. Fry revisits Wordsworth‘s later ‗metaphysics‘ 
and roots the concept of ‗nature‘ throughout Wordsworth‘s poetry in physics or naturalism.40 
Despite his youthful misgivings about religion, British monarchy, and vitalism, the older 
Wordsworth, ostensibly, becomes more religious and politically conservative. In Shelley‘s 
poetic terms, nature is the Mother of the Narrator and makes him feel his own existence 
through ‗[h]er first sweet kisses‘ (A, 12). Those ‗kisses‘ determine the birth of the individual‘s 
being. The mythical breaths or kisses resonate with the engendering of life and the processes 
of fertilisation. Shelley employs poetic or mythic metaphors to trace the relationship between 
vitality and thought. ‗Mother‘ (A, 2), in Alastor, refers to nature as well as vitality. Life, being, 
or vitality, to the Narrator of Alastor, is comparable to a breath: ‗If spring‘s voluptuous 
pantings when she [Mother Nature] breathes / Her first sweet kisses, have been dear to me;‘ 
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(A, 11-12). The ‗first‘ kisses with breath or vitality which animate the Narrator are a metaphor 
of animation and alludes to God‘s breathing life into Adam‘s clay. Nonetheless, the Narrator 
addresses the ‗Great Parent [i.e., nature]‘ (A, 45) and questions whether his ‗soul‘ can ever 
connect the spirit of nature: 
If our great Mother has imbued my soul 
With aught of natural piety to feel 
Your love, and recompense the boon with mine; (A, 2-4) 
The word ‗soul‘ (A, 2) in Shelley‘s atheistic sense is an instance of material vitality. Put 
differently, the Narrator‘s birth as an ‗imbued‘ (A, 2) living organism anticipates modern 
theories of ‗built-in‘ DNA codes that dominate human feelings. Suffering from this radical 
interest in exploring nature and alchemy, the Narrator longs to return to a simple state of 
mind. Having learned of the poet-figure‘s tragic death in solitude (as embodied in the title of 
this poem: ‗Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude‘),41 the Narrator also recognises his own tragic 
and morally unconventional nature. In Shelley‘s poetry, the Narrator invokes the beloved 
Mother Nature and hopes for redemption from his overreaching ambition in pursuit of mystic 
science and the secrets of nature: 
… for I have loved 
Thee ever, and thee only; I have watched 
Thy shadow, and the darkness of thy steps, 
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And my heart ever gazes on the depth 
Of thy deep mysteries. … (A, 19-23) 
Shelley‘s use of the terms ‗shadow‘ (A, 21), ‗darkness‘ (A, 21), and ‗deep mysteries‘ (A, 23), 
indicate the Narrator‘s fascination with mystic science. The Narrator suggests that the ‗deep 
mysteries‘ (A, 23) of knowledge lead him to miserable thoughts: ‗Like an inspired and 
desperate alchymist / Staking his very life on some dark hope,‘ (A, 31-32). 
Both Shelley and Byron recognise the impact of overreaching knowledge on human 
emotion. Negative emotions, described in Alastor and Manfred, interfere with human 
well-being. The pursuit of knowledge in particular leads to the tragedies of the Poet in 
Alastor and Byron‘s Manfred. In the Preface to Alastor, Shelley clearly points to this 
ambition and search for knowledge: ‗He [the Poet] drinks deep of the fountains of knowledge, 
and is still insatiate‘ (SPP, 72). Having learned of the Poet‘s tragedy, the Narrator in Alastor 
confesses that his own ambition to explore the mystery of nature instigates his own 
misfortune: 
          … I have watched 
          Thy [Mother Nature‘s] shadow, and the darkness of thy steps, 
          And my heart ever gazes on the depth 
          Of thy deep mysteries. I have made my bed 
          In charnels and on coffins, where black death 
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          Keeps record of the trophies won from thee, [Emphasis added] (A, 20-25) 
Both the Narrator and the Poet may endeavour to discover ‗deep mysteries‘ (A, 23) – the 
secret of ‗life‘ or creation – through their endless experiments in alchemy. Some alchemists 
sought to reveal the mechanism of vitality so as to achieve human longevity, re-animation, 
and even rejuvenation. Such a pursuit is disclosed in the Narrator‘s confession – ‗the 
darkness of thy steps‘ (A, 21) – as well as his own reflections on the fascinations of alchemy 
and its search for rejuvenation: ‗O, for Medea‘s wondrous alchemy, / Which wheresoe‘er it 
fell made the earth gleam / With bright flowers, and the wintry boughs exhale / From vernal 
blooms fresh fragrance! …‘ (A, 672-75). Medea‘s myth depicts a scenario of perfect alchemy 
achieving both rejuvenation and reanimation. The imagery of ‗bright flowers‘ (A, 674) on 
earth and ‗vernal blooms‘ (A, 675) on ‗the wintry boughs‘ (A, 674) illustrates one of the 
ultimate aims of the metaphorically ‗dark magician[‘s]‘ (A, 682) pursuit of rejuvenation. This 
optimal, hoped for, state in alchemy lures the Narrator and the Poet to pursue an unattainable 
dream which disheartens them. Recalling Ahasuerus in Shelley‘s Queen Mab (1813) – and 
the central figure of his The Wandering Jew; or, The Eternal Avenger (1810) – the miserable 
Poet in Alastor is akin to the wretched Cain wandering the earth:
42
 
… O, that God,  
Profuse of poisons, would concede the chalice 
Which but one living man [the Wandering Jew] has drained, who now, 
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Vessel of deathless wrath, a slave that feels 
No proud exemption in the blighting curse 
He bears, over the world wanders for ever, 
Lone as incarnate death! … (A, 675-81) 
This Faustian ambition, considered as both ‗poisons‘ (A, 675) and a ‗blighting curse‘ (A, 679), 
recurs in Alastor and later in Frankenstein. The Narrator in Alastor senses that anyone who 
fails to dominate emotion, particularly passion, during his or her pursuit of knowledge is ‗… 
a slave that feels / No proud exemption in the blighting curse‘ (A, 678-79). In the opening 
passage of Alastor, the Narrator stresses a negative image of overreaching knowledge 
through rummaging amongst ‗charnels‘ (A, 24) and ‗coffins‘ (A, 24) in search of answers. 
Like the cursed Wandering Jew, the Poet is hounded by endless mental sufferings, symbolised 
by the Furies. In the Preface to Alastor, Shelley points out the Poet‘s miseries: ‗The Poet‘s 
self-centred seclusion was avenged by the [F]uries of an irresistible passion pursuing him to 
speedy ruin‘ (SPP, 73). The Furies in Shelley‘s narrative are the personification of negative 
emotions in human nature. That is to say, the Poet is haunted by something unpleasant in his 
mind, particularly, those shadowy memories of his past unsuccessful pursuit of ‗mysterious‘ 
knowledge on what might be better understood as alchemy. Anticipating Frankenstein, 
Shelley‘s Alastor associates alchemy with reanimation: ‗Such magic as compels the charmed 
night / To render up thy charge: […] and, though ne‘er yet / Thou hast unveil‘d thy inmost 
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sanctuary,‘ (A, 36-38). Yet, as in Frankenstein, Shelley‘s Narrator fails to enter nature‘s 
‗inmost sanctuary‘ (A, 38) and successfully unveil the secret of her creation.  
Manfred‘s monologue at the very beginning of Byron‘s Manfred addresses the same 
topic of emotion and the pursuit of knowledge. With a Faustian remorse in mind, Manfred 
also recognises the limitations of human knowledge: 
But grief should be the instructor of the wise; 
Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most 
Must mourn the deepest o‘er the fatal truth, 
The Tree of Knowledge is not that of Life. 
Philosophy and science, and the springs 
Of wonder, and the wisdom of the world, 
I have essayed, and in my mind there is 
A power to make these subject to itself— (M, I.i.9-16) 
Byron notes the potential danger of exploring knowledge in nature without paying attention 
to human needs and nature. Byron, in Manfred, tends to affirm the potential danger in 
overreaching knowledge or actions. Manfred‘s pursuit of scientific knowledge, like the Poet‘s 
enthusiasm for ‗alchemy‘ in Alastor, attempts to surpass human limitations. The myth of 
Prometheus, as an allegory of scientific discoveries, is well-known to the Shelley circle and 




 In spite of an intimate acquaintance with science or natural philosophy, the 
Poet in Alastor and Byron‘s Manfred do not really attain happiness through science. The First 
Destiny mocks Manfred‘s human limitations: 
          That knowledge is not happiness, and science 
          But an exchange of ignorance for that 
          Which is another kind of ignorance. (M, II.iv.61-63) 
Manfred‘s scientific endeavour, as the mocking Destiny knows, does not bring him 
‗happiness‘ (M, II.iv.61), but grief. In his dramatic context, Byron is relating science to the 
systematised knowledge that eighteenth-century natural philosophers pursue through 
scientific reasoning and experiments. Nevertheless, Byron‘s scepticism is less focused on 
scientific and religious debates, and more concerned with aesthetic or emotional matters. ‗A 
power‘ (M, I.i.16) in Manfred‘s ‗mind‘ (M, I.i.15) may refer to unknown emotion. In the 
opening passage of Manfred, Byron employs the imagery of Eden to recall the spiritual 
suffering that knowledge can bring. By increasing his knowledge of nature, Manfred endures 
more sufferings and sees ‗knowledge‘ as the fountainhead of ‗sorrow‘ (M, I.i.10). Manfred, 
during his invocation to nature, urges nature to give him power to remove ‗the strong curse‘ 
(M.I.i.47) of bad thoughts or memories from his mind: ‗By the strong curse which is upon my 
soul, / The thought which is within me and around me, / I do compel ye to my 
will.—Appear!‘ (M, I.i.47-49). The mind, for Manfred, is ‗a wandering hell‘ (M, I.i.46). In 
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this sense, Shelley and Byron meditate on the intricate relationship between the construction 
of knowledge and the corporeal mind. The two poems disclose the poets‘ scepticism about 
knowledge and their desire to explore the mystery of the mind, particularly grief and solitude. 
     The emblems of the swan in Alastor and the eagle in Manfred suggest a contrast 
between nature and the observing self. In lines 275-95 from Alastor and lines 26-46 of 
Manfred (Act I, Scene II), the spheres of the outer nature and the inner nature in the Poet‘s 
and Manfred‘s mind are contrasted. The outer nature reflects the beautiful in the perceived 
world, whereas the human nature or the mind demonstrates the sublime. The activities of the 
mind or the changes of emotion result from sense stimulations. Shelley and Byron depict 
emotional sufferings or negative sublimity in Alastor and Manfred. In Alastor, Shelley uses 
‗the lone Chorasmian shore‘ (A, 273) and a beautiful swan flying up to the sky (A, 275-80) to 
demonstrate the Poet‘s emotions. In Manfred, Byron uses the cliffs in the mountain of the 
Jungfrau and a beautiful eagle winging over the mountains to illustrate Manfred‘s emotions 
(M, I.ii.1-38). These two scenes in Alastor and Manfred connect the physical nature to human 
nature. These two birds reflect the beautiful – a state of peace in the mind. To the wretched 
existences of Shelley‘s Poet and Byron‘s Manfred, respectively, the swan and the eagle 
symbolise a blessed state of affectionate attachment to place and ‗home‘. Coming from an 
‗alienated home‘ (A, 76), the Poet in Alastor imagines that the swan has an eager companion 
awaiting its return:  
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          … ―Thou hast a home, 
          Beautiful bird; thou voyagest to thine home, 
          Where thy sweet mate will twine her downy neck 
          With thine, and welcome thy return with eyes 
          Bright in the lustre of their own fond joy. (A, 280-84) 
Manfred envies the powerful eagle for its ruling of the heaven and, eventually, desires to be 
its prey: 
          Thou winged and cloud-cleaving minister [eagle], 
          Whose happy flight is highest into heaven, 
          Well mayst thou swoop so near me—I should be 
          Thy prey, and gorge thine eaglets; …. (M, I.ii.29-32) 
On observing the swan and the eagle, the Poet and Manfred, respectively, experience two 
distinct emotions – the beautiful and the sublime. Here the sublime is in opposition to the 
beautiful and equates with ‗pain‘ in Edmund Burke‘s theory of aesthetics.44 The beautiful 
scenes merely bring temporary delight to Shelley‘s Poet and Byron‘s Manfred. Yet through 
imagination or recollection of their miserable past, negative sublimity, like the Furies, haunts 
the Poet‘s and Manfred‘s minds. In this case, inner feelings become tangible and 
physiological and this flowing ‗spirit‘ (or thought) captures both Shelley‘s and Byron‘s 
imagination. The contrasts between their inner sufferings (the sublime) and the outer delights 
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(the beautiful) reinforce the sorrow of the Poet and Manfred. This suffering leads the Poet 
and Manfred to ponder on the meaning of life as well as the origin of their own sufferings.  
An obsession with death permeates Alastor and Manfred. Shelley and Byron recognise 
that death is an ultimate means to terminate emotional sufferings that the Poet and Manfred 
experience. Like Byron‘s Manfred, who is tortured by madness, the Poet in Shelley‘s Alastor 
endures solitude and eventually recognises his own human mortality: 
          … A gloomy smile 
          Of desperate hope convulsed his curling lips. 
          For sleep, he [the Poet] knew, kept most relentlessly 
          Its precious charge, and silent death exposed, 
          Faithless perhaps as sleep, a shadowy lure, 
          With doubtful smile mocking its own strange charms. (A, 290-95) 
‗A gloomy smile‘ (A, 290) conveys the ambivalence of his death. The ‗charms‘ (A, 295) of 
death do not overwhelm his mind until his physical health is depleted. Similarly, the response 
of Byron‘s Manfred to the carefree eagle is that he would rather die as the food of the 
predator than live a guilty and mediocre life: 
          … I have ceased 
          To justify my deeds unto myself— 
          The last infirmity of evil. Ay, 
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          Thou winged and cloud-cleaving minister [the eagle], 
          Whose happy flight is highest into heaven, 
          Well mayst thou swoop so near me—I should be 
          Thy prey, and gorge thine eaglets; thou art gone 
          ……………………………………………….... 
          But we, who name ourselves its sovereigns, we, 
          Half dust, half deity, alike unfit 
          To sink or soar, …. (M, I.ii.26-41) 
Unlike the eagle, which is capable of sinking or soaring (M, I.ii.41), humans, Manfred 
suggests, are physically limited: ‗… we / Half dust, half deity, alike unfit / to sink or soar…‘ 
(M, I.ii.39-41). Experiencing emotional sufferings, Manfred, therefore, rethinks the greatness 
of humankind. The concept of mediocrity in humans is also evident in Alastor. In Alastor, the 
Poet observes the swan flapping ‗… strong wings / Scaling the upward sky, bent its bright 
course / High over the immeasurable main‘ (A, 277-79). It is notable that human limitations, 
for Shelley and Byron, are on the surface related to the physical body which restricts actions 
and profoundly dominates their emotions. Our intellectual capacities may lead humans to 
regard themselves as ‗half deity‘,45 rulers over other creatures and nature. ‗But‘, as Manfred 
recognises, ‗we, who name ourselves its sovereigns, we, / Half dust, half deity, …‘ (M, 
I.ii.39-40). This encounter with the eagle reminds Manfred of his limitations and inability to 
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overcome his negative memory and feel as carefree as the eagle does. The Poet, in Alastor, 
also experiences a similar plight. That is, he fails to transcend his physical and emotional 
limitations. The sufferings of the Poet and Manfred overwhelm their minds and, eventually, 
they feel impotent to dispel gloomy emotion from their minds. Rethinking anthropocentrism, 
Shelley and Byron suggest that a complicated mind, full of thoughts, prevents the human 
mind from returning to a simple or instinctive state of happiness.
46
 
     Within Alastor and Manfred, ancient ruins are the encrypted lessons of human 
civilisations.
47
 While natural philosophers employ scientific methods to obtain knowledge 
from nature, Shelley and Byron, like cultural archaeologists, endeavour to rake ancient ruins 
for a deeper understanding of human existence and civilisation.
48
 The Poet in Alastor 
journeys through time and ancient civilised sites: ‗The awful ruins of the days of old:‘ (A, 
108). Those ancient ruins are located in South Europe, Middle East, and North Africa, for 
example ‗Athens‘, ‗Tyre‘, ‗Balbec‘, ‗Jerusalem‘, ‗Babylon‘, ‗Memphis‘, ‗Thebes‘, and 
‗Æthiopia‘ (A, 109-12, 115). Byron‘s Manfred encounters the ancient civilisation of Rome (M, 
III.iv.8-30), in the form of the ruins of ‗the Colosseum‘s wall‘, ‗the Caesars‘ palace‘, 
‗Caesar‘s chambers‘, and ‗the Augustan halls‘ (M, III.iv.10, 16, 29). In his recollections, 
Manfred retrieves sense data about physical objects as if they were stored in his neural 
memory. Shelley‘s poet-figure journeys in those sites and accumulates data in his mind. This 
journey reflects a worldview in which the self is constructed through the stimulations of the 
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physical objects. In Alastor and Manfred, Shelley and Byron illuminate the effect of those 
ruins upon the mind and the connection between the physical objects and intellect. In Alastor, 
the Poet attempts to disclose the mystery of ancient ‗thoughts‘ through reading a series of 
ruins, for example ‗the eternal pyramids‘, ‗alabaster obelisk‘, ‗jasper tomb‘, ‗mutilated 
sphynx‘, ‗ruined temples‘, ‗[s]tupendous columns‘, ‗wild images [o]f more than man‘, and 
‗marble dæmons‘ (A, 111-20). The Poet reads the ruins like natural texts or codes and 
attempts to produce meaning. To the Poet, in Alastor, the silent ruins await his interpretations: 
… dead men 
Hang their mute thoughts on the mute walls around, 
He lingered, poring on memorials 
Of the world‘s youth, …. (A, 119-22) 
Clearly, the ‗mute thoughts‘ (A, 120) of people in history, as well as on ‗the mute walls‘ (A, 
120), represent the original meaning that the Poet endeavours to understand through those 
‗memorials‘ (A, 121). Shelley suggests that the constructs of knowledge or the forms of 
‗history‘ are dependent on the interpretations of the individual, especially those sophisticated 
readings of archaeologists, scientists and historians. In Alastor, the mystery of 
‗understanding‘ is unveiled: 
          Gazed on those speechless shapes, nor, when the moon 
          Filled the mysterious halls with floating shades 
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          Suspended he that task, but ever gazed 
          And gazed, till meaning on his vacant mind 
          Flashed like strong inspiration, and he saw 
          The thrilling secrets of the birth of time. (A, 123-28) 
Shelley echoes a Lockean empiricist view of the mind. The Poet‘s ‗vacant mind‘ (A, 126) 
relates to Locke‘s concept of tabula rasa in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(1689): ‗Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, 
without any ideas …‘ (2.1.2).49 As well as Lucretius, Shelley had an intimate acquaintance, 
in 1815, with Locke‘s Essay Concerning Human Understanding before composing Alastor.50 
Locke‘s empiricism illuminates the construction of knowledge through senses: ‗No man's 
knowledge here can go beyond his experience‘ (ECHU, 2.1.19). In Alastor, Shelley‘s 
interrogation of ‗meaning‘ (A, 126) or knowledge is determined by Locke‘s empiricism in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In his account about knowledge, Locke relates its 
‗materials‘ to sensation and reflection: ‗Our observation employed either, about external 
sensible objects [i.e., sensation], or about the internal operations of our minds perceived [i.e., 
reflection] and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all 
the materials of thinking‘ (ECHU, 2.1.2). The Narrator in Alastor points to the Poet‘s 
cognitive development and his intuitive understanding of nature: 
            By solemn vision, and bright silver dream, 
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          His infancy was nurtured. Every sight 
          And sound from the vast earth and ambient air, 
          Sent to his heart its choicest impulses. 
          The fountains of divine philosophy 
          Fled not his thirsting lips, and all of great, 
          Or good, or lovely, which the sacred past 
          In truth or fable consecrates, he felt 
          And knew…. (A, 67-75) 
The Poet is ‗nurtured‘ (A, 68) through a wealth of environmental stimulations: ‗… Every 
sight / And sound from the vast earth and ambient air, / Sent to his heart its choicest impulses‘ 
(A, 68-70). Those ‗choicest impulses‘ (A, 70) refer to his natural education in which delicate 
sources are sent to ‗his heart‘ (A, 70). This concept echoes Locke‘s idea of ‗thinking‘ and 
memory: ‗… the memory of thoughts is retained by the impressions that are made on the 
brain, and the traces there left after such thinking …‘ (ECHU, 2.1.15). Without the 
association of ideas or thinking, sense experience is necessarily the major element from 
which to construct an ‗intelligent‘ mind. For that reason, the Poet ‗[g]azed on those 
speechless shapes …‘ (A, 123) in the ancient ruins and only recognises its meaning when ‗… 
his vacant mind / Flashed like strong inspiration …‘ (A, 127).  
Byron‘s Manfred conveys his intention to connect nature with the hidden meaning: ‗I 
 167 
learn‘d the language of another world‘ (M, III.iv.7). After a tour of Roman relics, Manfred 
suggests that his knowledge of the ancient glory is proved and reinforced by the ruins: ‗The 
dead, but sceptred sovereigns, who still rule / Our spirits from their urns.—‘ (M, III.iv.40-41). 
In other words, the human mind, associated with ‗spirit‘ in Byron‘s lines, is affected by those 
past ideas, which are recorded from signs, symbols, and objects. Language is a science of 
signs that forms a major medium to ascribe those ideas or codes meaning. That is, the 
individual‘s understanding of the world derives from the naming of objects through such 
signs and symbols. Those ruins, to Manfred‘s acute intelligence, are not simply meaningless 
and beyond comprehension, but meaningful signs. Every detail conveys to Manfred a 
historical scenario. The history of the Roman Empire through his previous ‗education‘ 
initially forms images in Manfred‘s mind and later those ancient relics strengthen those 
connections with previous knowledge. Dependent on such a historical imagination or 
mapping, Manfred gives the ruins meaning. Manfred‘s imagination revives the Caesars‘ glory 
age and ‗the gladiators‘ bloody Circus‘ (M, III.iv.27). As for Shelley and Byron, thoughts are 
viewed as optical matter travelling to the mind like light.
51
 In Alastor, ‗meaning‘ or thought 
approaches the mind like a flash: ‗Flashed like strong inspiration …‘ (A, 127).52 The 
narrative in Alastor and Manfred illuminates Byron‘s and Shelley‘s own scientific interests 
and reflections on mental processes and their interactions with the outer world. 
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II. Love and Emotion 
Repressed emotion and desire of an unobtainable desired object are at the centre of the 
narrative structures of Alastor and Manfred. A veiled girl in Alastor and Astarte‘s ghost in 
Manfred are seen as visions which crystallise the poets‘ emotions in search of love. In Alastor, 
the Poet‘s dream (A, 151-91) reflects his desire for ideal love or a so-called soul mate. In 
Manfred, the encounter with the phantom of Astarte (M, II.iv.98-157) represents Manfred‘s 
remorse for his deceased love, as well as his desire for reunion. After the encounter between 
the Poet and ‗an Arab maiden‘ (A, 129), the Narrator in Alastor describes the Poet‘s pursuit of 
an ideal figure of woman from the Poet‘s dream: 
          … He dreamed a veiled maid 
          Sate near him, talking in low solemn tones. 
          Her voice was like the voice of his own soul 
          Heard in the calm of thought; its music long, 
          Like woven sounds of streams and breezes, held 
          His inmost sense suspended in its web 
          Of many-coloured woof and shifting hues. (A, 151-57) 
Shelley employs a vision to illustrate how an ideal partner might bring delight. Byron also 
employs a similar narrative to demonstrate Manfred‘s thirst for a lost delight or, at least, a 
means to reduce his negative emotions, especially those of grief. Byron‘s dramatic design 
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conjures up the phantom of Manfred‘s beloved woman – Astarte. In this psychic scenario, 
what can make Manfred regain peace of mind or even delight is a reunion with Astarte and 
her forgiveness. In Manfred, the desire for delight permeates the encounter between Manfred 
and Astarte through his confessions. When he meets Astarte‘s ghost emerging from ‗… no 
living hue, / … like the unnatural red‘ (M, II.iv.99-100), Manfred tries to reduce his sense of 
guilt about Astarte‘s death: ‗Forgive me or condemn me‘ (M, II.iv.105). Prior to the ghost‘s 
disappearance, Manfred repeatedly begs Astarte‘s ghost for forgiveness: 
          MAN.     Yet one word more—am I forgiven? 
          PHAN. Farewell! 
          MAN.         Say, shall we meet again? 
          PHAN.                              Farewell! 
          MAN. One word for mercy! Say, thou lovest me. 
          PHAN. Manfred! (M, II.iv.152-57) 
Manfred‘s expectation for Astarte‘s forgiveness and reunion reveals his extreme pursuit of 
delight. In Alastor, the ideal love‘s voice promises the Poet extreme delight. The Narrator, in 
Alastor, refers the voice of the maid as ‗… woven sounds of streams and breezes …‘ (A, 155) 
and the heavenly voice works in ‗[the Poet‘s] inmost sense suspended in its web / Of 
many-coloured woof and shifting hues‘ (A, 156-57). Shelley emphasises the feeling of delight 
when one encounters ideal love. In Alastor, the Narrator points to the Poet‘s ultimate pursuit 
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of a soul mate: ‗Her voice was like the voice of his own soul‘ (A, 153). It is clear that the 
voice conveys the physical existence of a being elsewhere in the space beyond the physical 
realm. Her voice particularly suggests those characteristics of the mind or a wholeness being. 
Such aspiration for love is also proved in Alastor, where the veiled maiden talks to the Poet in 
his dream: ‗[She] [s]ate near him, talking in low solemn tones. / Her voice was like the voice 
of his own soul‘ (A, 152-53). It is notable that voice becomes a medium to delight.53 
Astarte‘s voice is clearly a potential origin of delight for Manfred. Byron‘s Manfred 
repeatedly begs Astarte to speak to him. At the very beginning of the confrontation with 
Astarte, Manfred asks Nemesis to ‗bid her speak‘ (M, II.iv.104) and desires again Astarte‘s 
voice: ‗Astarte! my beloved! speak to me:‘ (M, II.iv.118). At the end, before Astarte reveals 
Manfred‘s death,54 Manfred resumes his request: ‗Speak to me! though it be in wrath;—but 
say— / I reck not what— but let me hear thee once— / This once—once more!‘ (M, 
II.iv.146-48). Manfred‘s remorse stems from the irrecoverable loss of his beloved. Manfred‘s 
ideal delight is taken with Astarte‘s disappearance or tragic death. Like the Poet who 
discovers that verbal communications are a major source for delight, Manfred regards his 
beloved‘s voice as music: ‗The voice which was my music—Speak to me!‘ (M, II.iv.135). 
Manfred recognises the significance of verbal communications as Astarte‘s voice conveys her 
entire existence: ‗Say on, say on— / I live but in the sound—it is thy voice!‘ (M, 
II.iv.150-51). 
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For Shelley, the ideal union for delight relies on not merely sight and voice, but mutual 
physical intimacy. In the Poet‘s dream, the process of his consummation with the veiled girl 
is detailed in lines 172-187, but the approaching intimacy between the Poet and his ideal love 
is never consummated and the figure, ultimately, disappears like the phantom of Manfred‘s 
Astarte: 
          … He [The Poet] reared his shuddering limbs and quelled 
          His gasping breath, and spread his arms to meet 
          Her panting bosom: … she drew back a while, 
          Then, yielding to the irresistible joy, 
          With frantic gesture and short breathless cry 
          Folded his frame in her dissolving arms. (A, 182-87) 
This scene in the dream suggests a sexual intimacy between the Poet and the veiled girl, yet 
‗her dissolving arms‘ (A, 187) reveal the disappearance of the Poet‘s love. In the scene, the 
Poet dispels his reason and approaches the girl‘s ‗panting bosom‘ (A, 184). The couple enjoy 
momentary romantic love: ‗Then, yielding to the irresistible joy, / With frantic gesture and 
short breathless cry‘ (185-86). Awakening from this vision, the Poet experiences a distinct 
emotion – a loss of love: 
Now blackness veiled his dizzy eyes, and night 
Involved and swallowed up the vision; sleep, 
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Like a dark flood suspended in its course, 
Rolled back its impulse on his vacant brain. (A, 188-91) 
Shelley‘s symbolic language prefigures neuroscientific understandings of the mind.55 When 
sleep comes, this ‗flood‘ (A, 190), like a stream, is ‗suspended‘ (A, 190), as Shelley puts it, 
and we lose consciousness. The ‗vacant brain‘ (A, 191), in Shelley‘s terms, refers to 
unconsciousness or involuntary operations of the mind and the ‗impulse‘ (A, 191) equates to 
electrical activity. With the disappearing of the veiled maid in the Poet‘s dream, an ‗impulse‘ 
(A, 191) pours into the ‗vacant brain‘ (A, 191) and startles the Poet into consciousness: 
‗Roused by the shock he started from his trance –‘ (A, 192). Shelley recalls Locke‘s notion 
that there is no consciousness, impression, or memory in sleep, as Locke argues: 
… in the thinking of the soul, which is not perceived in a sleeping man, there the 
soul thinks apart, and making no use of the organs of the body, leaves no 
impressions on it, and consequently no memory of such thoughts‘ (ECHU, 
2.1.15).  
Shelley‘s metaphor relates to current scientific notions. Some experiments of sleep 
demonstrate the working of our body.
56
 The mechanism of sleep deprives us of 
consciousness other than the autonomic nervous system (ANS), which works without 
conscious control: ‗You lose muscle tone as the neurons controlling skeletal muscle 
movements are actively inhibited but, thankfully, the ones controlling respiration and heart 
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rate carry on working normally!‘ (39).57 This scientific evidence explains the relationship 
between consciousness and sleep and is suggestive, too, about the materiality of emotion. In 
other words, emotion never exists without consciousness. Eternal sleep – death – plays an 
important role in terminating vain desire and negative emotions, which becomes the ultimate 
obsession of the Poet and Manfred, who both suffer from the loss of love. 
     In this treatment of the subject of love, Shelley‘s Alastor is the counterpart to Byron‘s 
Manfred. While Alastor describes the poet-figure‘s pursuit of love and imagination, Manfred 
points out a vivid tragedy after a failing relationship. In Manfred, Byron challenges Shelley‘s 
idealism in love and recognises that the ‗fulfilment‘ of romantic love is ultimately destructive. 
Prior to the episodes of the maiden in the Poet‘s dream in Alastor and Astarte‘s phantom in 
Manfred, the Arab maiden and Astarte are flesh-and-blood objects that are memorable to both 
the Poet and Manfred. This antithesis in Shelley‘s and Byron‘s love philosophy indicates a 
striking dichotomy between passion and reason or sense and sensibility. The philosophy of 
love in Alastor and Manfred is distinct. Alastor demonstrates Shelley‘s Platonic stoicism. 
Manfred mediates on the taboo of incestuous love. The Arab maiden and Astarte are the 
prototype of forbidden love. The relationship with the Arab maiden relates to a religious 
taboo and that with Astarte refers to a moral taboo. 
     Alastor explores the Poet‘s reason for his pursuit of ideal love. As in the epigraph to 
Alastor, Shelley quotes St. Augustine‘s Confessions (III.i.) to illuminate his own philosophy: 
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‗Nondum amabam, et amare amabam, quærebam quid amarem, amans amare‘ [Not yet did I 
love, yet I was in love with loving; … I sought what I might love, loving to love].58 The Poet 
insists on an ultimate true love compatible with his imagination: ‗Her voice was like the 
voice of his own soul‘ (A, 153). In the Poet‘s journey to Persian ruins, the encounter with ‗an 
Arab maiden‘ (A, 129) is a decisive event that challenges the Poet‘s reason: 
            Meanwhile an Arab maiden brought his [the Poet‘s] food, 
          Her daily portion, from her father‘s tent, 
          And spread her matting for his couch, and stole 
          From duties and repose to tend his steps:—   
          Enamoured, yet not daring for deep awe 
          To speak her love:—and watched his nightly sleep, 
          Sleepless herself, to gaze upon his lips 
          Parted in slumber, whence the regular breath 
          Of innocent dreams arose: then, when red morn 
          Made paler the pale moon, to her cold home 
          Wildered, and wan, and panting, she returned. (A, 129-39) 
This scene relates to the myth of Cupid and Psyche.
59
 Unlike Cupid‘s fierce response, the 
Poet‘s idealism suggests his gentle response to the maiden‘s temptation. This idealised 
romantic love is all but fulfilled when the Poet ‗… dreamed a veiled maid / Sate near him, 
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talking in low solemn tones‘ (A, 151-52). In addition to the same position sitting next to the 
Poet, ‗the veiled maid‘ (A, 151) relates to ‗the Arab maiden‘ (A, 129) who wears a veil. After 
this unsuccessful romantic vision, the Poet persists in his wanderings and pursuit of true love 
and, as a result, dies in solitude. Aware that romantic love seems unattainable in Alastor, 
Shelley starts to reassess his idealism. In the Preface to Alastor, Shelley recognises the peril 
of his idealism or reason in a search for true love – ‗a prototype of his conception‘ (SPP, 73): 
‗They who, … loving nothing on this earth, … rejoicing neither in human joy nor mourning 
with human grief[,] … have their apportioned curse‘ [emphasis added] (SPP, 73). This ‗curse‘ 
relates to the physical and genetic which exists not only in Alastor but also in Manfred. 
     Similar to the Poet‘s idealised love relationship, Manfred‘s passion is both a curse of 
the ideal and a genetic one. In the opening passage of Manfred, Manfred accuses nature of 
imbuing a curse on his mind to torment him: ‗A wandering hell in the eternal space; / By the 
strong curse which is upon my soul, [emphasis added]‘ (M, I.i.46-47). The curse in Manfred 
relates to Manfred‘s nature, which he is born to be ‗different‘. Manfred complains to the 
Abbot about his emotional limitations and his inability to change his nature (scientifically, his 
biologically determined DNA): ‗I could not tame my nature down; … / … / … I disdained to 
mingle with / A herd, though to be leader—and of wolves. / The lion is alone, and so am I‘ 
[emphasis added] (M, III.i.117-23).
60
 Here Manfred suggests that his tragic or genetic flaw is 
due to being unable to resist intimacy with Astarte. Astarte is believed to relate to Augusta 
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Leigh, Byron‘s half-sister.61 Manfred‘s ‗cursed‘ characteristic is also demonstrated in 
Byron‘s personality. Byron once wrote to Augusta: ‗[T]he manner in which I was brought up 
must necessarily have broken a meek spirit, or rendered a fiery one ungovernable‘ (qtd. in 
B&S 8). Byron‘s ‗meek spirit‘ (namely, the moral goodness) which used to be constructed by 
nurture is replaced by his ‗fiery‘ and ‗ungovernable‘ nature. This nature refers to his 
unconventional DNA. Byron realises that the human nature is a certain unchangeable 
substance which governs emotion. This incest scandal with Augusta is implicitly behind 
Byron‘s Manfred.62 During the gossip between Manfred‘s servants Herman and Manuel, 
Manfred‘s incest scandal is hinted at: 
Count Manfred was, as now, within his tower,— 
How occupied, we knew not, but with him 
The sole companion of his wanderings 
And watchings—her, whom of all earthly things 
That lived, the only thing he seem‘d to love, — 
As he, indeed, by blood was bound to do, 
The lady Astarte, his——   
Hush! who comes here? 
[Emphasis added] (M, III.iii.41-47) 
In Andrew Elfenbein‘s reading, Manuel‘s unvoiced word is ‗sister‘ (‗BGS‘, 69). Manfred 
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challenges the moral code of sexuality or the morally good and endeavours to obtain optimal 
happiness in ‗romantic love‘. Prior to his servants suggesting an incestuous relationship, 
Manfred‘s ravings may confuse the Chamois Hunter, but do suggest Manfred‘s own guilt: ‗I 
say ‘tis blood—my blood! the pure warm stream / Which ran in the veins of my fathers, and 
in ours / When we were in our youth, and had one heart, / And loved each other as we should 
not love,‘ (M, II.i.24-27). The Hunter recognises ‗some half-maddening sin‘ (M, II.i.31) from 
Manfred‘s ‗strange words‘ (M, II.i.31). This undisclosed sin corrodes Manfred and brings 
about endless ‗bitterness‘ (M, II.i.58): ‗… actions are our epochs: mine / Have made my days 
and nights imperishable, / Endless, and all alike, …‘ (M, II.i.52-54). It is manifest that 
Manfred challenges forbidden love and eventually leads himself to madness and remorse, 
which is even worse than Shelley‘s Poet dying in solitude. 
     In Alastor and Manfred, Shelley and Byron believe that emotion ends with death. 
Similar to a conviction in Greco-Roman and French materialism that death is an escape of 
emotion, the philosophy in Alastor and Manfred conveys the connection between sleep, death, 
and emotion. In Lucretius‘s philosophy, death is conceived of as an everlasting sleep. In 
Alastor, the narrator mourns the death of ‗[a] lovely youth [the Poet]‘ (A, 55) on ‗[t]he lone 
couch of his everlasting sleep‘ [emphasis added] (A, 57). A deep sleep, however, can be seen 
as a temporary death. Although there are many issues related to the enigma of sleep, 
neuroscientists believe that sleep helps us ‗reset things in the brain‘ when the brain stops 
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‗processing sensory information, or being vigilant and attentive, or having to control our 
actions‘ (NSB, 40). Therefore, emotion disappears with sleep. Likewise, the Poet‘s reason or 
repression of sexuality is loosened in his sleep until he awakens (A, 151-93). The Poet, 
nevertheless, enjoys the ‗delightful realms‘ (A, 219) of sleep. A sound sleep is a biological or 
genetic mechanism that amends or recovers physical damages to the body. The Poet‘s sleep 
reveals his desire for a consummation with the Arab maiden: 
The spirit of sweet human love has sent 
A vision to the sleep of him who spurned 
Her choicest gifts. He eagerly pursues 
Beyond the realms of dream that fleeing shade; 
He overleaps the bounds. Alas! alas! 
Were limbs, and breath, and being interwined 
Thus treacherously? Lost, lost, for ever lost, 
In the wide pathless desart of dim sleep, 
That beautiful shape! Does the dark gate of death 
Conduct to thy mysterious paradise, 
O Sleep? …. [Emphasis added] (A, 203-13) 
In sleep, a ‗mysterious paradise‘ (A, 212) without the restrictions of morality or reason, the 
Poet instead accepts the Arab girl‘s ‗choicest gifts‘ (A, 205) (her body and her purity) and 
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enjoys the physical intimacy and her ‗beautiful shape‘ (A, 211). When awake, without real 
physical contact with the maiden, the Poet‘s ‗brain‘ (A, 221) is ‗stung‘ (A, 221) and it feels 
like ‗despair‘ (A, 222): ‗The insatiate hope which it awakened, stung / His brain even like 
despair‘ (A, 221-22). In this sense, Shelley‘s Alastor relates sleep to the issue of emotion. The 
material body is the very basis of emotion. 
     Byron‘s Manfred also conveys this mechanism of sleep to suggest the materiality of 
emotion. Unlike death that deletes all thoughts stored in our neurons, sleep continues with the 
minimal signs of life through repressed self-consciousness. The Spirit tells Manfred about 
this mechanism of sleep and thoughts: 
Though thy slumber may be deep, 
Yet thy spirit shall not sleep, 
There are shades which will not vanish, 
There are thoughts thou canst not banish; 
By a power to thee unknown, 
[Emphasis added] (M, I.i.202-06) 
The ‗shades‘ (M, I.i.204), on the surface, refer to supernatural ghosts from a non-scientific 
worldview. In order to comprehend the mystery of the mind, Byron may relate ‗shades‘ (M, 
I.i.204) to a certain substance running in the brain during sleep. Like Shelley, Byron 
recognises that only death, not a slumber, can terminate the self, ‗shades‘ (M, I.i.204), and 
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‗thoughts‘ (M, I.i.205). Such a concept is again based on a hypothesis of Greco-Roman 
materialism and later French materialism. In The System of Epicurus, the French materialist 
La Mettrie (1709-1751), following Lucretius‘s materialist ideas, emphasises the notion that 
when death comes, the individual will lose sensations and consciousness and enter an 
everlasting ‗sleep‘: ‗It is death‘s opium; all the blood is inebriated by it, and the senses are 
dulled. We feel ourselves dying as we feel ourselves falling asleep or fainting…‘.63 ‗Death‘, 
La Mettrie emphasises, ‗is the end of everything; after it, I repeat, there is a void, an eternal 
nothingness‘ (MMOW, 108). At the death of the Poet in Alastor, a materialist concept is 
clearly demonstrated: ‗No sense, no motion, no divinity— / A fragile lute, …‘ (A, 666-67) 
and ‗… a dream / Of youth, which night and time have quenched for ever, / Still, dark, and 
dry, and unremembered now‘ (A, 669-71). Human senses and emotions vanish with the 
destruction of the ‗lute‘ (instrument or body) (A, 667). Following this materialist thinking, the 
modern reader may better understand how Byron, like Shelley, employs an allegorical 
narrative to relate to their understanding of the physical mind. In Manfred, the ‗shades‘ (M, 
I.i.204) and ‗spirit‘ (M, I.i.203) may be explained, in current scientific terms, as different 
electro-chemical substances (scientifically, brainwaves or neuro-transmitters), which remain 
active in the brain or mind during our sleep: ‗Though thy slumber may be deep, / Yet thy 
spirit shall not sleep, / There are shades which will not vanish,‘ (M, I.i.202-04). This 
evolutionary mechanism that also occurs in a coma or anaesthesia helps to provide nutrition 
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to sustain the organism: ‗The proteins that they make help to stabilise LTP [long-term 
potentiation, which affects lasting changes in synaptic strength between neurons] and make it 
last longer‘ (NSB, 29). Due to this physiological process, thoughts can still cling to neural 
networks in the brain: ‗There are thoughts thou canst not banish;‘ (M, I.i.205). Nevertheless, 
Byron and Shelley alike may still thirst for the mystery of vitality, namely an ‗unknown‘ 
power of life‘s genesis (M, I.i.206). This inquiry central to Shelley‘s Alastor also permeated 
Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein and their later works when this circle was formed in 
Switzerland in the summer of 1816. 
     In Manfred, Byron‘s depiction of death as the end of emotion demonstrates more 
influence of Greco-Roman and French materialism on Byron‘s philosophy. Drawing on 
materialist philosophy, the only way to terminate despairing ‗thoughts‘, Manfred recognises 
is simply to end his life. Manfred believes that once he is dead, emotion will no longer torture 
him. Manfred responds to the Chamois Hunter who comes to his aid: 
          In this one plunge.—Farewell, ye opening heavens! 
          Look not upon me thus reproachfully—   
          Ye were not meant for me—Earth! take these atoms! (M, I.ii.107-09) 
Manfred‘s philosophy of ‗atoms‘ (M, I.ii.109) reflects Greek atomism and his desire for 
escapism. Greek atomists believe in the mortality of the soul. In other words, death is an 
absolute slumber that can take away Manfred‘s grief about the death of his beloved Astarte. 
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In addition to death or forgetfulness, madness is another way to escape emotional tortures of 
the self. Manfred wishes madness to cease his grief. When he meets the Witch of the Alps, 
Manfred complains to her about his failed invocation to the ‗Daughter of Air‘ (M, II.ii.127): 
‗… I have pray‘d / For madness as a blessing—‘tis denied me‘ [emphasis added] (M, 
II.ii.133-34). To Manfred, madness can help him lose self-consciousness or his ‗self‘ and, 
therefore, avoid emotional sufferings. Madness is also central to later works of the Shelley 
circle, for example Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein and Shelley‘s Julian and Maddalo. It is 
evident that the Shelley circle attempts to comprehend the mysterious substance of emotion. 
     A critical comparison of Shelley‘s Alastor with Byron‘s Manfred shows how both poets 
understand the mind in a scientific way. Byron and Shelley are fascinated by human nature, 
the mind and emotion from both atheistic and materialist perspectives as they endeavour to 
locate the origins of the self. Byron‘s and Shelley‘s investigations into emotion prefigure 
neuroscientific concerns, as their depictions of the mind both foreshadow later scientific 
developments (including neuroscience, quantum physics, and genetics) and echo early 
empiricism and aesthetics. More significantly, materialism is evident in their early poetic 
works Alastor and Manfred in which they recognise an affinity between existence and 
emotion. In their explorations of human emotions, Shelley and Byron embody a Romantic 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A Storm of the Mind: Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein (1818) 
This chapter explores the effects of human physical appearances on the mind. In 
Frankenstein, ‗feeling‘ and ‗feelings‘ denote emotional operations of the mind. These 
storm-like emotions are mutable and overwhelming. Frankenstein recognises the existence of 
protean emotions before starting his creation: ‗No one can conceive the variety of feelings 
which bore me onwards, like a hurricane, in the first enthusiasm of success‘ [emphasis 
added].
1
 After his failure of creating the ‗being‘, ‗creature‘, or monster,2 Frankenstein 
meditates on human emotions: ‗How mutable are our feelings, and how strange is that 
clinging love we have of life even in excess of misery!‘ (F, 119) 
Critics have investigated the relationship between materiality and aesthetics, and their 
inquiries provide a point of departure for my reading of Frankenstein. Terry Eagleton‘s The 
Ideology of the Aesthetics draws on Alexander C. Baumgarten‘s theory of cognition of ‗the 
generalities of reason and the particulars of sense‘ (15) to revisit aesthetic phenomena, for 
instance, ‗passion, imagination, [and] sensuality‘ (28) in the context of the body and power.3 
Paul Gilmore examines the intricate relations between the mind and electricity using the 
concept of the materiality of aesthetics.
4
 Gilmore employs the term ‗aesthetic electricity‘ to 
examine the connection between human consciousness and science that fascinates both 
Shelley and Coleridge
5
 and later between electricity and American Romanticism.
6
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The emotions in Frankenstein are grounded in sensations and physical appearances.
7
 A 
few critics have noted this emotional connection with human outer appearances or 
physiognomy.
8
 According to The Oxford English Dictionary, physiognomy is ‗[t]he study of 
the features of the face, or of the form of the body generally, as being supposedly indicative 
of character; the art of judging character from such study‘.9 Some eighteenth-century 
sentimentalist writers, for example Laurence Sterne, Henry Mackenzie, Johann von Goethe, 
William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Matthew Lewis, have explored this idea of 
physiognomy in their works.
10
 This connection between sentimentalism and physiognomy 
helped writers depict inner human characteristics from physical gestures, including facial 
expressions. Lewis – known as ‗Monk‘ Lewis11 – was an influential writer who introduced 
the Shelley circle to physiognomy during their residence in Switzerland in the summer of 
1816. On 14 August 1816, Mary Shelley mentioned Lewis‘s visit at their villa, Diodati, in her 
Journals: ‗Lewis comes to Diodati‘ (JMS Vol. 1, 125). Lewis‘s friendship with this circle and 
his acquaintance with Johann Caspar Lavater‘s systematic inquiries into physiognomy 
inevitably influenced the Shelleys‘ depictions of human faces and behaviour. In addition to 
Lewis, Godwin, Wollstonecraft, Goethe, Sterne, and Mackenzie all espouse sentimentalist 
and physiognomic notions. From Mary Shelley‘s Journals, it is clear that she had perused 
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As we have seen earlier, Mary Shelley‘s writings aligned physiological elements with 
states of the mind. Consequently, this chapter will focus on how Frankenstein is pervaded 
with extreme emotional responses to the human body, including the beautiful, the sublime, 
and the ugly. By focusing on these emotional variations, this chapter aims to disclose the 
innate complexities that attend these emotive responses to human physical appearances. 
 
I. Physiological Aesthetics: The Beautiful and the Ugly 
Mary Shelley‘s preoccupation with the materiality of emotion in Frankenstein draws 
on eighteenth-century aesthetic theories.
13
 The term aesthetics, coined by the German 
philosopher Alexander Baumgarten in his Aesthetica, combines art with science: ‗Aesthetics 
(as the theory of the liberal arts, as inferior cognition, as the art of beautiful thinking and as 
the art of thinking analogous to reason) is the science of sensual cognition‘.14 The theory or 
even materiality of beauty finds favour not only in British aesthetics but also in German 





 then, aestheticians sought for a pattern of beauty within the 
symmetry of the human body. In Frankenstein, the physical beauty of the human body 
dominates the mind. Apart from his attempt to discover the mystery of life, Frankenstein is 
fascinated with the mystery of the mind. In part, a materialist viewpoint is employed to 
examine the beauty of the human body in Frankenstein. 
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     In Frankenstein, Elizabeth Lavenza – Frankenstein‘s cousin – and the Monster 
demonstrate the antithetical extremes of human physiological figures: the beautiful and the 
ugly. In numerous literary texts, the beautiful is not merely physical but significantly linked 
to human emotion. Notwithstanding moral education, the preference for the beautiful remains 
rooted in culture and even genes.
17
 One may emphasise that forms of ‗beauty‘ change over 
time, but our subconscious preferences for the beautiful over the ugly remain a constant even 
if such preferences are products of our subjective taste and social conditioning. Immanuel 
Kant emphasises the subjectivism of the beautiful. Robin Jarvis indicates that ‗Kant sources 
the pleasure associated with beauty and the subject, rather than the object …‘.18 Yet, 
paradoxically, Kant may suggest that physical appearances determine the object‘s position 
and destiny. Human preference for the beautiful originates in ancient Greek literature. For 
example, Helen epitomises beauty in Homeric epics and Greco-Roman mythology. By 
contrast, the Harpies, Medusa, Grendel, and Erik (the Phantom of the Opera) exemplify the 
ugly in mythology and literature. Their physiological features are categorised as abnormal 
and hideous. 
In Frankenstein, this striking dialectic related to the importance of the physical beauty 
is seen in the episode of Frankenstein‘s creating the Monster‘s mate. The reason that 
Frankenstein abandons the Monster and tears the female monster‘s remains to pieces is 
merely his disgust at ugliness and his fear of subsequent threats from this couple‘s hideous 
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progeny. Frankenstein ponders on his second creation: 
They [the Monster and his female companion] might even hate each other; the 
creature who already lived loathed his own deformity, and might he not conceive 
a greater abhorrence for it when it came before his eyes in the female form? She 
also might turn with disgust from him to the superior beauty of man; she might 
quit him, and he be again alone, exasperated by the fresh provocation of being 
deserted by one of his own species. [Emphasis added] (F, 114) 
This ‗hate‘, ‗abhorrence‘, or ‗disgust‘ (F, 114) between the Monster and his prospective mate, 
Frankenstein speculates, could be triggered by this couple‘s deformity and hideousness. 
Frankenstein suggests that the innateness of hating ugliness and loving beauty would affect 
both partners in this relationship even though the Monster requires a ‗hideous‘ mate: ‗I [the 
Monster] demand a creature of another sex, but as hideous as myself: … we shall be monsters, 
cut off from all the world; but on that account we shall be more attached to one another‘ 
[emphasis added] (F, 98-99). The Monster‘s desire for a harmonious relationship or family is 
threatened, in Frankenstein‘s view, by the female monster‘s affection for beautiful objects: 
‗She also might turn with disgust from him to the superior beauty of man…‘ (F, 114). In this 
sense, Frankenstein demonstrates a ‗psychology of beauty‘ and the issue of physical 
appearances that affects or dominates human emotions. Unlike Anne K. Mellor‘s analysis that 
reads Frankenstein‘s destruction of the female monster as deprivation of ‗the female‘s control 
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over reproduction‘,19 physical ugliness or deformity is understood here as the motivation for 
Frankenstein‘s destruction of the female creation. From a physiological perspective, human 
bodies are determined by the beholders. In other words, they are watched and then judged. 
The judgement between the beautiful and the ugly, though morally unjust, unavoidably 
derives from human emotions. 
     Elizabeth‘s beauty is discussed in physiological terms within the descriptions of her in 
Frankenstein. In Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty, Nancy Etcoff proposes the 
reciprocal relationship between beauty and social resources.
20
 Beautiful people in this 
discourse obtain privileges at school, the workplace, and in the interpersonal network more 
than those who are less attractive or even ugly. Countless cases are cited in Sander L. 
Gilman‘s investigation into current aesthetic surgery to demonstrate the necessity of the 
beautiful.
21
 In his A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful (1759), to which the Shelleys were probably directed through Wollstonecraft‘s 
works,
22
 Burke employs a wide range of bodily components to illustrate the beautiful, such 
as proportions, colour, smoothness, physiognomy, elegance, sounds, smell and so forth.
23
 
Some of these attributes are particularly described as establishing a close connection between 
the mind and physiology. Gentle and amiable qualities, according to Burke‘s study of facial 
expressions, are part of key elements to ‗form a finished human beauty‘ because they are 
closely linked with ‗the softness, smoothness, and delicacy of the outward form [outer 
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appearance]‘ (PE, 118).  
Mary Shelley emphasises this ideal pattern of female features in the 1831 version of 
Frankenstein.
24
 In the 1831version, Frankenstein retraces the process of ‗finding‘ a girl 
whom his mother desires as a daughter and delineates Elizabeth‘s physical appearance: 
          One day, when my father had gone by himself to Milan, my mother, 
accompanied by me, visited this abode [a poor cot in Italy where the residents 
once attracted the Frankenstein couple]. She found a peasant and his wife, hard 
working, bent down by care and labour, distributing a scanty meal to five hungry 
babes. Among these there was one [i.e., the little Elizabeth] which attracted my 
mother far above all the rest. She [Elizabeth] appeared of a different stock. The 
four others were dark-eyed, hardy little vagrants; this child [Elizabeth] was thin, 
and very fair. Her hair was the brightest living gold, and despite the poverty of 
her clothing, seemed to set a crown of distinction on her head. Her brow was 
clear and ample, her blue eyes cloudless and her lips and the moulding of her 
face so expressive of sensibility and sweetness, that none could behold her 
without looking on her as of a distinct species, a being heaven-sent, and bearing 
a celestial stamp in all her features. (HF, 36) 
It is clear that Elizabeth‘s surpassing and ‗royal‘ looks are the selling point which attracts the 
interest of Frankenstein‘s mother, Caroline Beaufort, to probe into Elizabeth‘s unfortunate 
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history. Like perfect parts assembled in a machine, Elizabeth‘s looks characterised by 
flawless hair, brow, eyes, and lips catch Caroline‘s attention and Caroline, as a result, 
therefore, ‗fixe[s] eyes of wonder and admiration on this lovely girl [Elizabeth]‘ (HF, 36). In 
this version, Elizabeth‘s original ‗hazel eyes‘ (F, 19) and hair ‗of a rich dark auburn‘ (F, 51) 
are replaced by hair of ‗the brightest living gold‘ and ‗blue eyes‘ (HF, 34). These deliberate 
changes heighten Mary Shelley‘s aesthetic concern for biological rareness. Etcoff‘s inquiry 
into the phenomena of what is termed ‗Blond Crazy‘ (SPSB, 127) demonstrates a wide range 
of discussion on biological differences and ‗the purity and innocence of the standard image of 
the blonde‘ (SPSB, 128). Frankenstein‘s father, returning from Milan, also considers 
Elizabeth ‗a child fairer than pictured cherub—a creature who seemed to shed radiance from 
her looks …‘ and eventually ‗consult[s] their village priest‘ about fosterage (HF, 36-37). With 
reference to the symbolic description of Elizabeth‘s appearance, she is pictured ‗fairer than a 
garden rose among dark-leaved brambles‘ (HF, 36) and ‗a creature who seemed to shed 
radiance from her looks and whose form and motions were lighter than the chamois of the 
hills‘ (HF, 37). 
     Frankenstein reveals traces of Rousseau‘s literary aesthetics. As in Mary Shelley‘s 
Frankenstein, Rousseau also pursues an ideal beauty represented by the female body. Mary 
Shelley read Rousseau‘s Julie, or the New Heloise (1761) from 27 June 1817 and finished it 
on 2 July 1817: ‗Finish Julie‘ (JMS Vol. 1, 175-76, 176). Rousseau pursues ideal beauty. 
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Sainte-Beuve‘s inquiry into Rousseau‘s Julie comments on Rousseau‘s ultimate desire for 
female beauty: 
          Rousseau‘s love was neither for any living woman nor for one of those beauties 
of yesterday that the poet‘s dreams recall to life. His love was for ideal beauty, 
for the phantom to which he himself gave life and passion. …. [W]hen a real 
woman [an admirer of Rousseau‘s novel Julie] presented herself who had the 
proud daring to show him the earthly object of his ideal and to say to him: “I am 
Julie,” (sic) he did not deign to recognize her; he was almost angry with her for 
having hoped to substitute herself for the object of his divine dream.
25
 
Rousseau‘s ‗divine dream‘ of perfected womanhood is identical to the artist‘s ideal notion of 
beauty. Imagination has the capacity to satisfy the artist‘s or Rousseau‘s passions. This 
idealised and imaginary beauty can instigate positive emotions in the observer, as Rousseau‘s 
female admirer destroys the image of his ideal beauty and this results in the negative 
emotions of Rousseau‘s anger. 
Rousseau‘s ideas of education are also alluded to in Frankenstein.26 The Monster‘s 
thoughts of educating a child echo Rousseau‘s Emile; or, On Education (1762). Mary Shelley 
referred to her reading of Rousseau‘s Emile in her letter in 1815.27 In Emile, Rousseau 
provides various masks, lastly ‗the most hideous and frightful‘, to stimulate a child‘s 
sensations until their assimilation or adaptation.
28
 Unlike Emile, William (Frankenstein‘s 
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little brother) is too ‗ill-trained‘ to accept the Monster‘s face. At the encounter between little 
William and the Monster, William‘s anger and fear destroy the Monster‘s expectation that 
children would have no prejudice against ugliness: ‗Suddenly, as I gazed on him, an idea 
seized me, that this little creature was unprejudiced, and had lived too short a time to have 
imbibed a horror of deformity‘ (F, 142). 
     By contrast with Elizabeth (and other beautiful characters in Frankenstein, including 
Caroline, Safie, Safie‘s mother, and William),29 the Monster falls victim to the beholder‘s 
judgement as a result of his physiological deformity. Clearly, the beautiful and the deformed 
shape two polarised emotions. One arouses positive feelings such as pleasure and the other 
negative feelings such as fear. After a series of misfortunes, the Monster recognises that his 
despair is caused by his ‗solitude and deformity‘ (F, 95). Such physiological deformity results 
in unspeakable fear, disgust, or possible anger not only in literature but in real life. Philip K. 
Wilson states that the Elephant Man (Joseph Carrey Merrick),
30
 ‗evoke[s] feelings of horror 
and fear in many who gazed upon him [Merrick]‘ and over time is reduced only to ‗a 
―professional freak‖‘ even though the narrative shows ‗how truly human he [is]‘; more 
unbelievably, he seems to be ‗a perfect baby‘ but for ‗an ―extraordinary mass of flesh‖‘ that 
abnormally grows from his lip [emphasis added].
31
 In Frankenstein, the Monster‘s body with 
its ‗filthy mass‘ (like that of the Elephant Man) disgusts Frankenstein and causes him to 
change his attitude towards the Monster from compassion to ‗horror and hatred‘: ‗… when I 
                                                                                     
 200 
[Frankenstein] looked upon him, when I saw the filthy mass that moved and talked, my heart 
sickened, and my feelings were altered to those of horror and hatred‘ (F, 99). Nevertheless, 
the Monster was originally conceived of as a perfect creature, as the Elephant Man was ‗a 
perfect baby‘ before being afflicted by his misfortune of disfiguration. Tragically, a failure in 
Frankenstein‘s experiment brings out a series of imperfections, misfortunes, and grotesque 
events. Like the Elephant Man‘s ‗human‘ character, the Monster‘s inner self is also extremely 
human. After listening to the Monster‘s story, Frankenstein especially comments on the 
Monster‘s human characteristic: ‗His tale, and the feelings he now expressed, proved him to 
be a creature of fine sensations…‘ (F, 99). Even so, the Monster‘s horrifying looks never 
convince even the gentlest humans, for instance, even the De Lacey family, to trust him. 
With regard to deformity, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), in his An Inquiry 
Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design (1725), seeks a universal difference between 
beauty and deformity and discovers that ‗[d]eformity is only the absence of beauty, or 
deficiency in the beauty expected in any species‘.32 He is aware that the displeasing 
experience roused by the ugly or deformed is because ‗[o]ur sense of beauty seems designed 
to give us positive pleasure, but not positive pain or disgust …‘ (PW, 32). Hutcheson suggests 
that the ‗sense of beauty‘ (PW, 32) derives from an innate or genetic mechanism. 
The origin of the Monster‘s misfortunes can be attributed to his creator, Frankenstein, 
whose dream is to create a perfect man with a great proportion and every flawless feature, yet 
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Frankenstein at length feels remorse for the birth of the Monster. It turns out that ‗the beauty 
of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my [Frankenstein‘s] heart‘ (F, 
34). In effect, after the experiment of galvanism, the Monster‘s ‗… watery eyes, that seemed 
almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in which they were set, his shrivelled 
complexion and straight black lips‘ utterly terrify Frankenstein (F, 34). Prior to the initial 
drafting of Frankenstein (15-16 June 1816), Mary Shelley gave birth to her daughter Clara 
and son William respectively on 22 February 1815 and 24 January 1816.
33
 The Monster‘s 
‗watery eyes‘ and ‗shrivelled complexion‘ (F, 34) associate with the newborn‘s conditions. 
Compared with the newborn‘s crying shortly after childbirth, the Monster‘s physical pain 
approximates the patient‘s sufferings after surgery without the benefit of painkillers: ‗… 
feeling pain invade me [the Monster] on all sides, I sat down and wept‘ [emphasis added] (F, 
68). On the other hand, nervous and muscular connections and recovery also relate to the 
Monster‘s pain and deformity. 
     The Monster‘s ‗hellish‘ ugliness, contrasted with Elizabeth‘s angelic beauty, is the 
fountainhead of his misfortunes and the following crimes. Abandoned by his creator, the 
Monster continues to rouse turmoil among the human community. The Shelleys, however, 
explicitly state their compassion for the Monster. In her Introduction to the 1831 version of 
Frankenstein, Mary Shelley ‗bid [her] progeny [the Monster] go forth and prosper‘ (HF, 10). 
In his ‗On Frankenstein‘, Shelley makes the direct connection between the Monster‘s crimes 
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and mistreatments: ‗Treat a personal ill, and he will become wicked‘ (‗OF‘, 186). In Volume 
2, Chapters 3-8, Mary Shelley permits the Monster to articulate a great change in his mind 
and emotions. As a Romantic and advocate of liberty, Mary Shelley draws attention to the 
marginalisation and stigmatisation of the Monster as ‗wretch‘, ‗ugly‘, ‗fiend‘, ‗devil‘, and 
‗daemon‘.34 
     The Monster narrates his misfortunes from Chapter 3 of Volume 2 and commences to 
realise the extreme differences between his body and others‘. On his first encounter with 
human beings, the Monster states his occurrences: 
          It was about seven in the morning … I perceived a small hut…. Finding the door 
open, I entered. An old man sat in it, near a fire, over which he was preparing his 
breakfast. He turned on hearing a noise; and, perceiving me, shrieked loudly, and, 
quitting the hut, ran across the fields with a speed of which his debilitated form 
hardly appeared capable. … his flight, somewhat surprised me. (F, 70) 
Clearly, the old man‘s sudden terror is agitated by the Monster‘s hideous looks. In her 
investigation of ‗the ugly‘, Denise Gigante discovers that ‗when ―real existence‖ finally does 
break out in the mode of the ugly, a violent reaction should be axiomatic‘.35 William Blake 
employs his advertisement to his 1809 exhibition to demonstrate ‗the typically kneejerk 
response to the ugly‘ (‗FUCF‘, 578) and concludes that on seeing ‗[t]he most Ugly they [the 
Roman Warriors] fled with outcries and contortion of their Limbs‘ (qtd. in ‗FUCF‘ 579). The 
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effect of a solid ‗sublimity‘ – or precisely an ugly figure like that of the Monster – is 
determined physiologically by the links between the human mind, emotion, and the body. It is 
evident that the reactions of the old man and the Roman warriors are physiologically 
identical. 
The close association between the ugly and emotion is once again manifest in the 
Monster‘s second encounter with human beings. The Monster states his misfortunes: 
          … the milk and cheese … allured my appetite. One of the best of these [cottages] 
I entered; but I had hardly placed my foot within the door, before the children 
shrieked, and one of the women fainted. The whole village was roused; some 
fled, some attacked me, until, grievously bruised by stones and many other kinds 
of missile weapons, I escaped to the open country, and fearfully took refuge in a 
low hovel…. (F, 70-71) 
In this event, this negative sublime is simultaneously experienced by the villagers and the 
Monster. Jarvis denotes that ‗Burke writes of ―ideas‖ of pain or danger, for he makes clear 
that the ―delight‖ that accompanies the sublime is cancelled if one actually feels physically 
threatened…‘ (RP, 178). The villagers‘ emotions greatly change from harmony to agitation. 
The Monster‘s emotions may be stronger than the former. For the Monster, the pleasure 
initially caused by the smell of the milk and the cheese vanishes; instead, anguish grows in 
his mind. 
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It is obvious that the Monster‘s bodily ugliness prevents any further affinity with 
human society. Mary Shelley even suggests that it is useless despite the Monster‘s endeavour 
to master language and knowledge to ‗make them [the De Laceys] overlook the deformity of 
[his] figure‘ (F, 76). Due to his blindness, the amiable De Lacey is the only one that can, 
initially, listen to the Monster without fear and prejudice. Wishing to be under the aegis of De 
Lacey, the Monster accounts for the prejudices of humans: 
            ―‗They [humans] are kind – they are the most excellent creatures in the world; 
but, unfortunately, they are prejudiced against me. I have good dispositions; my 
life has been hitherto harmless, and, in some degree, beneficial; but a fatal 
prejudice clouds their eyes, and where they ought to see a feeling and kind friend 
[the Monster], they behold only a detestable monster.‘ 
          ………………………………………………………. 
―‗… I feel so many overwhelming terrors. I tenderly love these friends; I have, 
unknown to them, been for many months in the habits of daily kindness towards 
them; but they believe that I wish to injure them, and it is that prejudice which I 
wish to overcome.‘ [Emphasis added] (F, 90) 
The Monster‘s statement meanwhile reveals the fact of his hideous looks and, more 
importantly, the destructive power of this human ‗prejudice‘ (F, 90) towards him. In reality, 
the crisis of the Monster‘s identity arises in his mind after being indirectly educated by the De 
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Lacey family, particularly gaining knowledge from Paradise Lost, Plutarch’s Lives, and the 
Sorrows of Werter.
36
 Identifying with Werter‘s sentimentalist condition and citing Shelley‘s 
lines in ‗Mutability‘, the Monster sighs for grief: 
‗The path of my departure was free;‘ and there was none to lament my 
annihilation. My person was hideous, and my stature gigantic: what did this 
mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination? 
These questions continually recurred, but I was unable to solve them.‘ (F, 86) 
These interrogations echo John Milton‘s lines in Paradise Lost when Adam is puzzled by the 
origin of his existence: ‗… Who am alone / From all eternity, for none I know / Second to me 
or like, equal much less‘ (VIII.405).37 For the Monster, his hideous appearance causes his 
isolation from human society. Similar to Adam‘s loneliness, the Monster‘s isolation has a 
direct bearing on his interrogation of his own existence. 
     The Monster‘s ‗fatal‘ ugliness eventually obstructs his acceptance by the De Laceys. As 
soon as other De Lacey family members return, the Monster describes the reactions of Felix, 
Safie, and Agatha on beholding him: 
Agatha fainted; and Safie, unable to attend to her friend, rushed out of the 
cottage. Felix darted forward, and with supernatural force tore me from his 
father, to whose knees I clung: in a transport of fury, he dashed me to the ground, 
and struck me violently with a stick. (F, 91) 
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Mary Shelley echoes Burkean aesthetics here. She focuses on descriptions of the emotions 
that are evoked by responses to adverse physical appearance, which include fainting, 
weakness, fear, and aggression. Despite the gentleness and amiability in this Christian family 
of which the Monster was convinced, they still fail to exert their self-disciplined reason and 
benevolence to accept their wretched friend. For his observers, the Monster‘s physical body 
is the fountainhead of danger or the sublime. As a result, the Monster‘s misfortunes 
repeatedly exemplify Burke‘s physiological aesthetics.  
     The prejudice to physical appearances, at this point, is identical to those to class, race, 
and gender, sex, and sexuality. Differences obstruct mutual understandings, yet the core of 
the problem, in one sense, is linked to the body per se. In this regard, the Monster‘s deformed 
body instigates great agitation in the De Lacey family. After the Monster‘s presence at the 
cottage, Felix explains to his landlords, two country gentlemen, that they can never again rent 
the property: 
          ... ‗we can never again inhabit your cottage. The life of my father is in the 
greatest danger, owing to the dreadful circumstance that I have related. My wife 
[Safie] and my sister will never recover their horror. I entreat you not to reason 
with me any more. Take possession of your tenement, and let me fly from this 
place.‘ [Emphasis added] (F, 93) 
That Felix fears and worries about the other De Laceys‘ safety is evidence of the close 
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relation between the Monster‘s looks and a sense of underlying danger. Unfortunately, the 
Monster does not encounter the sensitivity advocated by Hutcheson or Kant. Hutcheson, in 
his Treatise, advocates the importance of ‗acquaintance‘ and ‗reason‘ (PW, 32): ‗… if upon 
long acquaintance [with the ugly or deformed] we are sure of finding sweetness of temper, 
humanity, and cheerfulness, although the bodily form [of the ugly or deformed] continues, it 
shall give us no disgust or displeasure …‘ (PW, 32). Similarly, Kant‘s a priori reason may not 
be able to overcome the fear on seeing the Monster or any kind of extremely mutant species 
or alien. The Monster‘s physical appearance instigates terror and results in a kind of negative 
sublimity. Frankenstein, in the philosophical mode of Hutcheson or Kant, is the only one who 
dares to look at the Monster and listen to him. Nonetheless, his hideous progeny remains 
unwelcome. 
     Mary Shelley introduces the sublime as both aesthetically positive and negative in 
Volume 2, Chapter 2 of Frankenstein. Initially, the positive sublimity arouses great pleasure, 
as Frankenstein, along with his family, ‗revisited the source of the Arveiron‘ and experienced 
‗sublime and magnificent scenes‘ (F, 63). At the same location, Frankenstein‘s emotions are 
changed from the positive sublime to the negative when he glimpses the appalling Monster‘s 
‗superhuman speed‘ (F, 65). The natural scenes provide positive emotions, such as joy and 
ecstasy, but the hideous body is the origin of negative sublimity such as is embodied by 
horror. When the Monster approaches him, Frankenstein describes him: ‗… its unearthly 
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ugliness rendered it almost too horrible for human eyes‘ (F, 65). In addition to the detestation 
of the villagers, the De Lacey family, and Frankenstein, the last blow that provokes the 
Monster‘s indignation can be attributed to little William. The Monster recalls this humiliating 
episode: 
―… As soon as he [William] beheld my form, he placed his hands before his 
eyes, and uttered a shrill scream: I drew this hand forcibly from his face, and 
said, ‗Child, what is the meaning of this? I do not intend to hurt you; listen to 
me.‘ 
―He struggled violently; ‗Let me go,‘ he cried; ‗monster! ugly wretch! you 
wish to eat me, and tear me to pieces – You are an ogre – Let me go, or I will tell 
my papa.‘ 
―‗Boy, you will never see your father again; you must come with me.‘ 
‗―Hideous monster! let me go; [m]y papa is a Syndic—he is M. 
Frankenstein—he would punish you. You dare not keep me.‘  
[Emphasis added] (F, 96-97)
38
 
William‘s affinity to Frankenstein and these provocative words arouse the Monster‘s anger 
and precipitate William‘s death. Prior to the encounter with William, the Monster‘s wound 
from a rustic‘s gun, as the Monster endeavoured to rescue a drowning girl, is a definite 
turning point in his journey towards evil ends.
39
 William‘s humiliation is simply the last 
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straw. Humanity, as Hutcheson advocates, does not work well in the Monster‘s case. The 
Monster‘s ugliness deprives him of every single opportunity to encounter friendship and 
wider society. The rustic‘s act and William‘s words reaffirm this rule. Burke claims that 
ugliness is not necessarily associated with ‗a sublime idea‘, terror, ‗unless united with such 
qualities as excite a strong terror‘ (PE, 119). In this sense, the Monster‘s extreme hideousness 
is closely linked to terror. 
Frankenstein demonstrates a wide range of comparisons between the beautiful and the 
ugly from a perspective of physiological aesthetics. Burke points to further physical 
connections between the beautiful and those qualities of grace and sound.
40
 In Frankenstein, 
the beautiful face is not the only determining factor for the domestication of Caroline, 
Elizabeth, or Safie. Echoing the description of Ianthe‘s perfect figure in Shelley‘s Queen Mab, 
Elizabeth‘s ‗inner‘ qualities of her physical beauty are vital attributes to her body, as 
Frankenstein exclaims: ‗… I never saw so much grace both of person and mind united to so 
little pretension‘ [emphasis added] (F, 20). Therefore, the ‗reunion‘ of the inner beauty and 
the outer beauty culminates in Elizabeth. Nevertheless, the beautiful characters and the 
Monster are caught in a whirlpool of emotions. Different from Elizabeth‘s sufferings, the 
Monster‘s sufferings are not only physical but psychological. 
 
 
                                                                                     
 210 
II. Emotion in Frankenstein‘s Sublime Science 
The sublime in Frankenstein relates to agitated emotions and human physiology. The 
achievement of Frankenstein is reflected in the novel‘s mixture of aesthetic sublimity and 
scientific experiments. The issue of terror or fear was early explored in Greek tragedies and 
continues to attract eighteenth-century philosophers of the mind. Burke‘s aesthetics of the 
sublime, James T. Boulton notes, is indebted to the Bible, Longinus, and Burke‘s 
contemporaries, including John Baillie, Jonathan Richardson, John Dennis, Joseph Addison, 
David Hume, William Smith, James Thomson, and Abbé du Bos.
41
 Burke also relates the 
sublime to ‗terrible objects‘ (PE, 39) which excite ‗the strongest emotion‘ or ‗pain‘ (PE, 39): 
‗I [Burke] say the strongest emotion, because I am satisfied the ideas of pain are much more 
powerful than those which enter on the part of pleasure‘ [emphasis added] (PE, 39). The 
philosophical dialectic between the mind and the brain was hotly debated in the 
Enlightenment and later in Romanticism. Debates over whether the mind was material or 
immaterial instigated debates within both Romantic and Enlightenment thought. In the 
eighteenth century, chief exponents of scientific empiricism were British Christian 
empiricists (John Locke and George Berkeley) and, later, British Christian materialists 
(David Hartley and Joseph Priestley) and French atheistic materialists (D‘Holbach and La 
Mettrie).
42
 In the early nineteenth century, these philosophical debates re-emerged between 
John Abernethy‘s vitalism and William Lawrence‘s materialism.43 Materialist science 
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influenced, as previously discussed, the Shelley circle more broadly and the composition of 
Frankenstein in particular.
44
 The terrible object is a source of the Burkean ‗sublime‘. This 
terrible object finds its focus in my argument on the human body which can excite danger, 
terror, pain, or even ‗the sublime‘. This ‗sublime body‘ in Frankenstein is a synthesis of 
aesthetic legacies, Gothicism, and scientific sublimity. In the Preface to Frankenstein, Shelley 
suggests that Frankenstein the story associates physiological writings with ‗a series of 
supernatural terrors‘ to heighten the significance of ‗poetry‘ and ‗many exquisite 
combinations of human feeling‘.45 The eighteenth century saw frequent discussion of the 
relationship between the mind and the world outside, and both British empiricism and 
Continental rationalism sought to account for the frequently violent emotions which could 
arise in the individual‘s mind between these two phenomena. 
Mary Shelley in Frankenstein had ample opportunity to present the sublime, from the 
novel‘s opening in Geneva to Frankenstein‘s residence in Ingolstadt, the episodes in the 
remote villages, the journeys, the Arctic wastes, and finally the confrontation between mortal 
and super-mortal, the latter demanding the creation of a female ‗monster‘. Sublimity 
co-exists with but struggles against the abomination of the ugly: a range of intricate emotions 
is the result. One interesting and original feature of Shelley‘s presentation of this range of 
emotions is the employment of the facial muscles as an index to the workings of the mind. 
This exercised contemporary scientists who studied facial expression and the information it 
                                                                                     
 212 
gave on mental changes. Enlightenment and Romantic writers particularly exerted the 
influence on the Shelleys thinking about physiology, anatomy, and galvanism. Frankenstein, 
in attempting the godlike feat of animation, seeks to surpass the limits of human 
understanding. The result is an appalling extreme of misery on the one hand and ecstasy on 
the other. This ambivalent emotion is at the heart of Frankenstein‘s radical science. 
Frankenstein further elaborates upon the mechanism of emotion connected to physical 
muscles. A clear example of this subtle connection is revealed at the scene of the reunion 
between Frankenstein and his father at the Irish prison: ‗―My father!‖ cried I, while every 
feature and every muscle was relaxed from anguish to pleasure‘ [emphasis added] (F, 125). 
This physiognomic expression echoes Lavater‘s ‗scientific‘ study of facial expressions. In his 
Essays on Physiognomy (1789-98), Lavater relates this emotional change to physiology: ‗To 
me it appears evident that, since excessive joy and grief are universally accompanied to have 
their peculiar expression … that the muscles which surround the eyes and lips, will 
indubitably be found to be in a different state‘ [emphasis added].46 In this mechanism, 
emotion is determined by sensation or association and then affects nerves and muscles in the 
face. Lavater defends this emotional science – physiognomy – and relates it to Burkean 
aesthetics:  
          So in physiognomy; (sic) physiognomonical truth may, to a certain degree, be                          
defined, communicated by signs, and words, as a science. We may affirm, this is 
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sublime understanding. Such a trait accompanies gentleness, such another wild 
passion. This is the look of contempt, this of innocence. Where such signs are, 
such and such properties reside. [Emphasis added] (EP, 71) 
Lavater suggests that facial expressions are affected ‗by signs and words‘ (EP, 71). This 
complicated mechanism of physiognomy, Lavater affirms, is based on human ‗understanding‘. 
In other words, the sublime is only censored by each observing mind. Like Lavater, who 
emphasises the innate ‗properties‘ or emotion from facial expressions (gentleness, passion, 
contempt, innocence),
47
 this irresistibly innate or genetic mechanism of emotion
48
 is 
demonstrated when Frankenstein recognises that Stoic reason looks at death positively, but 
fails to remove his extreme of negative emotions in bereavement: 
Those maxims of the Stoics, that death was no evil, and that the mind of man 
ought to be superior to despair on the eternal absence of a beloved object, ought 
not to be urged. Even Cato [Antagonist of Caesar and notable Stoic]
49
 wept over 
the dead body of his brother. (F, 46) 
This ‗despair on the eternal absence of a beloved object‘ (F, 46) refers to Frankenstein‘s grief 
for William‘s death. Death, in Burke‘s concept of the sublime, instigates the strongest ‗pain‘ 
(PE, 39) and is conceived of as the ‗king of terrors‘ (PE, 40). Echoing these ideas about 
physiognomy and aesthetics, Mary Shelley suggests that this overwhelmingly destructive 
emotion or sublimity is innate: ‗Even Cato wept over the dead body of his brother‘ (F, 46). 
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This innate principle of grief is later explained in Charles Darwin‘s evolutionism.50 
Bereavement is a major factor that causes the sentiment of grief and this emotion is 
thoroughly depicted in Mary Shelley‘s description of physiognomic expressions. Death 
suggests the termination of vitality as well as attachment to one‘s beloved, as earlier 
expressed in the Stoic claim of ‗the eternal absence of a beloved object‘ (F, 46). The murder 
of William by the Monster demonstrates the Monster‘s understanding of this sublime emotion 
caused by bereavement: ‗[T]his death [of William] will carry despair to him [Frankenstein], 
and a thousand other miseries shall torment and destroy him‘ [emphasis added] (F, 97). The 
death of William first strikes the Frankenstein family and brings them a profound feeling of 
grief. In this tragic event, Mary Shelley touches on physiognomy in connection with emotion. 
In the letter to Frankenstein, Alphonse (Frankenstein‘s father) describes Elizabeth and her 
physiological responses on William‘s death, including an exclamation with clasping hands, a 
faint, and then continually weeping: ‗She fainted, and was restored with extreme difficulty. 
When she again lived, it was only to weep and sigh‘ (F, 45). These physiognomic images, 
transferred to Frankenstein through Alphonse‘s language, reflect the state of Elizabeth‘s mind 
or her emotion. These genetic responses to bereavement are detected from physical gestures, 
particularly facial expressions. Mary Shelley heightens this mystery of the mind and its 
destructive power from bereavement when Frankenstein faces the execution of Justine Moritz, 
the beloved maiden in the Frankenstein family:  
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          Nothing is more painful to the human mind, than, after the feelings have been 
worked up by a quick succession of events, the dead calmness of inaction and 
certainty which follows, and deprives the soul both of hope and fear. Justine 
died…. (F, 59) 
Further cases of the deaths of Justine, Elizabeth, Clerval, and Alphonse, as well as the 
destruction of the female monster‘s body, all arouse this kind of negative emotion in the 
victims‘ dependents. 
This emotion of bereavement or general grief in Frankenstein is repeatedly illustrated 
as relating to physiognomy. At this critical moment, Frankenstein‘s emotion changes from joy 
to grief. Frankenstein‘s joy was originally activated – from his gloom in the malfunctioning 
creation of the Being or later the Monster – by the reunion with his best friend, Henry Clerval. 
This dramatic change of physiognomy is observed by Clerval, though recollected by 
Frankenstein: ‗Clerval, who had watched my countenance as I read this letter [from Alphonse 
about William‘s death], was surprised to observe the despair that succeeded to the joy I at 
first expressed on receiving news from my friends‘ [emphasis added] (F, 46). This 
‗countenance‘ is like a screen that displays Frankenstein‘s emotions or the changes of the 
mind, such as ‗despair‘ and ‗joy‘. According to physiognomy, facial expressions convey the 
operations and emotions of the mind. 
Mary Shelley‘s understanding of physiognomy derives from eighteenth-century 
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sentimentalism and this physiognomic concept is widely applied in Frankenstein. 
Anticipating Lavater‘s inquiries into physiognomy, Burke briefly points out the physical 
connection between the face and the mind in ‗The Physiognomy‘: ‗… the countenance … is 
capable of joining the effect of certain agreeable qualities of the mind to those of the body‘ 
[emphasis added] (PE, 118). In Frankenstein, Mary Shelley employs this term physiognomy 
to illustrate the emergence of Burke‘s alleged ‗certain agreeable qualities of the mind to those 
of the body‘ (PE, 118). This term is adopted to depict Frankenstein‘s impression or judgement 
on his two tutors at Ingolstadt – M. Krempe and M. Waldman: 
I attended the lectures, and cultivated the acquaintance, of the men of science of 
the university; and I found even in M. Krempe a great deal of sound sense and 
real information, combined, it is true, with a repulsive physiognomy and manners, 
but not on that account the less valuable. In M. Waldman I found a true friend. 
His gentleness was never tinged by dogmatism; and his instructions were given 
with an air of frankness and good nature, that banished every idea of pedantry. It 
was, perhaps, the amiable character of this man that inclined me more to that 
branch of natural philosophy which he professed, than an intrinsic love for the 
science itself. [Emphasis added] (F, 29) 
Frankenstein‘s emotions are determined by his professors‘ physical traits, including facial 
expression and manners. Mary Shelley explains how one‘s mind or attitude determines his or 
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her outer behaviour or physiognomy. More importantly, this outer behaviour affects the 
perceiver‘s mind and the mind again dominates human physiognomy. This observation of 
human faces is also seen in the encounters between Walton and Frankenstein, as well as 
Frankenstein and the Monster. The world, according to Mary Shelley‘s observation in 
Frankenstein, is composed of changing emotions (what we understand now as the neural 
mind) which derive from the facial expressions (the physical body) of those characters in this 
novel. Grief, sadness, sorrow, or despair are overwhelming emotions which Mary Shelley 
strives to examine. This sentiment, as previously discussed, is heightened in both Shelley‘s 
Alastor and Byron‘s Manfred written around the same time as Mary Shelley‘s composition of 
Frankenstein. In her 1831 Introduction to Frankenstein, Mary Shelley suggests that this 
negative emotion in German ghost stories enlightens her about the human mind: ‗Eternal 
sorrow sat upon his [the miserable Frankenstein‘s] face …‘ (HF, 7). 
The sublime, the human body, and nervous mechanism presented in Frankenstein can 
be associated with Burkean aesthetics. Aside from the influence of physiology or specifically 
galvanism on Frankenstein, physiological aesthetics also bear on this discussion of the 
sublime in this novel. Burke is a major aesthetician who advocates the materiality of 
aesthetics. He obtains knowledge in relation to the body and the mind from British 
empiricism and attempts to relate the sublime to human sensations. Different from early 
writers, Burke focuses his sublimity on the destructive side – terror. The sublime, according 
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to him, is the mystery of human feelings and emotions but can be detected through bodily 
experience. Such a perspective is also introduced into present mainstream brain studies.
51
 
Ugliness, according to Burke, can be called ‗the sublime‘ if it is capable of exciting ‗a strong 
terror‘ (PE, 119). Burke tends to explain the reactions of the mind, maybe emotions, from a 
physiological perspective. Fear or terror can affect our bodies to react as if we suffer from 
pain. As Burke describes, the moment a man suffers great pain, his teeth [are] set, his 
eye-brows are violently contracted, his forehead is wrinkled, his eyes are dragged inward, and 
rolled with great vehemence, his hair stands on end, the ‗voice is forced out in short shrieks 
and groans, and the whole fabric totters‘ (PE, 131). The main reason is that the individual is 
aware of potential danger. This danger, as Burke claims, is equivalent to a sublime body that 
causes ‗terror‘ (PE, 39).  
     Terror is a significant aspect of the sublime that Mary Shelley endeavours to delineate 
in Frankenstein. The dissemination of galvanism aroused eighteenth-century scientists‘ 
passion for the mystery of life and subsequent treatment for manic depression throughout 
Europe. Galvanism, though not yet explicitly mentioned until the 1831 version, was 
inevitably discussed at the Shelley circle‘s conversations and stimulated Mary Shelley‘s 
scientific imagination. In fact, the Shelleys would have been aware of contemporary galvanic 
experiments from Davy, Lawrence, Byron, and Godwin.
52
 It suggests that the Shelleys were 
aware of this galvanic trend during their writing of Frankenstein. In her 1831 Introduction, 
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Mary Shelley thought herself ‗a devout but nearly silent listener‘ (HF, 8) between Byron and 
Shelley. Even so, she learned of ‗various philosophical doctrines‘ and ‗the nature of the 
principle of life‘ (HF, 8), as well as recent scientific galvanic experiments. 
On the one hand, experiments on decapitated frogs led scientists (including Alexander 
Stuart, Johann G. Zimmermann, George Prochaska, and Luigi Galvani) to localise the 
relations between nerves and muscles. With the help of a Leyden jar and through animal 
experiments, Galvani postulates that the brain is the fountainhead of electricity and later 
confirms the existence of animal electricity.
53
 Unlocking the mystery of organic life leads 
Giovanni Aldini (1762-1834), Galvani‘s nephew and follower, to execute further experiments 
on human and animal bodies throughout Europe. Apart from Aldini‘s public experiment on a 
newly killed dog with electricity in London,
54
 the most sensational, however, was performed 
on the hanged criminal George Forster at the Royal College of Surgeons in London on 17 
January 1803, recorded in The Medical and Physical Journal (1803): 
The subject of the experiments [namely, Forster] was a malefactor executed at 
Newgate, on the morning of the 17
th
 of January last. The body was exposed a 
whole hour in a temperature of about 30º, after which it was delivered to the 
College of Surgeons … and was transferred to Prof. Aldini….55 
Like the electrified dog, Forster‘s body, after an electrified arc was transmitted to his mouth 
and one of his ears, soon brought about dramatic changes, as illustrated by the way that: ‗… 
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the jaw immediately began to quiver, the adjoining muscles were horribly contorted, and the 
left eye actually opened‘ (‗PAGE‘, 383). Aldini‘s experiments proved the close relations 
between terror, the mind, and physiology that Burke articulated. After galvanic impulses on 
the assembled body, Forster-like physical responses are demonstrated in Frankenstein‘s 
laboratory: ‗… I [Frankenstein] saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open; it breathed hard, 
and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs‘ (F, 34). This experiment helps explain Lavater‘s 
argument about physiognomy, in which he proposed facial nerves and muscles control facial 
expression. This galvanic science exemplifies the subtle connection between the human body 
and the sublime. In this context, arguably Forster‘s corpse and the Monster‘s body exemplify 
how the body can be sublime. 
Terror and disgust caused by the ugly seizes Frankenstein and human community in the 
novel; however, Frankenstein‘s fear of the Monster‘s sublime body is distinct from the 
reactions to the Monster‘s observers. Frankenstein‘s training in physiology and anatomy 
assist him in combating the extremely unbearable terror and disgust from blood, dissection 
and rottenness. Even so, his creation turns out a hideous wretch instead of a perfect being. It 
is even worse than ‗a mummy‘ (F, 35) and causes Frankenstein only terror, disgust, and 
revolting fear. Those complicated emotions for Frankenstein are approximate to the pangs of 
conscience. The horrifying Monster is the cause of Frankenstein‘s ‗pangs of conscience‘ and 
sense of guilt. This kind of terror is vividly transformed into Frankenstein‘s dream in which 
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his ‗beloved‘, Elizabeth, is bizarrely linked with an unpleasant first kiss, the embrace of his 
mother‘s corpse, and grave-worms:  
          … I slept indeed, but I was disturbed by the wildest dreams. I thought I saw 
Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the streets of Ingolstadt. Delighted 
and surprised, I embraced her; but as I imprinted the first kiss on her lips, they 
became livid with the hue of death; her features appeared to change, and I 
thought that I held the corpse of my dead mother in my arms; a shroud enveloped 
her form, and I saw the grave-worms crawling in the folds of the flannel. I 
started from my sleep with horror; a cold dew covered my forehead, my teeth 
chattered, and every limb became convulsed.... (F, 34-35) 
This emotion of fear, though experienced in Frankenstein‘s dream, is again suggestive of 
Burke‘s physiological aesthetics.56 This fear caused by the nightmare overwhelms 
Frankenstein‘s body: ‗… my teeth chattered, and every limb became convulsed…‘ (F, 34-35). 
Like the terrified bystander at Aldini‘s galvanic experiment, Mary Shelley conveys this 
torture of the mind through sensory stimulations even within the dream. Terror sneaks into 
Frankenstein‘s dreams even when he thinks of himself as a ‗man of reason‘ and the 
Enlightenment and appreciates the importance of ‗a calm and peaceful mind‘ and the close 
relationship between ‗bodily exercise‘ and the relaxation of the mind (F, 55, 58, 59, 197). 
Such terror continues to haunt him in his journeys of hunting down the ‗fiend‘ – the Monster. 
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Like rational physicians (for instance, Aldini), Frankenstein as a rational scientist is never 
terrified by corpses even though the event of death usually triggers within him unspeakable 
terror. Frankenstein‘s ‗scientific‘ reason is seen in the processes of deserting the ‗remains of 
the half-finished‘ female monster and eventually disposing of them in the sea (F, 118). His 
fear does not originate from the lifeless corpse but the ‗murder‘ that might be disclosed by the 
horrified peasants. The depictions of corpses conjure up ghostly displeasure and terror to the 
ordinary observer. For Frankenstein, deeper terror comes from his sense of guilt and the 
Monster‘s threat – ‗I shall be with you on the wedding-night‘ (F, 116). 
The complex mechanism of emotions entwined with the physical body finds its origin 
in classical mythology. As the title The Metamorphoses suggests, Ovid attempts to relate 
various ‗transformations‘ of human bodies. The horsemen Centaurs, the one-eyed giants 
Cyclops, the ‗tree woman‘ Daphne, and the reanimated man Pelops all derive from Ovid‘s 
imagination. Nevertheless, those myths and bodily changes reflect partly human desire and 
partly physical mechanism. Mary Shelley‘s acquaintance with Ovid‘s Metamorphoses was 
noted from her Journals dated in the spring of 1815.
57
 In Ovidian mythology, Pygmalion‘s 
desire for a perfect ‗woman‘ or, originally, an ivory statue can be read as a precursor of 
Frankenstein‘s ‗creature‘. The Ovidian myth of Pygmalion‘s ivory maiden derives from 
mythological imagination in which Venus (Aphrodite) is the agent of vitality. The 
transformation from the want of vitality is completed in Ovid‘s account: ‗She [the statue] 
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seemed warm … at his touch the ivory lost its hardness, and grew soft …. It was indeed a 
human body!‘58 The main elements are, however, theology and desire. The beauty of the 
ivory maiden derives from Pygmalion‘s artistic skill in sculpture. The statue is created to 
dispel Pygmalion‘s loneliness or generally negative emotion: ‗Pygmalion … called it his 
bedfellow‘ (MO, 232). Frankenstein‘s sublime science, with bloody horrors, is indebted to the 
reassembling of Pelops‘s body. Pelops‘s missing left shoulder, ‗from between his neck and 
upper arm‘ (MO, 145), denotes a kind of deformity. His ‗ivory‘ shoulder is, therefore, a case 
of implantation or prosthetic which exemplifies the body as mechanistic.
59
 Not grounded in 
science, such an implant is merely the perfect handiwork of Vulcan (Hephaestus), god of fire 
and craftwork. The bodily re-assembling of Pelops is for the sake of bodily wholeness, which 
is a basic desire which enables the individual to mingle with their human fellows. That is to 
say, deformity or ugliness tends to trouble the individual. Frankenstein‘s Monster is the case 
of a wretch who suffers from physical imperfection. Unlike reconstructive surgery through 
medical technology, Pelops‘s reconstructive ‗surgery‘ is assisted by supernatural powers 
instead of medical expertise. 
The motif of physical ugliness in Frankenstein finds other counterparts elsewhere in 
mythology. The Monster‘s self understanding of his physical ugliness in the reflection echoes 
the Shelleys‘ acquaintance with John Milton‘s Paradise Lost and Ovid‘s The Metamorphoses. 
The Monster reads Paradise Lost and sorrows for the stark differences between his physical 
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appearance and Adam‘s: ‗But Paradise Lost excited different and far deeper emotions. … He 
[Adam] had come forth from the hands of God a perfect creature…‘ [emphasis added] (F, 
87). The motif of self-reflection designates the tension of physical appearances. Through the 
reflection in the pool, the Monster eventually understands the origin of his perceivers‘ disgust 
as well as his own self-hatred: 
… how was I terrified, when I viewed myself in a transparent pool! At first I 
started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in the 
mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was in reality the monster that I 
am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification. 
Alas! I did not yet entirely know the fatal effects of this miserable deformity. 
[Emphasis added] (F, 76) 
In contrast with the Monster, Milton‘s Eve gazes on her beautiful reflection ‗with vain desire‘ 
(PL, IV.466): ‗What there thou [Eve] seest fair creature is thyself‘ (PL, IV.468).60 The pool 
reflects Narcissus‘s self-indulged beauty and the Monster‘s self-loathed ugliness. They, 
however, experienced the same emotion – grief. Unlike Narcissus‘s self-love, the Monster‘s 
hatred for his hideous reflection is explained by what is called physiological aesthetics. 
The motif of self-reflection in Frankenstein is also indebted to Ovid‘s one-eyed giant 
Polyphemus, one of the Cyclopes.
61
 Like Frankenstein‘s gigantic monster, who appreciates 
beautiful beings, Ovid‘s Polyphemus pursues the beautiful nymph Galatea and expresses his 
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humanity: ‗But if you knew me well, you would regret having fled…‘ (MO, 306). Like Mary 
Shelley‘s Monster, Ovid‘s Giant sees his ‗ugly‘ reflection in the pool. Probably because of his 
pride in being the son of Poseidon, Polyphemus does not abhor his ‗ugly‘ image: ‗… quite 
recently I saw my reflection in the clear water, and I liked what I saw. See how big I am!‘ 
[emphasis added] (MO, 307). He instead beautifies his loathsome ‗deformity‘ and reinforces 
his physical advantages in order to pursue Galatea: 
     … Jupiter is no bigger than I. Luxuriant locks hang over my rugged features, and          
shade my shoulders like a grove. And you must not think me ugly because my 
body is covered with thick bristling hair…. I have but one eye, in the middle of 
my forehead, but it is the size of a huge shield. Think, does not the great sun in 
heaven see all this world of ours? And yet the sun had just one eye. [Emphasis 
added] (MO, 307-08) 
The Giant‘s experience of wooing young women is also seen in Frankenstein, especially in 
the 1831 version. The Monster expresses his romantic sentiments to the sleeping Justine: 
‗―Awake, fairest, thy lover is near – he who would give his life but to obtain one look of 
affection from thine eyes: my beloved, awake!‖‘ (HF, 145). The Monster starts to fear any 
eye contact with Justine: ‗The sleeper [Justine] stirred; a thrill of terror ran through me‘ (HF, 
145). This ‗timidity‘ or anxiety about horrifying the human observer explains why 
Polyphemus recites his romantic love to Galatea from a hiding place.
62
 This is evidenced in 
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Burke‘s view of the sublime. Burke relates the ‗large and gigantic‘ (PE, 157), for example 
‗Polyphemus‘ (PE, 158), to ‗the sublime‘ (PE, 157) and sees this unwanted giant as an object 
alienated from love: ‗The large and gigantic, though very compatible with the sublime, is 
contrary to the beautiful. It is impossible to suppose a giant the object of love‘ (PE, 157). 
The Shelleys‘ philosophy demonstrates their futuristic vision. Shelley advocates the 
significance of science and his futuristic vision: ‗Science has done something and will do 
more [….] In another century or two we shall make a beginning: at present we are playing 
the game of blind man‘s buff, struggling to clutch truth‘ [emphasis added].63 Indeed, after 
nearly two centuries since Shelley‘s own time, our science has significantly evolved. This 
‗truth‘ that Shelley ‗struggl[es] to clutch‘ has been reflected in the pursuit of vitality and 
beauty in Frankenstein. Frankenstein‘s science is not merely to animate a creature but a 
perfect one: ‗… I [Frankenstein] had selected his [the Monster‘s] features as beautiful‘ (F, 34). 
This creation fantasy derives from Shelley‘s preoccupation with science, vitality, and 
aesthetics. Shelley‘s ‗On a Future State‘ (1815) investigates the physicality of ‗being‘, life, or 
existence. For Shelley, this materiality is evidenced by the necessity of sensations in life. 
Frankenstein continues to disclose this physicality of feelings through sensations. 
The production of a new human in Frankenstein is not merely a creation but an 
unsuccessful (re-)birth of a beautiful body. At this stage of the ‗science of art‘, the desire for 
beauty is involved in a mechanical production and human perceptions. In Gilman‘s 
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investigations, ‗the beautiful is the symmetrical, the regular, and the proportioned‘, all of 
which are originally derived from the assertion of Albrecht Dürer.
64
 ‗[T]he facial angle and 
the nasal index‘ of the Dutch anatomist Petrus Camper and the ‗canon of beauty‘ of the 
German sculptor Johann Gottfried Schadow represented the eighteenth-century aesthetic 
criteria of the human face and were adopted by cosmetic surgeons.
65
 Different from those 
elements in mythology, the modification of physical beauty becomes attainable with the rise 
of aesthetic surgery or other beauty technologies. The desire for beauty in Frankenstein is, 
therefore, satisfied by later scientific analyses and productions. 
Different also from a Frankensteinian disaster of creating a hideous ‗monster‘, the 
beauty industry seeks to attain the extreme beauty of the body from imagination to reality. 
With the popularity of the beauty industry throughout the world, the issue of ‗artificial 
beauty‘ becomes hotly debated. Artificial beauty has been pursued since ancient times. Aside 
from modern ‗art‘ or avant-gardism, which tends to challenge the form of ‗beauty‘ or art, 
human beauty in a traditional idea is perfected through the imagination in classical paintings 
and sculptures. Greek sculptures, especially those of Michelangelo, are seen as ideal 
standards of beauty to aestheticians and cosmetic surgeons. In the realm of the arts, literature 
demonstrates imaginary beauty through words, music through sounds, paintings through 
two-dimensional illustrations, and sculptures through three-dimensional moulding. In 
reconstructive or aesthetic medicine, such imagined beauty gradually becomes more realistic.  
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     In the post-industrial age, reconstructive surgery is the practice of human desire for 
beauty or for wholeness. Distinct from mythical imagination and science fiction fantasy, 
technological practices denote the significance of science. Grafting, for example, of facial 
transplants, has announced medical progress and brought about controversy.
66
 In the beauty 
industry, medical technologies fulfill the imaginations from myth and science fiction. Even so, 
this beauty science is not less sublime than the galvanic science of Frankenstein. Human 
desire for beauty and happiness has fuelled the rise of the beauty industry. Similarly, 
‗artificial beauty‘ through surgery attempts to access those social advantages that tend to be 
given to beautiful people. Deidre Lynch astutely notes that this aesthetic judgement and 
prejudice existed in the eighteenth century and is a prejudice which continues into the 
present: 
A face indexed character: a social norm, a determinate place on the ethical map 
where every person had a proper place and where distinction was contained 
within limits. Recognizing a face, or putting a name to a face, was thus an 
allegory for what eighteenth-century philosophy of mind valued as the most 




Lynch‘s inquries into the face in the eighteenth century recall Burkean aesthetics and 
exemplify the ‗rank‘ of the human face in Frankenstein. Frankenstein discloses this anxiety 
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about and desire for physical beauty and resonates with early science of beauty and human 
emotions. 
Frankenstein‘s interest in the materiality of emotion and the relationship between 
physical beauty and emotions persist in present medicine, physiology, and psychology. The 
Monster‘s case discloses universal prejudices to deformity and ugliness and prefigures much 
later practices of aesthetic surgery. In real life, any form of deformity or ugliness, though part 
of it is stereotyped by culture and society, continues to influence human judgements about 
physical appearances.
68
 Traditionally, prosthetics (a medical study of bodily wholeness) is 
regarded as an easy alternative to meet their demands. Given this pursuit if wholeness and the 
perfected body beautiful, it is understandable that cosmetic surgery, marketed in early 
twentieth-century America, has become a current craze throughout the world. It is believed 
that through bodily modifications (either for cosmetic purposes for surgical necessity) a new 
sense of self can emerge which, on occasions, subverts the concept of reality or ‗natural‘ 
beauty. In Frankenstein, Mary Shelley highlights the significance of physical appearances 
within a network of social interactions, but also reminds her readers that outward perfected 
beauty is no guarantee of inward spiritual wholeness or psychological well-being. For all the 
Monster‘s suffering and torment, as a result of his physical appearance, we as readers are still 
reminded of the inner beauty of mind and soul that is imprisoned within in his monstrous 
form.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Seeking Love: Byron‘s Don Juan (1819) and Shelley‘s Epipsychidion (1821) 
Love is one of the most mysterious human emotions to fascinate the Shelley circle. The 
philosophical and emotional dialogues rehearsed between Shelley‘s Alastor (1816) and 
Byron‘s Manfred (1817) are re-imagined (after the two poets were reunited in Venice on 22 
August 1818) in Don Juan and Epipsychidion.
1
 Wide-ranging critical perspectives have 
interpreted the Shelley circle‘s preoccupation with love in terms of a visionary journey or 
self-quest. Sexuality, desire, passions, homoeroticism, libido, and eros are all aspects of these 
two poetic works by Byron and Shelley often discussed by critics
2
 and which form a point of 
departure for my own argument concerned here with the materiality of love. Their reunion in 
Venice renews the poetic dialogue between Shelley and Byron, as dramatised in Shelley‘s 
composition of Julian and Maddalo: A Conversation in early 1819.
3
 This chapter contrasts 
Shelley‘s philosophy of love, in Epipsychidion, with Byron‘s notion of love exhibited in the 
first canto of Don Juan. Prior to writing Epipsychidion, Shelley saw love as ‗the link and type 
of the highest emotions of our nature‘4 and his unorthodox concept of love advocates the 
idea of free love.  
My approach draws on science, emotion, and sexuality to explore how the emotion of 
love is manifest through material world of physicality. The cultural history of sexuality
5
 and 
gender studies (in particular, queer theory) scrutinise non-normative love. The sexual 
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discourse has been systematised by Michel Foucault and current queer critics.
6
 The term 
‗queer‘ in my discussion is taken from the discourse of theories of gender and extended to 
include any form of marginalised sexuality that challenges traditional morals or laws. The 
concept of ‗queer‘ has been subjected to a variety of different interpretations. Anna-Marie 
Jagose extends the term queer from ‗lesbian and gay‘ to include ‗cross-dressing, 
hermaphroditism, gender ambiguity and gender-corrective surgery‘ (3).7 Robert J. Corber 
and Stephen Valocchi, referring to a wider school of queer theorists, argue that ‗… ―queer‖ 
names or describes identities and practices that foreground the instability inherent in the 
supposedly stable relationship between anatomical sex, gender, and sexual desire‘ (1).8 In 
order to advocate sexual dynamics and equality in my chapter, I adopt the broader sense of 
queer that is understood by Corber and Valocchi. 
Drawing on literary readings of sexuality in Epipsychidion,
9
 this chapter compares the 
philosophy of queer love in Don Juan and Epipsychidion. Recently literary critics, including 
Richard C. Sha and Alan Richardson, have started to draw on forbidden sexuality, aesthetics, 
and science in British Romanticism.
10
 In light of these concerns, my chapter compares 
Byron‘s Don Juan and Shelley‘s Epipsychidion to show how love for Byron and Shelley is 
grounded in queer sexuality and atheistic materialism.  
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I. The Womaniser‘s Love and Queer Emotion 
Byron read to Shelley a draft of Don Juan (Canto 1) during their reunion and later 
Shelley himself read its published version in January of 1820.
11
 Both of Byron‘s Don Juan 
and Shelley‘s Epipsychidion disclose repressed love and sexuality.12 Queering or 
womanising in their philosophy of love challenges mainstream sexual behaviour. At the level 
of narrative in Don Juan, Don Juan is both an ‗innocent‘ abroad and womaniser who seeks 
ultimate love by means of his own unconventional desires.
13
 In his letter to the Reverend 
John Becher on 26 February 1808, Byron expressed his own real-life preference for 
womanising in his youth: ‗Indeed, I am worse than ever, to give you some idea of my late life, 
I have this moment received a prescription from Pearson, not for any complaint but from 
debility, and literally too much Love‘.14 A ‗womanizer‘, according to The Oxford English 
Dictionary, is ‗one who goes after or consorts illicitly with women‘.15 Despite Don Juan 
being stigmatised as a womaniser, the womaniser‘s ‗illicit‘ behaviour suggests dissatisfaction 
with their current sexual relationships. Due to this unsatisfied love, a womaniser consciously 
or subconsciously resists permanent relationships.
16
  
This womanising or queer philosophy is more complicated in Shelley‘s Epipsychidion. 
Earl R. Wasserman, referring to the etymology of ‗Epipsychidion‘ from C. D. Locock and 
James A. Notopoulos, claims that Epipsychidion echoes the idea of ‗a soul within our soul‘ in 
Shelley‘s ‗On Love‘, which he continues to explore as his ‗theme of the ―epipsyche‖ [on the 
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soul]‘.17 This ‗little soul‘ (psychidion), in my discussion, signifies a suppressed or belittled 
love. Shelley relates this little love or homosexual love to ‗the eternal Curse‘ (E, 25) or a ‗sad 
song‘ (E, 35). Like Byronic sexuality in Don Juan, forbidden love or queer sexuality in 
Epipsychidion has been a topic of investigation for critics of Shelley. In his letter to his 
publisher John Gisborne, Shelley refrains from revealing his unspoken homoerotic desire and 
instead calls this poem ‗a mystery‘: ‗The Epipsychidion is a mystery—As to real flesh & 
blood, you know that I do not deal in those articles … as expect any thing human or earthly 
from me‘ (qtd. in SCR 419). Like Byron, Shelley‘s sexuality fluctuates between 
homosexuality and heterosexuality, which intrigues his biographers and critics to unveil the 
mystery of his sexuality. Nathaniel Brown argues that this ‗psychodynamics of Shelleyan 
love are thus epitomized as the quest of the lover to match his ideal self-image or inner 
type ….‘18  
Byron employs a sexually notorious character or ‗womaniser‘ named Don Juan to 
mock sexual conservativism and morality. Despite different tones and styles in Don Juan, the 
omnipresent narrator in Don Juan tells the reader about the young Juan‘s youthful exploits. 
The narrating ‗I‘ in Don Juan reveals not only Don Juan‘s mental development but physical 
changes. Considered an autobiographical poem by some Byron critics,
19
 Don Juan presents 
Byron‘s narrator as synonymous with Byron himself.20 Byron‘s narrator introduces the 
reader to the flirtatious Spanish figure of Don Juan as a vehicle to explore liberated sexuality 
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and human nature: 
I WANT a hero: an uncommon want, 
            When every year and month sends forth a new one, 
Till, after cloying the gazettes with cant, 
            The age discovers he is not the true one; 
          Of such as these I should not care to vaunt, 
            I‘ll therefore take our ancient friend Don Juan, 
          We all have seen him, in the pantomime 




In Byron‘s satirical parody, Don Juan – pronounced ‗Jew-an‘ – sounds like ‗Don True-One‘ 
for whom Byron longs: ‗The age discovers he [a new one] is not the true one;‘ (DJ, 1.4). This 
‗Mr True Man‘ or a womaniser is the spokesman of Byron‘s ‗uncommon‘ (DJ, 1.1) sexual 
radicalism which questions the hypocrisy of the society that fills the ‗gazettes with cant‘ (DJ, 
1.3). Byron strives to liberate human nature and reassess sexual morality that not only 
restricts human nature but can make human beings unhappy. Andrew Elfenbein demonstrates 
that Byron‘s first canto of Don Juan challenges the ‗Regency idealization of love‘ or ‗the 
hegemony of conventional heterosexual love‘.22 Don Juan‘s ‗unnatural‘ sexuality or 
womanisation is exemplified in Foucault‘s History of Sexuality: 
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Underneath the great violator [Don Juan] of the rules of marriage—stealer of 
wives, seducer of virgins, the shame of families, and an insult to husbands and 
fathers—another personage can be glimpsed: the individual driven, in spite of 
himself, by the somber madness of sex. [Emphasis added] (WK, 39) 
Foucault suggests that ‗an insult to husbands and fathers‘ (WK, 39) is a strategy to challenge 
the hegemony of a heterosexual marriage. Byron revives this sexually radical character in a 
bid to unveil the repressed sexuality caused by conventional morality. He retells Juan‘s 
adventures in a comic style to appeal for a more tolerant society for queer or unorthodox love. 
Juan‘s innate wildness was repressed by his formal education until puberty. This repressed 
sexuality reveals Donna Inez‘s ‗sexual hypocrisy‘ through the ‗deliberately emasculated 
education‘ she imposes on him (BHF, 181). Observing the adolescent Juan‘s untamed nature, 
Byron flaunts unconventional discipline, behaviour, and education. In stanza 25, the infant 
Juan was as untamed as a ‗mischief-making monkey‘ (DJ, 25.194) and ‗the most unquiet imp 
on earth‘ (DJ, 25.196) and was expected to become well-mannered through schooling: ‗… 
they‘d [Juan‘s parents] have sent young master [Juan] forth / To school, or had him soundly 
whipp’d at home, / To teach him manners for the time to come‘ [emphasis added] (DJ, 
25.198-200). School, in Byron‘s narrator‘s understanding, results in the deprivation of human 
nature. This behaviouristic or approximately Spartan education – through stimulus-response 
‗conditioning‘ processes23 – defies Byron‘s liberalism. George III, whom Byron attacks in 
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Don Juan, emphasised traditional morality to eradicate sexual ‗vices‘.24 Byron‘s narrator 
mockingly points out that this education only works temporarily, but Juan‘s parents have ‗… 
destroy[ed] / His [Juan‘s] natural spirit …‘ (DJ, 50.396-97) simply for their own reputation 
and pleasure. Despite this view echoing Rousseau‘s natural man in Emile, Byron‘s Don Juan 
further stresses this liberalism in love as well as sexuality. 
Byron describes an unhappy married life between Juan‘s parents as well as that 
between Donna Julia and Don Alfonso to express a preference for queer love and reassess 
sexual morals in a heterosexual marriage. In the last section of Don Juan, the narrator claims 
that ‗… this is not a moral tale, though gay [cheerful]; / Besides, in canto twelfth, I mean to 
show / The very place where wicked people go‘ (DJ, 207.1654-56). Byron‘s narrator suggests 
that Don Juan does not convey moral teachings, but demonstrates a diverse set of lifestyles, 
including those of ‗wicked people‘ (DJ, 207.1656) and sexual dissidents in a celebratory 
manner. In his Preface to Julian and Maddalo, Shelley notes Byron‘s anti-religious hedonism: 
‗… Maddalo [i.e., Byron] takes a wicked pleasure in drawing out his taunts against religion‘ 
[emphasis added] (SPP, 121). Different from Shelley‘s comment on this ‗wicked pleasure‘, 
Byron‘s hedonistic view subverts religion-based marriage systems and leads to a liberated 
and more humane sexual morality. In addition to queer theorists, other recent cultural 
historians have probed into eighteenth-century sexuality in an attempt to reassess the morality 
of sex at the time.
25
 Byron‘s anti-religious sexual liberalism may be indebted to the early 
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eighteenth-century ‗erotic‘ writer John Cleland. Randolph Trumbach notes: ‗Cleland‘s 
romantic eroticism, unlike that of most of his fellow novelists, was not, however, tied to a 




Byron‘s sentimentalism in relation to the emotion of love is embedded in his satirical 
narrative in the two cases of Donna Inez (Juan‘s mother) and Donna Julia (Juan‘s seducer). 
These two women are victims trapped within a traditional set of morals and marital system. 
Eighteenth-century sentimentalism leads Byron to the realm of emotion. Some critics note 
Byron‘s awareness of this sentimentalism in Don Juan and this discussion helps to develop 
my argument on the emotion of love. Along with the influence of ‗[Alexander] Pope and 
[Oliver] Goldsmith‘ on Byron, ‗[Lawrence] Sterne‘s fusion of sentiment and ironic 
psychological presentation‘, according to W. Ruddick, deeply impresses Byron and is 
inevitably adopted in Don Juan.
27
 James Soderholm discloses ‗Byron‘s sentimental idealism‘ 
(93) and womanising characteristic through the interpretation of Byron‘s ‗To Thryza‘ and his 
ex-wife Annabella Milbank‘s unpublished poem ‗Thyrza to Lord Byron‘ (90-93).28 In this 
context, Alan Rawes emphasises that ‗Byron often used poetry as a kind of cathartic 
self-therapy, venting not only a boiling imagination, but heated emotions‘.29 Ostensibly in a 
comic vein, Don Juan explores Byron‘s repressed ‗heated emotions‘ in the form of Inez‘s and 
Julia‘s marriages. 
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Donna Inez‘s failing marriage encompasses complicated emotions that derive from 
sexual desire. Despite Juan‘s mother‘s sophistication in ‗calculation‘ (DJ, 16.121) and the 
good nature of her ‗magnanimity‘ (DJ, 12.90), the system of marriage restricts her sexual 
freedom. The extramarital affair (or adultery) with the sixteen-year-old handsome Juan that 
the twenty-three-year-old beautiful Julia commits is the consequence of a traditional marriage 
focused not on sexuality but reproduction as the priority. This restriction of sexuality, for 
Byron, is in itself morally harmful and detaches humans from the utmost positive emotion of 
happiness. Studying the cultural history of eighteenth-century sexuality, G. S. Rousseau and 
Roy Porter, drawing on philosophical hedonism and sexual practice, comment that: 
     New currents of philosophical hedonism, led by Lamettrie, d‘Holbach and 
Diderot, and of utilitarianism, systematised by Jeremy Bentham, gained ground, 
advancing the view – popularised in novels such as John Cleland‘s Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure – that sex was a basic mode of human enjoyment. (SUE, 1) 
Chiming with these early philosophical assertions of, for example French materialism and 
Bentham‘s utilitarianism, Byron‘s hedonism emerges through his narrator‘s defence of bodily 
autonomy and critiques sexual repression of this kind. Byron has compassion for Donna 
Inez‘s wretched marriage – without a sex life – and teases Don Jóse (Juan‘s father) about his 
wild extra-marital affairs:  
Perfect she [Donna Inez] was, but as perfection is 
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  Insipid in this naughty world of ours, 
Where our first parents never learn‘d to kiss 
  Till they were exiled from their earlier bowers, 
Where all was peace, and innocence, and bliss, 
  (I wonder how they got through the twelve hours) 
Don Jóse, like a lineal son of Eve, 
Went plucking various fruit without her leave. (DJ, 18.137-44) 
Like Shelley‘s Emilia, who is physically imprisoned in the convent (as detailed in the 
epigraph to Epipsychidion),
30
 Donna Inez is a symbol of a married woman with a ‗sex‘ life 
equivalent to being imprisoned in an ‗[i]nsipid‘ (DJ, 18.138) convent. Although with 
sympathy, Byron‘s narrator implicitly relates the ‗perfection‘ (DJ, 18.137) of Juan‘s dominant 
mother to her sexual ‗insensitivity‘ or repression. Inez‘s sexual ‗innocence‘ (DJ, 18.141) or 
ignorance, like the asexual state of Adam and Eve in Eden – ‗Where our first parents [Adam 
and Eve] never learn‘d to kiss‘ (DJ, 18.139) – is caused by her mismatched marriage with 
Don Jóse. On the contrary, the ‗naughty world of ours‘ (DJ, 18.138) alludes to a queer society 
with sexual plurality
31
 which is reflected in Juan‘s and his father‘s casual attitude towards 
sex. This ‗[i]nsipid‘ (DJ, 18.138) but ‗[p]erfect‘ (DJ, 18.137) state, in Byron‘s satirical 
expression, explains Donna Inez‘s sexual plight through a comparison with Inez‘s ‗virtues‘ 
(DJ, 17.135) or chastity and a ‗modern female sain[t]‘ (DJ, 17.130) who needs no ‗guardian 
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angel‘ (DJ, 17.132). ‗[T]he twelve hours‘ (DJ, 18.142), Byron‘s narrator suggests, are critical 
moments for the physical intimacy of Adam and Eve in the ‗bowers‘ (DJ, 18.140) or 
chambers, yet nothing sexual occurs in Eden. Due to his radicalism, Byron criticises this 
religious myth that eliminates those sexual emotions or desires that Inez suffers. Yet Jóse‘s 
wild nature or womanisation, contrasted with Inez‘s chastity, explains a Satanic emotion of 
sex: ‗Don Jóse, like a lineal son of Eve, / Went plucking various fruit without her leave‘ (DJ, 
18.143-44). This ‗various fruit‘ (DJ, 18.144) refers to Jóse‘s addiction to forbidden fruit – sex. 
Inez‘s chastity or virginity was only removed after ‗Don Jóse and his lady [Donna Inez] 
quarrel‘d …‘ (DJ, 23.177) and afterwards created their by-product of love – Don Juan. 
Nevertheless, Byron illuminates Inez‘s sexual awakening soon after her husband‘s love 
affairs: ‗Whisper‘d he [Jóse] had a mistress, some said two, / But for domestic quarrels one 
[Inez] will do‘ (DJ, 19.151-52). These ‗domestic quarrels‘ (DJ, 19.152) allude to Inez‘s 
sexual desire after the disclosure of Jóse‘s extramarital love affairs. This inharmonious sex 
life between Inez and Jóse recurs after the birth of the little Juan. In stanza 27, Byron claims 
that Inez‘s sexual disappointment results in her unhappiness and decision to end the marriage: 
For Inez call‘d some druggists and physicians, 
And tried to prove her loving lord [Don Jóse] was mad, 
But as he had some lucid intermissions, 
  She next decided he was only bad; 
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Yet when they ask‘d her for her depositions, 
  No sort of explanation could be had, 
Save that her duty both to men and God 
Required this conduct—which seem‘d very odd. (DJ, 27.209-16) 
The ‗conduct‘ (DJ, 27.216) that Inez requires refers to sexual desire, but this reason for 
divorce, according to the narrator, ‗seem‘d very odd‘ (DJ, 27.216) in a society where sex is 
seen as an unspeakable taboo. This recognition of sexual desire and unconventional emotion 
instigated by physical love pervades the first canto of Don Juan. 
In addition to Donna Inez‘s marriage, Byron continues his sentimentalist philosophy to 
analyse Donna Julia‘s ‗unreasonable‘ emotion, such as ‗hysteria‘, conflicts, and violence, in 
an imbalanced love relationship with either Don Alfonso or Don Juan. In spite of her 
confinement to a traditional marriage – without a satisfying sex life – Julia‘s sexual 
awakening is earlier than Inez‘s. Julia defends her ‗virtuous woman‘s fame‘ (DJ, 146.1166) or, 
in fact, a defensive deception when Alfonso ransacks Julia‘s chamber for the sexual intruder – 
Don Juan: 
          During this inquisition Julia‘s tongue 
            Was not asleep—‗Yes, search and search,‘ she cried, 
          ‗Insult on insult heap, and wrong on wrong! 
            It was for this that I became a bride! 
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          For this in silence I have suffer’d long 
            A husband like Alfonso at my side; 
          But now I‘ll bear no more, nor here remain, 
          If there be law, or lawyers, in all Spain. 
[Emphasis added] (DJ, 145.1153-60) 
Byron uses Homeric comic relief, like the adultery of Ares (Mars) and Aphrodite (Venus) in 
Homer‘s Odyssey, to demonstrate the close relation between women‘s sexual emotions and 
love, as well as war (Ares) and love (Aphrodite). McGann supports this complex emotion that 
relates to sex. McGann suggests that sexuality instigates love and wars in Byron‘s Don Juan: 
‗Love is the occasion of terrible wars, Byron suggests, but throughout the context it is clear 
that greed and frustration (which are much the same thing, whether sexual or otherwise) are 
the real causes of evil conflicts‘.32 Complicated emotions, in this scenario, are related to an 
unhappy marriage or the failure of love not only in the case of Inez but now in that of Julia. 
Byron implicitly advocates the importance of acknowledging these physical needs in 
marriage and interrogates why ‗no one understands‘ (DJ, 21.168) this. Eighteenth-century 
philosophers of sexuality and erotic writers have pointed out the importance of sex,
33
 but 
Byron further explores gender relations in an attempt to blur the traditional boundary between 
the masculine and the feminine. Without sex, the woman‘s emotion, according to Byron‘s 
narrator, turns into violence: ‗And sometimes ladies hit exceeding hard, / And fans turn into 
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falchions in fair hands,‘ [emphasis added] (DJ, 21.166-67). Drawing on Susan J. Wolfson‘s 
‗cross-dressing‘ or queer reading that relates Don Juan to a ‗phallic woman‘,34 the 
masculinity of women is reflected in the psychic ‗manhood‘ of Inez and Julia. Comically and 
symbolically, Byron suggests that Inez and Julia possess the phallus through their active 
masculine sex-drives. Byron‘s queer argument heightens the relationship between love and 
sex and challenges the established gender-oriented dualism.  
     The fragments of (as well as drafted Prefaces to) Epipsychidion reveal Shelley‘s sexual 
and emotional ambivalence that is embedded in his love poem. This inner conflict derives 
from Shelley‘s queer love for a ‗woman‘ or, arguably, a disguised man. Mary Shelley omits a 
few significant passages in Shelley‘s ‗Passages of the Poem [Epipsychidion], or Connected 
Therewith‘ (published in 1839),35 to reduce speculations about Shelley‘s homosexual 
orientation behind his notorious womanisation. Shelley‘s ‗myth‘ in Epipsychidion relates to 
sexuality and his unsaid queer or potentially same-sex lover:  
And as to friend or mistress, ‘tis a form; 
Perhaps I wish you were one. Some declare 
You a familiar spirit, as you are; 
Others with a more inhuman 
Hint that, though not my wife, you are a woman; 
What is the colour of your eyes and hair? 
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Why, if you were a lady, it were fair 
The world should know—but, as I am afraid, 
The Quarterly (sic) would bait you if betrayed; 
And if, as it will be sport to see them stumble 
Over all sorts of scandals, hear them mumble 
Their litany of curses—some guess right, 
And others swear you‘re a Hermaphrodite; (‗PPCT‘, 45-57) 
Shelley indirectly tells the reader that this poem is not dedicated to a ‗friend or mistress‘ (E, 
45) but to a non-female lover: ‗Perhaps I wish you were one [of them]‘ (‗PPCT‘, 46). The 
assumption that this secret lover is ‗a woman‘ (‗PPCT‘, 49), according to Shelley, is an 
‗inhuman / Hint‘ and this alludes to Shelley‘s queer philosophy of love. Shelley‘s 
expression – ‗if you were a lady‘ [emphasis added] (‗PPCT‘, 51) – implies that this 
love-object is by no means a lady but a non-female love object despite the general public‘s 
assumption that the addressed person is ‗a woman‘ (‗PPCT‘, 49).36 Shelley even worries that 
once the public knows of the real gender of this ‗lady‘, particularly through the Quarterly‘s 
investigation (‗PPCT‘, 53), it will be an unbearable scandal (‗PPCT‘, 55-56) and his male 
lover will be cursed as ‗a Hermaphrodite‘ (‗PPCT‘, 57). In his letter to Gisborne, Shelley 
confirms this unorthodox love or queer sexuality: ‗I think one is always in love with 
something or other … The error, and I confess it is not easy for spirits cased in flesh and 
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blood to avoid it …‘ [emphasis added] (qtd. in SMV 159). Shelley suggests that this ‗error‘ 
(SMV, 159) is his genetically or psychologically determined homosexuality. This sexual 
desire implies the void of Platonic love, which requires no ‗flesh and blood‘ (SMV, 159). 
Instead, this sex drive is thoroughly demonstrated in Epipsychidion. Furthermore, Shelley‘s 
understatement of his homoerotic preference becomes reasonable as he worries that this fatal 
announcement of his love could incur ‗curses‘ (SPW, 56) from anti-homosexual ‗litany‘ (SPW, 
56) in Christianity and make his same-sex lover humiliated as ‗a Hermaphrodite‘ (SPW, 57). 
As it is, Shelley became more enthusiastic about writing love poems in Italy in 1819 as an 
escape from this queer anxiety.
37
 The concerns of these poems, though fragmented, are still 
reflected in his later Epipsychidion.  
In addition to these ‗Passages‘, which suggest Shelley‘s queer inclinations, the three 
complex drafts for the Advertisement to Epipsychidion and its published Advertisement 
reveal further hints of his understated sexual secret. In the Advertisement, Shelley outlines his 
ambivalence over homoeroticism: 
The present Poem, like the Vita Nuova of Dante, is sufficiently intelligible to a 
certain class of readers without a matter-of-fact history of the circumstances to 
which it relates; and to a certain other class it must ever remain 
incomprehensible, from a defect of a common organ of perception for the ideas 
of which it treats. (SPP, 392) 
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Acquainted with Dante‘s Vita Nuova, Shelley attempts in Epipsychidion to advocate a new 
life of sexuality, presumably queer love. Shelley alludes to a ‗certain class of readers‘ (SPP, 
392) to ‗gay men‘38 or other sexual dissidents whose ‗history‘ is devoiced by the 
heterosexuality-oriented authorities – ‗without a matter-of-fact history‘ (SPP, 392). Worse 
than atheism in Shelley‘s time, homosexuality was forcefully silenced by political and 
religious authorities and, therefore, lacked its own written ‗history‘ (SPP, 392). For Shelley, 
Epipsychidion will confuse ‗a certain other class‘ (SPP, 392), that is, those people who are 
unable to perceive ‗the [queer] ideas of which it [Epipsychidion] treats‘ (SPP, 392). Due to 
the unarticulated voice of the queer, Shelley points out his disappointment by quoting a prose 
line from Dante‘s Vita Nuova, as translated from Italian: 
          Great would be his shame who should rhyme anything under the garb of 
metaphor or rhetorical figure; and, being requested, could not strip his words of 
this dress so that they might have a true meaning. (SPP, 392)
39
 
Shelley refrains from writing explicitly about the ‗true meaning‘ (SPP, 392) of queer love or 
potential homosexuality, but feels ashamed to decorate his true feelings with ‗metaphor or 
rhetorical figure‘ (SPP, 392). This shame of forbidden love is further alluded to in 
Epipsychidion: ‗… Emily, / I love thee; though the world by no thin name / Will hide that 
love from its unvalued shame‘ [emphasis added] (E, 42-44). Shelley again disconnects his 
lover‘s name from ‗Emily‘: ‗… the world by no thin name / Will hide that love…‘ [emphasis 
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added] (E, 43). The ‗unvalued shame‘ (E, 44), meaning extremely great shame,40 refers to his 
queer love. Shelley later insists in his idealist optimism, asserting hope to conquer negative 
emotions, like ‗grief and shame‘ (E, 322): ‗At length, into the obscure Forest came / The 
Vision I had sought through grief and shame [emphasis added]‘ (E, 321-22). 
A heterosexual reading of Epipsychidion discloses the real identity of Emily as well as 
Shelley‘s unspoken sexuality. Even though the feminine name ‗Emily‘ is interpreted by critics 
to be associated with the persona of Teresa Viviani (known to the Shelleys as ‗Emilia 
Viviani‘), a queer reading of Shelley‘s biography leads to a suggestive darker realm of 
Shelley‘s sexual desire.41 This traditional association of Emily with Emilia Viviani was 
earlier mentioned by Notopoulos. Notopoulos argues that ‗Emilia Viviani‘ is ‗the Platonic 
counterpart of his [Shelley‘s] soul‘, that is, ‗Plato‘s Intellectual Beauty and Love‘.42 In his 
textual reading of Epipsychidion, Wasserman relates ‗the love song of P. B. Shelley to Emilia 
Viviani‘ (SCR, 428) and affirms King-Hele‘s idea43 about the similarities between some lines 
in ‗Emilia [Teresa] Viviani‘s essay on Love‘ (SCR, 460) and Epipsychidion in an attempt to 
‗prove‘ that the Emily is Emilia. Stuart M. Sperry doubts this glib connection of Teresa and 
Emily: ‗If it springs directly from the intensity of Shelley‘s involvement with Teresa, it also 
moves through a series of progressive disengagements. The lines are not addressed to Teresa 
Viviani but to an ―Unfortunate Lady, Emilia V—,‖ or, more simply, the ―Emily‖ of this 
poem‘.44 It is therefore arguable that Emily refers to Emilia. In the light of this, Nancy 
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Moore Goslee re-examines the drafts of Epipsychidion and infers that Shelley may have 
started Epipsychidion in the fall of 1820 instead of December 1820 when the Shelleys met 
Teresa Viviani.
45
 Lauritsen‘s queer reading particularly rejects Emily‘s association with 
either Teresa or Emilia and instead relates Emily to Edward Ellerker Williams (Shelley‘s best 
friend in Italy), whose ‗code name‘ would be Emily in ‗the Shelley-Byron circle‘.46 From 
this queer perspective, the feminised name ‗Emily‘ – ideally to meet mainstream values of 
sexuality which are dominated by a heterosexual society – can be seen as Shelley‘s disguise 
of a male lover. This literary phenomenon related to ‗cross-dressing‘ or queering is 
demonstrated in Gothic texts, such as Lewis‘s The Monk, Godwin‘s Caleb Williams, Byron‘s 
Manfred, and Polidori‘s The Vampyre.47 Shelley‘s acquaintance with these texts and their 
authors reinforces the queering of his ‗female‘ Emily. Following Lauritsen‘s assumption, I 
further probe into Shelley‘s ‗cloud‘ that alludes to his secret lover: ‗The Epipsychidion I 
cannot look at; the person whom it celebrates was a cloud instead of a Juno …‘ [emphasis 
added] (qtd. in SHTW 271). Different from his public authorship of Prometheus Unbound 
(1820), Shelley‘s motive to publish Epipsychidion anonymously alludes to his ‗cloud‘ to 
conceal his homosexuality. Like Byron‘s Thyrza or William Shakespeare‘s Mr. W. H., Shelley 
veils his dark sexuality through this feminised Emily. It turns out that Shelley becomes 
reluctant to use the name ‗Emily‘ and a female third person pronoun, like she or her, rather 
than a male one to narrate his young love. In Epipsychidion, Shelley suggests an angelic 
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woman‘s form to relate to a male lover (thee): ‗Seraph of Heaven! too gentle to be human, / 
Veiling beneath that radiant form of Woman / All that is insupportable in thee / Of light, and 
love, and immortality!‘ (E, 21-24). This non-female lover is again implied when Shelley 
desires to ‗ha[ve] been twins of the same mother‘ (E, 45) with Emily. Biologically, the 
identical traits in genes and/or characteristics that Shelley expects only occur to monozygotic 
twins (identical, same-sex twins). This is another example to prove Shelley‘s reluctance to 
feminise his lover. ‗[T]hat love‘ (E, 44) that Shelley intends to ‗hide‘ (E, 44) is homosexual in 
orientation, but Shelley‘s own time forces him to conceal any explicit descriptions of his love 
toward his male lover and, therefore, prevent his lover from being humiliated: ‗Aye, even the 
dim words which obscure thee now / Flash, lightning-like, with unaccustomed glow; / I pray 
thee that thou blot from this sad song‘ (E, 33-35). ‗[T]he dim words‘ (E, 33) refer to Shelley‘s 
poetic lines in Epipsychidion and seek to protect his lover with ‗this sad song‘ (E, 35) serving 
as a reference to the poem‘s understated queer love.  
Shelley‘s Epipsychidion represents a vision of Godwinian free love48 as well as his 
own coded homosexuality. This free love is, however, not limited to mainstream 
heterosexuality. Like Queen Mab, Epipsychidion again depicts Shelley‘s vision of happiness 
or his philosophy of love. Love, as an emotion that calms the mind, penetrates into Shelley‘s 
Queen Mab and Epipsychidion and eventually is the culmination of Shelley‘s idealist 
philosophy. Shelley‘s enthusiasm for homoeroticism emerges from Epipsychidion, but F. S. 
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Ellis, in his Shelley‘s Concordance, defines ‗love‘ in a traditional heterosexual understanding: 
‗the passion of love, a feeling of affection, sympathy and devotion between the sexes 
[emphasis added]‘.49 In other words, among Ellis‘s twenty-three aspects (nouns or verbs) to 
define ‗love‘,50 sexuality only occurs ‗between the sexes‘ rather than same sex. In terms of 
this, a potential spectrum of sexuality that Shelley suggested was not equally detected until 
queer scholars revisited it.
51
 The oppression of queer sexuality is demonstrated in 
Epipsychidion: ‗Sweet Benediction in the eternal Curse! / Veiled Glory of this lampless 
Universe!‘ (E, 25-26). For Shelley, the reciprocal love, though manifest in a queer and 
love-object-relation, is an oxymoron between sweetness and bitterness: ‗Sweet Benediction 
in the eternal Curse‘ (E, 25). The ‗Curse‘ (E, 25) derives from legal sanctions as well as social 
pressure against non-mainstream or queer sexuality.
52
 Shelley‘s poetic narrative prefigures a 
sexual utopia that queer scholars endeavour to attain. In his poetical language, this utopia 
should ‗… ha[ve] no thorn left to wound thy bosom‘ (E, 12). This trope of ‗thorn‘ (E, 12) 
refers to prejudices from moral and legal codes that incur pain to the ‗bosom‘ (E, 12) or the 
human mind. Love becomes a natural force for Shelley that leads to a visionary perfection. 
This power of true love in Epipsychidion helps Shelley to overcome these difficulties: ‗… but 
true love never yet / Was thus constrained: it overleaps all fence: / Like lightning, with 
invisible violence / Piercing its continents; like Heaven‘s free breath,‘ (E, 397-40). In addition 
to Lauritsen‘s claim that ‗[t]he death penalty for ―buggery‖ remained in effect in England 
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until 1861, and in Scotland until 1887‘ (DMG, 7), Charles Donelan investigates male 
sexuality in Romanticism and discovers: 
On 1 June 1787, George III issued a royal proclamation ‗for the Encouragement 
of Piety and Virtue, and for [the] (sic) preventing and punishing of Vice, 
Profaneness, and Immorality‘, which included a provision ordering the 
suppression of ‗all loose and licentious prints, books, and publications dispensing 
poison to the minds of the young and unwary‘. (R&M, 1) 
Sexuality, along with other ‗immoral‘ vices, is suppressed to avoid contaminating ‗the minds 
of the young and unwary‘ (R&M, 1). This potential ‗coming out‘ or queering through 
Epipsychidion is implied in Shelley‘s letter to Gisborne: 
The ‗Epipsychidion‘ I cannot look at; the person whom it celebrates was a cloud 
instead of a Juno; and poor Ixion starts from the centaur that was the offspring of 
his own embrace. If you are anxious, however, to hear what I am and have been, 
it will tell you something thereof. It is an idealised history of my life and feelings. 
I think one is always in love with something or other; the error, and I confess it is 
not easy for spirits cased in flesh and blood to avoid it, consists in seeking in a 




In other words, Shelley‘s letter to Gisborne instigates the potential rumour about Shelley‘s 
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queer sexuality which could be explained in Epipsychidion. Shelley also suggests that this 
love poem demonstrates his ‗life and feelings‘ (PBUR, Letters, 2, 434) relating to his 
homoeroticism. Shelley‘s sexuality is determined by his body or, scientifically, his genes: ‗I 
[Shelley] confess it is not easy for spirits cased in flesh and blood to avoid it [sexual 
preference]‘ (PBUR, Letters, 2, 434). This ‗confession‘ is less explicit than those of St. 
Augustine and Rousseau and conveys Shelley‘s sexually ‗new life‘ as suggested by Dante‘s 
Vita Nuova. Read as important material for ‗Greek love‘ or homosexuality,54 The Symposium 
aroused Shelley‘s enthusiasm and he translated the original version from Plato. Despite the 
mention of his short-lived emotional attachment to Emilia, Shelley comments on his own 
Epipsychidion and intentionally alludes to the homosexual issue throughout this love poem: 
‗… even they [critics] it seems are inclined to approximate me to the circle of a servant girl & 
her sweetheart. – But I intend to write a Symposium of my own to set all this right‘.55 This 
‗Symposium of [Shelley‘s] own‘ is Epipsychidion, which he regarded as a work of 
anti-Platonic or queer love. 
The vision of happiness in Epipsychidion, like that in Queen Mab or the solitary quest 
in Alastor, demonstrates Shelley‘s hoped for idealism of the potential of love. The concept of 
hope or optimism is used in Queen Mab and persists through his poetic concern to 
Epipsychidion, yet this unblessed love also resonates with Byron‘s Donna Julia‘s love for 
Don Juan. This idea of love brings pain to Shelley: ‗Ah, woe is me! / What have I dared? 
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where am I lifted? how / Shall I descend, and perish not? I know / That Love makes all things 
equal…‘ (E, 123-26). Love, no doubt, is a force for Shelley‘s optimism. In Epipsychidion, the 
imagery of light refers to love or Emily.
56
 Different from the non-material void in the 
darkness, light is presented through metaphors of material substance which repeatedly appear 
in Epipsychidion to relate to love, vision, and hope in the poem. Shelley‘s utopia of queer 
love is through his Vision or imagination: ‗I stood, and felt the dawn of my long night / Was 
penetrating me with living light: / I knew it was the Vision veiled from me / So many 
years—that it was Emily‘ [emphasis added] (E, 341-44). Shelley contrasts darkness and light 
to demonstrate his sentiments of longing for idealised love. Emily is symbolic of this ideal 
love. This light, in the hypothesis of quantum physics, is a kind of material and Shelley 
relates its substance to love. Like a current assertion of sexual equality and sexual rights, 
Shelley expects that his new perspective on love can change old-fashioned sexual values over 
time: 
Young Love should teach Time, in his own grey style 
All that thou art. Art thou not void of guile, 
A lovely soul formed to be blest and bless? 
A well of sealed and secret happiness,  
Whose waters like blithe light and music are, 
Vanquishing dissonance and gloom? (E, 55-60) 
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This ‗Young Love‘ (E, 55) alludes to a new form of sexuality or potential homosexuality. It 
also discloses Shelley‘s longing for a Dantean ‗new life‘ as in Vita Nouva. With the advances 
of thought, Shelley predicts that the ‗grey style‘ (E, 55) in history should be replaced by new 
values, especially sexual values. Shelley suggests that the unblessed love or same-sex love of 
‗[a] lovely soul‘ (E, 57) who faces its true sexuality without ‗guile‘ (E, 56) or trickery should 
be recognised or ‗de-stigmatised‘ by the general public. This ‗well of a sealed and secret 
happiness‘ (E, 58) signifies a homoerotic circle, in which homosexual love is confined within 
a well-like world. Meanwhile, Shelley interrogates whether homoerotic people‘s intelligent 
thoughts, like ‗blithe light and music‘ (E, 59), can defeat their identity crises and 
self-negation – ‗dissonance and gloom‘ (E, 60) – when they live in an extremely homophobic 
society. The frequently appearing imagery of light in Epipsychidion reflects the bright side of 
past times and hoped for future positive emotion. A homophobic or anti-queer society, for 
Shelley, is like a ‗Tempest‘ (E, 312) or an ‗obscure Forest‘ (E, 321) represented in his 
Dantean allusion. This imagery of darkness and storm, therefore, clouds oppressed 
homosexuals and, according to Shelley, is like ‗a lampless sea‘ (E, 311). In Epipsychidion, 
Shelley refers to his male lover in the feminised form of ‗Emily‘ (E, 344) and as a ‗living 
light‘ (E, 342): 
          Soft as an Incarnation of the Sun, 
          When light is changed to love, this glorious One 
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          Floated into the cavern where I lay, 
          And called my Spirit, and the dreaming clay 
          Was lifted by the thing that dreamed below 
          As smoke by fire, and in her beauty‘s glow 
          I stood, and felt the dawn of my long night 
          Was penetrating me with living light: 
          I knew it was the Vision veiled from me 
          So many years—that it was Emily. (E, 335-44) 
This ‗Vision‘ (E, 343) that Shelley has expected for ‗[s]o many years‘ (E, 344) is stressed in 
the Poet‘s lonely quest in Alastor and especially resonates with Shelley‘s own vision. This 
Emily who once entered Shelley‘s early teenage life is his schoolmate, but Shelley‘s object of 
affection was a boy. In his ‗An Essay on Friendship‘, Shelley recalls a similar same-sex 
attachment and this event may also be reflected in Alastor and now again in Epipsychidion:                                                                                                                                                          
          The nature of Love & Friendship is very little understood and the distinctions                              
          between them ill established. This latter feeling – at least a profound &        
          sentimental attachment to one of the same sex, wholly divested of the smallest    
          alloy of sensual intermixture, often precedes the former. … The object of these  
          sentiments was a boy about my own age, of a character eminently generous[,]  
          brave & gentle, & the elements of human feeling seemed to have been, from his  
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          birth genially compounded within him. There was a [d]elicacy (sic) & simplicity  
          in his manners inexpressibly attractive. … I recollect thinking my friend  
          exquisitely beautiful. Every night when we parted to go to bed I remember that   
          we kissed each other. [Emphasis added] (SPW, 245) 
In this poem, Shelley blurs the boundary between ‗Love & Friendship‘ (SPW, 245) and 
implies sexual attraction between groups of male friends or homosocial circles. Against this 
background Epipsychidion, though published anonymously, can be read as Shelley‘s private 
declaration of queer love. 
 
II. Materialism or Transcendence: The Beautiful and the Sublime 
Different from the Byronic hero‘s escapism in Manfred, a cheerful but satirical 
narrative voice pervades Byron‘s Don Juan. Shelley had sensed this dramatic change in 
Byron after their reunion and wrote in a letter to Thomas Love Peacock, dated 8 October 
1818, that ‗[Byron] is changed into the liveliest and happiest looking man I ever met‘ and 
reads him ‗the first canto of his [unfinished] ―Don Juan‖ (Letters, 394, 334).57 These 
personality traits of Byron are also described by Shelley in the Preface to Julian and Maddalo: 
‗He is cheerful, frank, and witty‘ (SPP, 120). This distinctive change in personality points to a 
difference between the poetic treatment of love in Byron‘s Don Juan and Shelley‘s 
Epipsychidion. For Shelley, the beautiful demonstrates love, whereas for Byron the sublime 
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equates with madness. That said Byronic and satiric in style of Don Juan, evidently, 
influences Shelley‘s attitude towards love. Through Shelley‘s idealism love becomes a force 
to transcend from the earthly to the eternal. In spite of these polarised differences between 
their philosophies of love, both the views of Byron and Shelley are grounded in a materialist 
and unconventional view of love. In what follows, Don Juan and Epipsychidion are 
understood as offering different concepts of love, which centre on the sublime and the 
beautiful. 
In Don Juan, Byron hints at the relationship between unconventional love and emotion.  
The subtle connection between Byron himself and his narrator in Don Juan has been explored 
by some critics, but other more sceptical critics have detached the author‘s voice from the 
characters it presents.
58
 Alternatively, the narrator can be regarded as Byron‘s double 
although this ‗Byron‘ is both a created persona and historical reality.59 Drawing on classical 
epics, Byron composes a love ‗epic‘ (DJ, 200.1593) which, ostensibly spoken by his narrator 
in Don Juan, competes with ‗the style of Virgil and of Homer‘ (DJ, 200.1599).60 Don Juan 
hints uncannily at Byron‘s own sexual journey and reflects on the sublime of human 
emotions. 
An anti-metaphysical or materialist conviction in Don Juan leads Byron to further 
emphasise the materiality of love and pursue the sublime of love. Byron targets Robert 
Southey, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and William Wordsworth
61
 as a means to advocate his 
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own brand of hedonism. In his Dedication to Don Juan, Byron claims that the first-generation 
Romantics betray truth for earthly fame or government posts
62
 in order to please the state, 
church, and monarchy. Among those Lakers, Southey is the arch target in this Dedication. As 
a laureate, Southey converted to the Tory party, which means that he now endorsed the 
legitimacy of the monarchy and British conservatism in his time. The nursery rhyme
63
 Byron 
quotes in this Dedication is recast as a taunt to the first-generation Romantics and their 
metaphysical philosophy: 
With all the Lakers in and out of place? 
A nest of tuneful persons, to my eye 
Like ‗four and twenty blackbirds in a pie; 
 
‗Which pie being open‘d, they began to sing‘— 
(This old song and new simile holds good) 
‗A dainty dish to set before the King,‘ 
  Or Regent, who admires such kind of food. (DJ, 6-12) 
Byron regrets that the great changes of the ‗Lakers‘ (DJ, 6) are like ‗blackbirds in a pie‘ (DJ, 
8) singing for ‗the King‘ (DJ, 11). Turning nursery rhyme into satire, Byron recognises that 
this ‗new simile‘ (DJ, 10) equates George III with the greedy king ‗… in his counting-house, 
/ Counting out his money‘ as depicted in the nursery rhyme.64 Byron‘s abhorrence of 
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metaphysics dates back to the fierce debates between vitalism and materialism between 
Abernethy and Lawrence.
65
 Over these debates, the Lakers uphold Abernethy‘s vitalist 
metaphysics. Abernethy may have rejected the mortality of the mind, but he agreed with 
Lawrence about the reciprocal relation between the mind and the body: 
They [philosophers] would then indeed still farther perceive how mind and 
matter reciprocally operate on each other by means of an intervening 
substance. … in addition to his [one‘s] bodily frame, he possesses a sensitive, 
intelligent, and independent mind …. [Emphasis added]66 
As a supporter of Lawrence‘s materialist camp, Byron continues to challenge the Lakers‘ 
vitalist convictions in Don Juan. This vitalist philosophy is fundamentally akin to early 
metaphysics as well as Kantian a priori hypothesis, in which the existence of God and the 
immortality of the ‗soul‘ were asserted. These first-generation Romantics‘ essentially 
succumbing to this metaphysics, for Byron, is a shame as well as a dangerous mistake. The 
comments of Byron‘s narrator, at the end of Don Juan, suggest more teasing complaints 
about these older Romantics: ‗Thou [the reader] shalt not set up Wordsworth, Coleridge, 
Southey; / Because the first is crazed beyond all hope, / The second drunk, the third so quaint 
and mouthey:‘ (DJ, 205.1634-36). In the Dedication, Byron‘s anti-metaphysics are explicitly 
mentioned in his regret for Coleridge‘s metaphysical philosophy: ‗And Coleridge, too, has 
lately taken wing, / But like a hawk encumber‘d with his hood, / Explaining metaphysics to 
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the nation— / I wish he would explain his Explanation‘ [emphasis added] (DJ, 13-16). Even 
though he later reassesses the significance of eternity in relation to the mind or the ‗soul‘, 
Byron sympathises with atheistic forms of materialism. He writes in a Journal of 16 
November 1821: ‗I have often been inclined to Materialism in philosophy—but could never 
bear it[s] introduction into Christianity—which appears to me essentially founded upon the 
Soul.—For this reason, [Joseph] Priestley‘s Christian Materialism—always struck me as 
deadly‘.67 A close friend to Coleridge, Priestley was regarded as another supporter of 
Abernethy‘s vitalism and his ‗Christian Materialism‘ which, as Byron suggests, is essentially 
a form of metaphysics. In this sense, it is inevitable that Byron saw Lawrence‘s atheistic 
materialism as a foundation for his own hedonistic pursuit of love and happiness. 
Freedom of thought as well as the body is central to Shelley‘s thought. In an unfinished 
Preface to his translation of Plato‘s The Symposium (or The Banquet), Shelley comments on 
Plato‘s ‗moral and metaphysical knowledge‘ (PoS, 402): 
His [Plato‘s] views into the nature of mind and existence are often obscure, only 
because they are profound; and though his theories respecting the government of 
the world, and the elementary laws of moral action, are not always correct, yet 
there is scarcely any of his treatises which do not, however stained by puerile 
sophisms, contain the most remarkable intuitions into all that can be the subject 
of the human mind. [Emphasis added] (PoS, 402)
68
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Except for his interest in Plato‘s studies on the complexities of the human mind, Shelley‘s 
philosophy is not solely inclined to Platonic metaphysics. Gerald Enscoe recognises this point 
and concludes in his reading of Alastor and Epipsychidion: 
Although he [Shelley] admired Plato and read him with great sympathy, he 
differs from the Platonic as well as traditional Christian ethos in that he rejects 
any superhuman, supernatural hierarchy. The God he seeks is a natural one, 
enclosed in human flesh and knowable only in human and sensual terms.
69
 
Shelley‘s translation of Plato‘s The Symposium, however, portrays a Socrates who 
foreshadows Kant‘s ideas of Beauty or love in a divine and peaceful state: ‗Love seems to me 
[Socrates], O Phædrus, a divinity the most beautiful and the best of all … [and] creates peace 
among men …‘ [emphasis added] (CWPBS Vol. 7, 191). 
     In Epipsychidion, Shelley depicts the Poet‘s ambivalence towards Platonic love and 
hedonist pleasure, which traditionally defines a dualistic conflict between the materiality of 
love (the body) and the immateriality of love (the spirit). The emotion of love is a major 
concern that pervades Shelley‘s poetry. In his ‗Love‘s Philosophy‘, written in 1819, Shelley 
suggests that love is ‗a sweet emotion‘: ‗The winds of heaven mix forever / With a sweet 
emotion‘ (3-4).70 These ‗winds of heaven‘ in Shelley‘s poetical language refer to the 
substance of pleasure that instigates pleasant emotion. Despite his ambivalence towards 
Platonic philosophy, the pursuit of ideal love leads Shelley to probe into the ideas of Platonic 
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and Greek love.  
Different from Byron‘s abhorrence of Platonism, anti-homosexual dialectic in Plato‘s 
The Symposium and Phaedrus means that Shelley discovers the sexual desire between young 
men. According to the Shelleys‘ Journals, ‗Shelley translates the ―Symposium‖‘ early on 9 
July 1818 and this ‗entire translation‘, as Notopoulos notes, is ‗the result of ten mornings‘ 
work‘ (PoS, 382).71 Other works by Shelley during this period focused on the subject matter 
of love, including ‗On Love‘, Discourse, ‗Love‘s Philosophy‘, and Prometheus Unbound. 
Epipsychidion is regarded as the epitome of Shelley‘s poetical creation on the subject of ideal 
love.  
     Byron comments on Plato‘s philosophy negatively through his narrator. The narrator 
argues that Plato‘s philosophical ‗system‘ (DJ, 116.924) of reason limits human sexuality and 
consists of ‗confounded fantasies‘ (DJ, 116.922): 
Oh Plato! Plato! you have paved the way, 
            With your confounded fantasies, to more 
          Immoral conduct by the fancied sway 
            Your system feigns o‘er the controlless (sic) core 
          Of human hearts, than all the long array 
            Of poets and romancers:—You‘re a bore, 
          A charlatan, a coxcomb—and have been, 
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          At best, no better than a go-between. (DJ, 116.921-28) 
Byron‘s narrator rejects Platonic love and mockingly calls Plato ‗a bore‘ (DJ, 116.926) for 
denying sexual passion in ‗human hearts‘ (DJ, 116.925). Like Shelley‘s bid to rehabilitate 
Prometheus and Satan,
72
 Byron takes up a Promethean or Satanic rebellion against Plato‘s 
sexual morals. Byron‘s Don Juan rejects Platonic love – pure love without sex – and upholds 
the spiritual and the sensual union between young people as supreme pleasure: ‗Such 
[Platonic] love is innocent, and may exist / Between young persons without any danger, / A 
hand may first, and then a lip be kist;‘ (DJ, 80.633-35). Byron‘s narrator emphasises the 
necessity of passions in life instead of Plato‘s rational admonishment. Byron‘s narrator rejects 
metaphysical and Platonic values, but advocates a materialist reason or law in Don Juan: ‗If 
people go beyond, ‘tis quite a crime, / But not my fault—I tell them all in time‘ (DJ, 
80.639-40). Hatred, jealousy, and pain, for Plato, are the symptoms of failing love. In Don 
Juan, Byron describes a loving husband‘s emotion towards an unfaithful wife: ‗A real 
husband always is suspicious, / But still no less suspects in the wrong place, / Jealous of some 
one who had no such wishes,‘ (DJ, 99.785-87). Byron‘s emphasis on the corporeal and 
anti-Platonic ideas are again exhibited in this physical concept of emotion. 
This loftiness or sublimity that works in the mind inevitably instigates strong emotions, 
including ecstasy and pain. Byron associates the sublime with Greek tragedies. In Don Juan, 
Julia‘s love for Juan exemplifies the sublime. After partaking of sexual pleasure with Juan, 
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Julia experiences pain from this temptation and ‗[t]he tears were gushing from her gentle 
eyes‘ (DJ, 117.931). In ‗his‘ On the Sublime,73 Longinus claims that the most talented poet of 
‗sublimity‘ (LS, 147) is Euripides because his tragedies convey sublime emotions – positive 
and negative (LS, 147). This emotional sublimity in Julia‘s ‗love‘ for Juan echoes the 
suffering of Queen Phaedra, who, in Euripides‘s Hippolytus, tragically loves her stepson:74 
          Phaedra. What sort of a thing do they mean when they say that people … love? 
          Nurse. A sweet thing, girl; yes, and painful too. 
          Phaedra. I have known only the pain. [Emphasis added] (74-75) 
Recognising the tempest of the mind, Byron alludes to Longinus‘s ideas of the sublime in 
Don Juan: ‗Although Longinus tells us there is no hymn / Where the sublime soars forth on 
wings more ample;‘ (DJ, 42.333-34). The sublime, for Byron‘s narrator, is described as a 
form of substance that moves speedily on soaring ‗wings‘ (DJ, 42.334). This physical 
metaphor, for Longinus and Byron‘s narrator, is not as poetical as a ‗hymn‘ (DJ, 42.333), but 
a concrete language that demonstrates quirky emotions which are dominated by neural 
substances. The Longinian aesthetics, in Juan‘s case, derives from an empiricist principle 
instead of a metaphysical hypothesis: 
He, Juan (and not Wordsworth), so pursued 
His self-communion with his own high soul, 
          Until his mighty heart, in its great mood, 
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            Had mitigated part, though not the whole 
          Of its disease; he did the best he could 
            With things not very subject to control, 
          And turn‘d, without perceiving his condition, 
          Like Coleridge, into a metaphysician. (DJ, 91.721-28) 
Byron‘s narrator heightens Juan‘s emotional self-fulfillment through the accumulation of 
sensory experience: ‗His [Juan‘s] self-communion with his own high soul, / Until his mighty 
heart, in its great mood, / Had mitigated part, …‘ (DJ, 91.722-24). This ‗mitigated part‘ (DJ, 
91.724) refers to the negative sublimity or emotion. In other words, his ‗great mood‘ (DJ, 
91.723) or pleasure can be obtained through a series of different pursuits in life. 
Transgressing conventional social boundaries, the adultery or extramarital affair between 
Julia and Juan is a form of queer pleasure. Juan‘s hedonist philosophy is, as described by the 
narrator, detached from Wordsworth‘s theistic imagination and Coleridge‘s metaphysical 
conviction. In Byron‘s playful pun, Wordsworthian ‗solitude‘ is transformed into a sensual 
domain: ‗By solitude I mean a sultan‘s, not / A hermit’s, with a haram for a grot‘ [emphasis 
added] (DJ, 87.695-96). This ‗solitude‘ in Byron‘s satire spurs the young Juan into his sexual 
exploits. Byron expresses a sexual interpretation of love:  
‗Oh Love! in such a wilderness as this, 
            Where transport and security entwine, 
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          Here is the empire of thy perfect bliss, 
            And here thou art a god indeed divine, 
          …………………………………………. 
          The poet meant, no doubt, and thus appeals 
            To the good sense and senses of mankind, 
          The very thing which every body feels, 
            As all have found on trial, or may find, 
          That no one likes to be disturb‘d at meals 
            Or love.—I won‘t say more about ‗entwined‘ 
          Or ‗transport,‘ as we knew all that before, 
          But beg ‗Security‘ will bolt the door. (DJ, 88.697-712) 
This ‗Love‘ (DJ, 88.697), in Byron‘s sexual understanding, encompasses two physical 
elements: ‗entwined‘ (DJ, 89.710) and ‗transport‘ (DJ, 89.711). It is clear that this ‗entwined‘ 
period refers to sexual intercourse and ‗transport‘, like trance, means orgasm. These poetic 
lines (DJ, 88.697-700) quoted by the narrator are transformed into a sexual discourse. Byron 
aims to heighten this ‗very thing‘ (DJ, 88.707) – sex – in a more humane discussion: ‗The 
very thing [sex] which every body feels,‘ (DJ, 88.707). Sexual appetite, Byron‘s narrator 
suggests, is like a desire for ‗meals‘ (DJ, 88.709) and should be equally satisfied.75 Divinity 
or ‗god‘ (DJ, 88.700), in Byron‘s jest, is at the supreme level of sexual love. Byron‘s narrator 
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relates ‗the good sense‘ (DJ, 89.706) to a bodily or sexual pleasure. Byron‘s idea, no doubt, 
echoes Greek hedonism as well as the principle of pleasure in eighteenth-century British 
empiricist aesthetics. With this sexual empiricism and hedonism, Byron‘s philosophy 
inevitably breaks from the metaphysics of Plato or the Lakers. 
In Byron‘s empiricist hedonism, the adventures in love or quest for the sublime are 
inevitably filled with pleasure and pain. Byron experiences tremendous remorse from his 
failed relationship with his half-sister, Augusta Leigh, and this disastrous episode is also 
embedded in his 1816 psychological verse drama – Manfred. Inevitably, pleasure and pain 
co-exist with love. Against Stoicism and Platonism, Byron recognises that love is a natural 
force from which pleasure can be obtained: ‗Oh Pleasure! you‘re indeed a pleasant thing, / 
Although one must be damn‘d for you, no doubt;‘ (DJ, 119.945-46). The existence of humans 
and the occurrence of emotion confuse Byron‘s narrator, but he still optimistically describes 
in empiricist terms the journey of life: 
Man‘s a phenomenon, one knows not what, 
       And wonderful beyond all wondrous measure; 
‗Tis pity though, in this sublime world, that 
       Pleasure‘s a sin, and sometimes sin‘s a pleasure; 
     Few mortals know what end they would be at, 
       But whether glory, power, or love, or treasure, 
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     The path is through perplexing ways, and when 
     The goal is gain‘d, we die, you know—and then— (DJ, 133.1057-1064) 
Byron‘s ideas about human emotion are present in Manfred and here he is reminded of the 
two-edged sword of ‗Pleasure‘ (DJ, 133.1060). Hedonist philosophy leads him to the territory 
of the unknown. Byron suggests that human existence or being is ‗a phenomenon‘ (DJ, 
133.1057) and the purpose of existence is, thus, to pursue pleasure from ‗glory, power, or 
love, or treasure‘ (DJ, 133.1062) until the termination of this phenomenon or vitality when 
‗we die‘ (DJ, 133.1064). For Byron, the ‗sublime world‘ (DJ, 133.1036) alludes to this 
hedonist world, full of exchanges of emotion between ‗sin‘ and ‗pleasure‘ (DJ, 133.1060). 
Longinus‘s ‗sublime‘ aesthetics introduces Byron to emotional philosophy. In Don Juan in 
Context, Jerome J. McGann notes that ‗the Longinian tradition‘ is highlighted in ‗Byron‘s 
major poetry‘ and Longianian thoughts ‗are those associated with political ideas of freedom‘ 
(DJC, 12). In Byron‘s Concordance, ‗the sublime‘ and ‗sublimity‘ are used particularly in 
Don Juan and his later works (1423-24).
76
 Byron‘s inquiry into the sublime aspects of 
emotion is clearly seen in stanza 29, in which Inez‘s ‗serenity‘ (DJ, 29.226) and ‗sublimity‘ 
(DJ, 29.231), respectively, refer to the peaceful mind in Inez and the disrupted mind in Jóse 
during Inez‘s well-organised and non-violent revenge on her husband‘s unfaithfulness: 
And then this best and meekest woman [Inez] bore 
            With such serenity her husband‘s woes, 
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          Just as the Spartan ladies did of yore, 
            Who saw their spouses kill‘d, and nobly chose 
          Never to say a word about them more— 
            Calmly she heard each calumny that rose, 
          And saw his (sic) agonies with such sublimity, 
          That all the world exclaim‘d ‗What magnanimity!‘ 
[Emphasis added] (DJ, 29.225-32) 
The ‗sublime world‘ (DJ, 133.1036), according to Byron‘s narrator, derives from Longinus‘s 
aesthetics, in which human emotions are agitated by the physical world. Longinus, in On the 
Sublime, explains that the sublime is ‗innate‘ (LS, 57) in the mind to perceive ‗the power of 
forming great conceptions‘ (LS, 57) and ‗vehement and inspired passion‘ (LS, 57). Inez‘s 
‗magnanimity‘ (DJ, 29.232) or virtues, in theory, leads to the emotionally beautiful – peace, 
calmness, or ‗serenity‘ (DJ, 29.226). This importance of a beautiful or peaceful mind is also 
desired by Julia: 
She [Julia] now determined that a virtuous woman 
            Should rather face and overcome temptation, 
          That flight was base and dastardly, and no man 
            Should ever give her heart the least sensation;  
[Emphasis added] (DJ, 77.609-12) 
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This Platonic reason – not to love but to control ‗temptation‘ (DJ, 77.610) – falters in Julia‘s 
instance. Byron notes the unnaturalness in Platonism. Nevertheless, the way Julia prevents 
temptation and passion follows an empiricist principle, that is, ‗… give [the] heart [i.e., mind] 
the least sensation;‘ (DJ, 77.612). Julia‘s vow that ‗… she never would see Juan more,‘ (DJ, 
76.601) evidences this close relationship between emotion and sense stimuli. Different from 
Byron‘s empiricist hedonism, Julia‘s society (representative of empiricist Stoicism) sends 
Julia to ‗a nunnery‘ (DJ, 191.1526): ‗Julia was sent into a nunnery, / And there, perhaps, her 
feelings may be better‘ [emphasis added] (DJ, 191.1526-27). In this empiricist framework, 
solitude (in a nunnery) – or the reduction of stimulants – prevents sexual temptation and may 
render Julia‘s disrupted mind healed or ‗better‘ (DJ, 191.1527). The sexual stimulant, for 
Julia, is merely the beautiful Juan. This love story in Don Juan, for Byron, maps out a guide 
to ‗the true sublime‘ (DJ, 201.1063). 
In Epipsychidion, Shelley pursues the beautiful and the transcendence of love through 
death. From line 513 to the end of Epipsychidion, Shelley‘s escapism or transcendentalism 
through love grows clear. It suggests that Shelley‘s poet-speaker appeals to Emily in terms of 
a suicide pact: ‗This isle and house are mine, and I have vowed / Thee to be lady of the 
solitude.—‘ (E, 513-14). Different from Byron‘s concept of the solitary, the ‗solitude‘ (E, 514) 
of Emily may allude to her eternal slumber or death. This materialist transcendence, for 
Shelley, coalesces sense experience with an abstracted world of ideals: ‗Those instruments 
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[bodily senses] … / … / … make the present last / In thoughts and joys which sleep, but 
cannot die, / Folded within their own eternity‘ (E, 520-24). Death becomes the couple‘s 
chamber where they ‗sleep‘ (E, 524) and will never be separated in ‗eternity‘ (E, 524). 
Different from Byron‘s hedonism, Shelley‘s nihilism or materialist idealism of love is 
strikingly demonstrated in Epipsychidion. This type of idealism for Shelley is rooted in his 
atheistic materialism. Meditating on the bodily and scientific limitations of a materialist 
worldview, Shelley proposes that death is a transcendence of life and eventually leads to a 
transcendent realm of ‗eternity‘. It is suggested in Epipsychidion that dying together with 
Emily is Shelley‘s death-wish and bid to transcend mortality.  
The close connection between the poet-speaker in Epipsychidion and Shelley‘s own 
biography is reinforced by Shelley himself. Sperry details critical debates on the affinity of 
Shelley‘s life and the Poet‘s narration in Epipsychidion.77 Shelley instead emphasises that 
‗the advertisement [to Epipsychidion] is no fiction‘ [emphasis added] and that ‗the 
―Epipsychidion‖ … is an idealized history of my life and feelings‘ (qtd. in SPP 391).78 In 
this sense, the death of the ‗Writer of the following Lines at Florence‘ before embarking on a 
‗voyage to one of the wildest of the Sporades‘ in the Advertisement (SPP, 392) and the 
request to Emily to embark on a deadly ‗journey‘ point to the possibility of Shelley‘s planned 
‗double‘ suicide with Williams.79 A range of terms that describe Shelley‘s physical desire for 
being ‗one‘ with Emily recur in the last stanza of Epipsychidion:  
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And by each other, till to love and live 
Be one … 
................ 
Our breath shall intermix, our bosoms bound, 
And our veins beat together; … 
………………………………... 
We shall become the same, we shall be one 
Spirit within two frames, oh! wherefore two? 
One passion in twin-hearts, which grows and grew, 
‘Till like two meteors of expanding flame, 
Those spheres instinct with it become the same, 
Touch, mingle, are transfigured; ever still 
Burning, yet ever inconsumable: 
In one another‘s substance finding food, 
………………………………………… 
One hope within two wills, one will beneath 
Two overshadowing mind …. 
[Emphasis added] (E, 551-85) 
This imagery of union is earlier shown in Shelley‘s love poems written in 1819. Among these 
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few subtle poems, the posthumous poem ‗Fragment: Wedded Souls‘ reveals Shelley‘s 
‗Platonic love‘: 
I AM as a spirit who has dwelt 
Within his heart of hearts, and I have felt 
His feelings, and have thought his thoughts, and know 
The inmost converse of his soul, the tone 
Unheard but in the silence of his blood. [Emphasis added] (1-5)
80
 
In this fragment, Shelley expresses that true love is confirmed through physical contact. 
Though echoing Alastor, Shelley instead mentions his homoeroticism by means of a male 
genitive – ‗his‘ – in this previously unpublished poem. Differing from this posthumous poem, 
Epipsychidion intentionally conceals Shelley‘s homosexual love in the language of 
heterosexual desire.  
By contrast Byron, in Don Juan, draws on materialist philosophy and naturalist 
education to emphasise the pleasures of heterosexual desire. Byron‘s Don Juan is moulded in 
the shape of Rousseau‘s Emile – a natural man, Juan follows ‗his own high soul‘ (DJ, 91.722) 
to attain a ‗mighty heart‘ (DJ, 91.723). Byron‘s narrator emphasises Don Juan‘s education in 
the episode of widowed Donna Inez: ‗And so they [tutors] were submitted first to her, all, / 
Arts, sciences, no branch was made a mystery / To Juan‘s eyes, excepting natural history‘ (DJ, 
39.310-12). In Inez‘s formalism for Juan‘s education, the little Juan‘s mind is moulded by 
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strict morals and scientific reason. In Don Juan, Byron‘s attitude towards this scientific or 
anti-mysterious education is ambivalent. He suggests that his contemporary advanced science 
and technology, for example bread technology, galvanism, and vaccines (DJ, 130.1033-40), 
still fail to unveil the mystery of human existence – ‗Man‘s a phenomenon, one knows not 
what,‘ (DJ, 133.1057). Nevertheless, Byron strives to understand this existence in terms of 
materialist or non-metaphysical philosophy. Unsympathetic to Rousseau‘s anti-materialist 
thought, Byron instead sympathises with Lucretius‘s philosophy and bases this materialist 
concept on attaining love or happiness. Byron suggests that Lucretius‘s materialism is like 
‗wholesome food‘ (DJ, 43.338) to the human mind, but it is too radical to be accepted by his 
contemporary society or particularly the state whose authority is allied to religion: 
‗Lucretius‘[s] irreligion is too strong / For early stomachs, to prove wholesome food;‘ (DJ, 
43.337-38). Louis Crompton points out that ‗[t]he moral crusade of the Society for the 
Reformation of Manners‘ (BGL, 61) dismissed in 1738, but revived in 1787 by George III‘s 
permission, was renamed ‗the Society for the Suppression of Vice‘ (BGL, 61) in 1801, 
persisting in ‗Georgian and Victorian England‘ (BGL, 62). In this social context, Shelley‘s 
eagerness for the revival of the Greco-Roman ideas of freedom is now closely connected to 
Byron‘s ambition in Don Juan. Byron‘s abhorrence of any kind of bonds and longing for this 
revival of ancient spirit are suggested in his Dedication: ‗Where shall I turn me not to view its 
bonds? / For I will never feel them—Italy! / Thy late reviving Roman soul desponds / 
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Beneath the lie this State-thing breathed o‘er thee;‘ (DJ, ‗Dedication‘, 16.121-24). The 
‗Roman soul‘ (DJ, ‗Dedication‘, 16.123) alludes to the mind without ‗bonds‘ (DJ, 
‗Dedication‘, 16.121) and this ancient spirit of freedom was revived by Rousseau and Byron. 
     The affinity of physical beauty and attraction is emphasised in Byron‘s materialist 
philosophy of the sublime. This physical passion or emotional sublimity aroused by beautiful 
appearances is introduced in a few cases in Don Juan. Unlike Shelley‘s focus on intellectual 
beauty, Byron‘s descriptions of physical beauty permeate those characters in Don Juan. 
Byron describes Donna Julia‘s physical beauty and strives to break down the stigma of 
exogamy or genetic hybridisation between races. In stanza 56, Julia‘s genetic origin, 
according to Byron‘s narrator, is marginalised by a traditional marriage in Spain: ‗(Her 
[Julia‘s] blood was not all Spanish, by the by; / In Spain, you know, this is a sort of sin.)‘ (DJ, 
56.443-44). This ‗sin‘ (DJ, 56.444) or an exogamous taboo is derived from Julia‘s impure 
‗blood‘ (DJ, 56.443). Without this cultural or racial prejudice, Byron‘s aesthetics is, however, 
based on physiological elements and somewhat forms another type of prejudice. Caroline 
Franklin also notes this physiological or ‗biological‘ principle: ‗The poet [in Don Juan] 
represents the resulting love affair as the comical triumph of biology—Julia‘s libido (I, 60) 
and Juan‘s puberty (I, 93)—over ideology‘ [emphasis added] (BH, 125-26). Drawing on 
beauty and cultural history, Bonnie Berry regards physical appearances as a kind of bias even 
in today‘s society, apart from ‗race, gender, age, economic resources, and physical ability‘.81 
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Beautiful Julia‘s genetic background is revealed through her ‗grandmother‘ (DJ, 58.463): 
This heathenish cross restored the breed again, 
Ruin’d its blood, but much improved its flesh; 
For, from a root the ugliest in Old Spain 
Sprung up a branch as beautiful as fresh; 
          The sons no more were short, the daughters plain:  
[Emphasis added] (DJ, 58.457-61) 
Julia is, therefore, an outstanding product of hybridisation between African and Spanish 
blood. Byron‘s philosophy of love is derived from British physiological aesthetics. These 
aesthetics emphasise the close relationship between physical beauty and love. In this sense, 
young Julia‘s beauty is the major factor to attract middle-aged Alfonso, Juan, and even Juan‘s 
mother. Byron describes Julia‘s physical beauty: 
          Her glossy hair was cluster‘d o‘er a brow 
            Bright with intelligence, and fair and smooth; 
          Her eyebrow’s shape was like the aerial bow, 
            Her cheek all purple with the beam of youth, 
          Mounting, at times, to a transparent glow, 
            As if her veins ran lightning; she, in sooth, 
          Possess‘d an air and grace by no means common: 
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          Her stature tall—I hate a dumpy woman. 
[Emphasis added] (DJ, 61.481-88) 
The narrator‘s claim of ‗I hate a dumpy woman‘ (DJ, 61.488) may amuse the reader, but this 
philosophy of love is based on beautiful characteristics of the body. A ‗dumpy‘ (DJ, 61.488) 
body, for the narrator, violates an aesthetic standard of symmetry and elegance. The quality of 
hair, eyebrow, cheek, and height are all carefully inspected. From a physiological perspective, 
eighteenth-century British aesthetician Edmund Burke discovers the changes of human 
emotion towards perceived beautiful objects: ‗Which shews (sic) that beauty, and the passion 
caused by beauty, which I call love, … and the consequent emotions of the body which attend 
what is called love …‘ [emphasis added].82 The descriptions of young Donna Julia‘s physical 
beauty echo this aesthetic philosophy. 
     Beauty subtly affects human emotion and these aesthetic values reinforce Byron‘s 
philosophy of love. In Don Juan, Juan was born with a perfect face: ‗Young Juan wax‘d in 
goodliness and grace; / At six a charming child, and at eleven / With all the promise of as fine 
a face / As e‘er to man‘s maturer growth was given:‘ (DJ, 49.385-88). This genetic superiority 
promises Juan‘s success in sensual adventures among ‗women‘.83 Byron‘s narrator describes 
the adolescent Juan‘s physical beauty: ‗Young Juan now was sixteen years of age, / Tall, 
handsome, slender, but well knit …‘ (DJ, 54.425-26). Fascinated by Greek culture, Byron 
describes physical features in terms of universal archetypes. Those features of being 
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‗[y]oung‘, ‗[t]all, handsome, slender, [and] well knit‘ meet aesthetic criteria or perceptual 
biases. This nature of appreciating physical beauty is emphasised by the Shelley circle and 
even revisited by cultural historians who dwell on human beauty.
84
 Resonating with Byron‘s 
physical aesthetics, Berry details physical beauty: ‗Physical features such as skin colo[u]r, 
hair texture, height, weight, eye shape, disabilities and deformities, condition of the teeth, 
evidence of aging, and ―beauty‖ are important markers for biased treatment‘ (BB, ix). 
Reminiscent of the intended creation of a well-proportioned beautiful man in Mary Shelley‘s 
Frankenstein, Byron‘s Don Juan is another focus of the Shelley circle on aesthetic or genetic 
attraction. 
Unlike Byron‘s Don Juan that expresses a hedonist philosophy, Shelley‘s 
Epipsychidion demonstrates his pursuit of the beautiful as a peaceful state of mind or mode of 
being. Epipsychidion presents Shelley‘s utopian idealism. From line 383 to the end of this 
poem, Shelley urges his feminised lover – ‗Lady‘ (E, 383) or ‗Emily‘ (E, 408) – to escape 
with him to start their new life: ‗The day is come, and thou wilt fly with me. / To whatsoe‘er 
of dull mortality / … / Emily, / A ship is floating in the harbour now,‘ (E, 388-409). ‗In 
thoughts and joys which sleep, but cannot die, / Folded within their own eternity‘ (E, 523-24), 
the young couple‘s love will remain inseparable in death through the power of the 
imagination: 
Before our gate, and the slow, silent night 
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Is measured by the pants of their calm sleep. 
Be this our home in life, and when years heap 
Their withered hours, like leaves, on our decay, 
Let us become the over-hanging day, 
The living soul of this Elysian isle, 
Conscious, inseparable, one. … (E, 534-40) 
This is Shelley‘s desire for escapism in pursuit of happiness or the beautiful. This potential 
suicide pact posed here between the young couple is implied by one of Shelley‘s first drafts 
of a Preface to Epipsychidion: ‗The following Poem was found amongst other papers in the 
Portfolio of a young Englishman [Shelley] with whom the Editor had contracted an intimacy 
at Florence, brief indeed, but sufficiently long to render the Catastrophe by which it 
terminated one of the most painful events of his life‘ (SPW, 424). It suggests that Shelley‘s 
anxiety about this homosexual relationship can be concealed through this intended double 
suicide which ‗render the Catastrophe by which it terminated one of the most painful events 
of his life‘ (SPW, 424). Here ‗the Catastrophe‘ (SPP, 424) might allude to a death penalty 
exacted for homosexuality and this ‗one of the most painful events of his life‘ (SPW, 424).  
The ‗love‘s rare Universe‘ (E, 589) at the very end of Epipsychidion alludes to Dantean 
outermost Heaven – the Primum Mobile, where Beatrice guides Dante through the Sphere of 
Fire: ‗The winged words on which my soul would pierce / Into the height of love‘s rare 
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Universe. / Are chains of lead around its flight of fire.—‘ (E, 588-90). These ‗chains‘ (E, 590) 
remind the reader of the limitation of bodily frames early – Shelley‘s unsteady health  
condition
85
 – as well as that of Shelley‘s homosexual desire for an unidentified male in the 
guise of Emily. Instead, Shelley‘s ‗winged words‘ (E, 588) lead the reader to his untrodden 
‗Universe of love‘. Shelley‘s philosophy of love is connected to ‗eternity‘ or immortality 
through a physical death. In Shelley‘s knowledge of physics, this Dantean paradise, like a 
black hole, surpasses the nine planets, all of which are dominated by physical mechanism. By 
this inference, Shelley‘s last line in Epipsychidion – ‗I pant, I sink, I tremble, I expire!‘ (E, 
591) – is by no means exclusively a sensual metaphor. Echoing Wasserman, Sperry thinks 
that the line is a ‗sexual metaphor‘ (SMV, 180) and ‗ecstasy can be achieved only at the cost 
of ultimate dissemination and collapse‘ (SMV, 180). Stuart Peterfreund elaborates this sexual 
reading and relates ‗the petit mort of sexual climax‘ to ‗a triumphal return to the Edenic 
state‘.86 Shelley ambivalently implies this act of suicide either in the Advertisements or in the 
final section of Epipsychidion. Shelley‘s tragic ‗accidental‘ drowning is prefigured in the 
imagery of drowning: ‗I pant, I sink, I tremble, I expire!‘ (E, 591). Presumably, the coda of 
Epipsychidion is a farewell letter: ‗… Then haste / Over the hearts of men, until yet meet 
Marina [Mary Shelley] (sic), Vanna [Jane (Giovanna) Williams] (sic), Primus [Edward 
Williams] (sic),
87
 and the rest, / And bid them love each other and be blest:‘ (E, 599-602). 
Shelley struggles between a materialist void and a religious ‗reunion‘ with his beloved Mary, 
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Jane, Edward, and ‗the rest‘ (E, 600) in Heaven after death. In Shelley‘s materialist or 
atheistic transcendentalism,
88
 self-termination for love reveals divinity or eternity through a 
Dantean flaming fire: ‗… ―Love‘s very pain is sweet, / But its reward is in the world divine / 
Which, if not here, it builds beyond the grave.‖‘ (E, 596-98). Shelley anticipates the physical 
struggle of dying and likens the pain to the burning fire which prefaces a Dantean paradise. 
His materialist worldview, in some way, draws him back from this religiously ‗divine‘ (E, 597) 
vision and he backs away with a conditional ‗if not here [the divine world]‘ (E, 598) to return 
to an atomic worldview – ‗beyond the grave‘ (E, 598). This concept of the atomic dates back 
to Shelley‘s description of the utopian ‗isle‘ (E, 478), which, Shelley thinks, is ‗[a]n atom of 
th‘ Eternal‘ (E, 479). Such aspiring passion, for Shelley, is the substance of love. This 
materiality is clearly explained in his ‗On Love‘, in which Shelley extends David Hartley‘s 
theory of vibrations
89
 to demonstrate the mental physics of love: ‗… if we feel, we would 
that another‘s nerves should vibrate to our own, that the beams of their eyes should kindle at 
once and mix and melt into our own … This is Love‘ (SPP, 503-04). Unlike Byron‘s 
hedonistic pursuit of a love relationship in Don Juan, Shelley, like Plato and Kant, 
understands that excessive physical passions will lead the mind to an inharmonious state. 
The Shelley circle – prefiguring those forms of sexual freedom advocated by recent 
critics, for example Eve K. Sedgwick, Gayle Rubin, and Judith Butler – launches a discourse 
of love in order to construct a more humane society. My inquiry into Don Juan (Canto 1) and 
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Epipsychidion has explored Byron‘s and Shelley‘s pursuit of romantic love by demonstrating 
their sexuality and re-examining their distinct philosophy of love. Prior to emerging queer or 
LGBT studies
90
 as well as scientific research on love,
91
 the complex emotions of love earlier 
attracted both Byron and Shelley. The Shelley circle‘s enthusiasm for materiality leads them 
to bridge gaps between the body and the mind, the physical and the spiritual, and emotion and 
reason. These younger Romantics (Shelley and Byron) should be admired due to their 
intellectual practice and profound philosophy of life and courage. Byron‘s and Shelley‘s 
philosophy of love demonstrates their disagreement with contemporary sexual morality and 
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sexuality was ‗first‘ (though indebted to Havelock Ellis) released in Alfred Kinsey‘s Sexual 
Behaviour in the Human Male (1948). The science of love attracted more researchers 
afterwards. 
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AFTERWORD 
Before and After the Shelley Circle 1812-1821: Cognitive Science and the Beauty Industry 
The issue of emotion has been widely discussed across different disciplines,
1
 but my 
thesis demonstrates how the Shelley circle reassessed long eighteenth-century philosophical 
and scientific ideas. Shelley, for example, meditates on the science of the mind and emotion 
through reconciling with one another various Enlightenment philosophies, including 
metaphysics, empiricism, atheism, and materialism. This circle’s collective work exhibits its 
revised philosophy of the human mind, but also registers the circle’s disagreement with the 
metaphysical conviction of the first-generation Romantics. In so doing, this circle’s Romantic 
responses anticipate much of today’s scientific understanding of the mind and emotion, 
especially, in cognitive science. Similar to the Shelley circle’s philosophical view of the mind, 
current cognitive research adopts scientific or materialist principles and hypotheses to explore 
the human mind. My concept of the ‘materiality of emotion’2 draws on distinct disciplines 
within the humanities and the sciences to articulate this Romantic re-imagining of its 
eighteenth-century philosophical legacy and prefiguring of later developments in cognitive 
science and science of the emotions. I also employ this concept to explore the Shelley circle’s 
scientific understanding of life (or vitality), as well as the human mind. Since those 
Enlightenment and Romantic ideals of a well-rounded education stressed a continuity of 
knowledge — the problematisation of which reached its peak in the twentieth century — the 
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perceived gap between the sciences and the humanities has been increasingly bridged. 
Reviving earlier debates between Thomas Henry Huxley and Mathew Arnold, 
twentieth-century commentators, including C. P. Snow, Thomas Kuhn, and Aldous Huxley, 
recognised the necessity of interdisciplinarity between those two opposed camps of science 
and the humanities.
3
 A further criss-crossing of boundaries between literature and science 
has also been promoted by recent interdisciplinary endeavours within literary studies.
4
 This 
ethos of interdisciplinarity has been equally practised within studies of British Romanticism. 
Critics, such as Alan Richardson and Denise Gigante, explore science in the context of British 
Romantic studies.
5
 Richardson draws on English Romantic texts and the history of brain 
studies. Distinctive from Richardson’s interests in neuroscience and Romanticism, Gigante 
premises her Romantic readings on life science or biology.  
My argument resonates with neuroscientific approaches — or what has recently been 
termed ‘cognitive historicism’— to Romantic studies in the context of eighteenth-century 
emotional philosophy.
6
 My thesis has explored the Shelley circle’s gravitation towards the 
science of its own day and its anticipation of contemporary cognitive science or neuroscience. 
My term ‘materiality of emotion’ seeks to articulate how the Shelley circle understood and 
sought to redefine materialist philosophy and the human mind and emotion. Contemporary 
cognitive science and the science of emotion are also grounded in a similar concept of the 
‘materiality of emotion’ and their research can be traced back to modern experimental 
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psychology founded by William James.
7
 Despite being indebted to Lockean empiricism and 
eighteenth-century philosophy of emotion (such as aesthetics and physiognomy), James’s 
physiological psychology of emotion sketches out a fundamental discourse for later 
‘cognitive sciences’.8 Cognitive neuroscience encompasses many discourses about the mind, 
the brain, and the emotions. Literary studies of the mind have ample opportunities to 
participate in this conversation. Richardson has examined the relationship between British 
Romantic literature and neuroscience. Adela Pinch, for example, approaches the subject of 
emotion in Romantic literature. Eighteenth-century aesthetics, empiricism, phrenology, 
physiognomy are all incorporated in my own sense of ‘cognitive historicism of emotion’. 
Different from other similar readings, my readings of selected texts by the Shelley circle 
demonstrate the extent to which second-generation Romantics had sympathy with the science 
of the mind that encompassed the non-physical and physical world and the self.  
The Shelley circle exercises both scientific reasoning and scepticism in its major works. 
Queen Mab, Alastor, Manfred, Frankenstein, Don Juan, and Epipsychidion all demonstrate a 
materialist world view that problematises our experience and concept of being. This circle’s 
explorations of human emotions and the worth of existence echo religious values, but this 
group inclines towards an atheistic and materialist worldview. ‘Particles’ in this circle’s 
atomistic understanding are evidenced in twentieth- and twenty-first-century neuroscience. 
PET (positron emission tomography) and fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), 
                                                                                     
 298 
for example, are cutting-edge apparatuses used to detect these ‘particles’ or molecules in 
neurons.
9
 Current neuroscientists locate a variety of neural substances in the brain that affect 
human cognition, personalities, behavioural modes, the quality of life, and even social 
orders.
10
 Byron and the Shelleys, as seen in my interpretations of their selected works in my 
thesis, demonstrate their humanistic concerns which reach beyond traditional scientific 
discourses. The Shelley circle’s philosophy, although grounded in scientific reason, aspires 
beyond rationality to the attainment of ultimate happiness. 
Empiricist or physiological aesthetics, initially discussed in the eighteenth century, is 
exhibited in the Shelley circle’s selected texts. Based on Lockean empiricism, the mind 
receives various emotions and feelings through outer stimulations. Eighteenth-century 
aesthetics, materialism, and physiognomy share a common inheritance in empiricism. This 
empiricist philosophy influences modern psychology
11
 and continues to play an illuminating 
role in cognitive neuroscience. This Enlightenment philosophy helps us to understand the 
subtle connection between the mind and the body and further relates to advanced sciences of 
emotion, including cognitive neuropsychology, beauty medicine (ASPS),
12
 and even robotics 
(Kismet).
13
 In the discussion of physical beauty, facial expression, and emotion, 
eighteenth-century physiognomy is recognised as the precursor of Darwinian emotional 
science and current cognitive science.
14
 For example, Johann Caspar Lavater, 
comprehensively, systematises physiognomy in his Essays on Physiognomy and relates 
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physical appearances to mental activity. Eighteenth-century sentimentalist writers, including 
Laurence Sterne, Henry Mackenzie, Johann Goethe, William Godwin, and Mary 
Wollstonecraft, also substantially describe physiognomy and ‘sensibility’ (or emotion) in their 
works. These literary representations of emotion mirrored philosophical ideas from aesthetics 
and physiognomy about the interconnection between physiology and emotion and later 
influenced the Shelley circle.  
Frankenstein’s ‘sublimely’ ambitious science (galvanism) also testifies to the Shelley 
circle’s interest in ‘pre-cognitive’ science. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein explores the 
relationship between physiology, emotions, and aesthetics (the beautiful and the ugly) and 
eventually anticipates how these ideas persist in our current practices of cosmetic surgery. 
Cosmetic surgery, growing out of reconstructive medicine, connects with the emotions of 
those afflicted with or suffering from some kind of physical deformity. Genetic, evolutionary, 
and environmental factors influence human attitudes towards, and cognition of, the beautiful 
or ugly. The Monster’s hideousness and his hope for beauty and happiness – classified as a 
high state of positive emotion – are by no means fictional, but such desires and feelings were 
also familiar to the fraught personal and political history of those members of the Shelley 
circle. 
Cultural historians of cosmetic surgery, Sander L. Gilman,
15
 for instance, have noted 
the mental trauma upon those patients who are afflicted with deformities. Not as advanced as 
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current medical treatment, so-called ‘vain’ surgery intended to enhance physical beauty had 
been discouraged until better techniques of anaesthesia (in the form of ether) were employed 
by William Thomas Green Morton on 16 October 1846.
16
 Without the assistance of 
anaesthesia — meaning ‘without sensation’— such operations could become brutal and 
torturous acts. Certainly, the personal experiences of patients testify as much. In September 
1811, this sublime quest of science for physical well-being caused horrifying pain and was 
experienced by Fanny Burney, who underwent an operation without anaesthetic: ‘When the 
dreadful steel was plunged into the breast … I [Burney] began a scream that lasted 
unintermittingly during the whole time of the incision ….’17 Byron also experienced similar 
pain while being treated for his foot correction in a ‘wooden contraption’.18 This surgical 
treatment, for Byron, may have promised a ‘normal’ body or beauty, but it ended up 
unsuccessful. In the age of less advanced anaesthesia – as in Byron’s time – the excruciating 
pain was the only hope and means to attain beauty. For this reason, the pursuit of physical 
beauty, especially a finely featured face, in the eighteenth century attracted no patient who 
was willing to endure such pain. Consequently, cosmetics became popular in the 
eighteenth-century society. This means of facial modification without undergoing surgery 
means that the cosmetics business sold ‘hope’ and the customer could learn from ‘beauty 
books’ how to achieve physical beauty.19 Such ‘hope’ undoubtedly engendered positive 
emotions in the consumer of such goods. Physical beauty, though comprised by different 
                                                                                     
 301 
factors and criteria is, ultimately, connected to self-esteem and social resources.
20
 
The eighteenth-century culture of beauty, inevitably, influences Mary Shelley and 
inspires her scientific imagination to examine the subtle relationship between emotions and 
physical beauty.
21
 When she read her mother’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), 
Mary Shelley understood this yen for bodily modifications amongst women in the eighteenth 
century and her mother’s criticism on the misuse of female beauty.22 These complex attitudes 
towards beauty are reflected in Frankenstein’s self-debates about whether the female monster 
should be created beautiful.
23
 In Frankenstein, Mary Shelley explained her own concern 
about the close relationship between physical beauty and happiness.
24
 Despite the fact that 
happiness or an emotion of love does not merely rely on physical beauty, but on more 
complicated conditions (including behaviour, personality, attachment, economy, race, health, 
gender, education, nationality, religion, social status, and sexual orientation), physical beauty 
plays a critical role in each and every one of these aspects. This issue of the interrelations 




Frankenstein’s galvanic experimentation, derived from Aldini’s experiments on the 
human body, testify to the complex mutuality between the sublime and the beautiful of the 
body.
26
 The galvanism of Mary Shelley’s day sought to re-animate matter and predicts the 
sublime aims of cosmetic surgery, which seeks out a new ‘life’ from the ugly to the beautiful, 
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from isolation to attachment. Mary Shelley recognises the importance of such physical beauty 
when she delineates the defective experiment as the origin of the Monster’s miseries and 
further suggests medical ethics. Like Aldini’s understanding of the close relationship between 
electrical physiology and emotion, demonstrated in his galvanic experiment for ‘melancholy 
madness’,27 Mary Shelley’s galvanic practice introduces the reader to two vital elements: life 
and emotion. These two elements are complicated and dominated by what I conceive of in 
this thesis as the ‘materiality of emotion’. 
     As seen in the final canto of Queen Mab, a secular ‘heaven’ in Shelley’s concept 
comprises health, freedom, and love. This concept of health suggests the importance of the 
body as well as the mind. The Shelley circle’s philosophy of emotion is framed in empiricist 
and materialist terms even though this circle’s humanist spirit approximates something close 
to religious or spiritual convictions. Yet, in this circle’s notion, the body and its senses 
dominate all living existence. Despite their denial of orthodox religion and its institutions, the 
Shelley circle draws on science and literature to map out the inner life of emotions, 
inextricably, welded to the outer life of the body by which we experience and judge the worth 
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14
 As regards Charles Darwin’s scientific studies of emotion, see Charles Darwin, The 
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